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CHURCHES IN CONTESTATION 
Asian Christian Social Protest 
Samenvatti ng 
Gedurende anderhalf milleni um na haar constan— 
tijnse legitimatie werd de christelijke kerk in 
het algemeen gezien als een steunpilaar van het 
sociale systeem van de westerse beschaving. 
Ondertussen ging die maatschappij enerzijds de 
wereld beheersen en werd zij anderzijds door 
het marxisme beschuldigd van een inherente 
exploitatie van de velen door de weinigen. 
Naar mate de wereldwijde verstoring van het 
evenwicht aan het daglicht trad begon de 
sociale rol van de kerken te verschuiven van 
het versterken van de sociale status quo naar 
het terug dringen van de ongelijkheid daarvan. 
Het is deze recente verschuiving van het 
gewicht van de kerken op de weegschalen van de 
maatschappij die hier onder de titel: Christe-
lijk sociaal protest, onderzocht wordt. 
Aldus breed opgevat kan het christelijke 
sociale protest op verschillende moderne 
verschijnselen toegepast worden. Van protes-
tantse zijde is er het Sociale Evangelie; van 
katholieke zijde de sociale encyclieken 
daterend uit de eerste eeuw na het Communis-
tisch Manifest; en meer recent is er het 
binnentreden van deze invloeden in de protes-
tantse en katholieke hoofdstromingen dankzij 
het Tweede Vaticaanse Concilie en de Wereldraad 
van Kerken. 
In een van de drie "onderontwi Π elde" conti­
nenten (het enige met een meerderheid van 
christenen: Latijns Ameni a) is het christe-
lijle sociale protest begonnen aan de dag te 
treden als een onmiddellijke bedreiging van de 
bestaande "(ιm>bal ance" van de sociale 
krachten. De wereld kreeg по een nieuw 
schouwspel van "kerken en contestatie" te rien 
— dat wil zeggen van kerken die als kerken de 
gevestigde machten in de naam van de machte-
lonen tegenstreefden. 
In een ander van deze derde wereld continenten 
(het continent waar christenen het meest zwal 
vertegenwoordigd zijn: Azië) zijn er vanzel-f-
spel·end minder telenen van bereidheid van de 
tant van de kerlen geweest om een sociaal teken 
van tegenspraal te zijn. Maar het verschil is 
alleen maar een gradueel verschil. In het 
grootste deel van het gebied en van de 
bevoll ing van Azië — vooral de door de 
communisten geregeerde delen van Noord en Oost 
Azië en de door de moslems geregeerde delen van 
Zuid-West en Zuid Azië — is het christelijle 
sociale protest uitgesloten geweest als een 
practische optie vanwege de extreme minori-
teitssituatie en de corresponderende onzeker-
heid van de christenen. Maar er blijft een 
maritieme halve maan, die zich uitstrekt van 
l orea via de Philippijnen naar herala, en die 
het grootste deel van de christenen van Azië 
omvat. Het is dan ook hier, dat wij het meeste 
van het christelijke sociale protest van Azië 
vinden. 
Deze studie JS een poginq de onderdelen van het 
asiatische geheel samen te brengen en het 
geheel te plaatsen in een groter globaal kader. 
De centrale -focus is noch de globale situatie 
als zodanig noch de individuele nationale 
situaties als zodanig, maar eerder de trans-
nationale asiatische trend, die tussen beiden 
bemiddelend optreedt. Er wordt geprobeerd de 
prestaties van de voornaamste transnationale 
lichamen in Azië en van de transnationale 
asiatische avant-garde te meten lanqs de 
meetlat van dit sociale protest. Er wordt 
gevraagd, binnen de aziatische context, hoe 
reëel, hoe ef-fectief en hoe duurzaam het 
verschijnsel ^ van het christelijke sociale 
protest is. 
Het representatieve aziatische lichaam voor de 
met Rome verbonden christenen is de Federatie 
van de Aziatische Bi schoppencon-f erenti et. Onze 
studie anderzoel·t de rol daarvan zoalE die naar 
voren treedt in de Synodfc van de Bisschoppen 
in Rome, in de verg*, ¡uringen van deze Federatie 
(FABC) en in ht L bureau van de FABC voor mense-
lij,^ ontwikl·elιng. Het representatieve li­
et am voor andere christenen is de Christelijke 
Con-ferentie van Azië. Deze studie onderzoekt 
ook de rol van deze Conferentie zoals die 
verschijnt in de eigen bijeenkomsten, in de 
bijdragen van de Con+erentie (CCA) en de leden 
ervan op het christelijte wereld-niveau en in 
de interactie met de FABC. Onder de titel "de 
transnationale avant-garde" bestuderen wij 
vooral urban en rural mission, de jeugd en de 
studenten-bewegingen en de radicale religeuse 
zin-gevers. 
Door te proberen dit ailes te plaatsen in een 
alomvattend transnationaal perspectie-f wil deze 
studie vragen welke koers het asiatische 
christelijke sociale protest tracht te varen 
tussen nationalisme en transnationalιsme, 
tussen capitalisme en communisme, en tussen de 
gevestigde machten en de schreeuw van het volk. 
De conclusie is, dat het aziatische christe­
lijke sociale protest een beweging is met 
voldoende diepe wortels in de joods-christe­
li jke traditie en оЫ met voldoende overeen­
komst met contemporaine globale trends, zodat 
minstens op \orte termijn een toekomst 
verzekerd is. Tenminste gedurende de rest van 
deze eeuw — dat is onze conclusie — zal dit 
protest niet verzwakt warden door een algemene 
verlichting van de condities, die het protest 
voortbrachten, en er zal ook minder reden zijn 
dan tot nu toe om het protest te laten 
verzwakken door een christelijk minoriteits-
complex in Azië. 
Wat betreft een andere mogelijke a-f remmende 
•factor — een mogelijk terug deinzen van de 
kerken zelf voor de strijd — onze studie 
e^ent dit als "de factor, die het meest 
onderworpen is aan de genade van menselijke 
vrijheid en wispelturigheid, en daarom het 
meest onderhevig aan vlagen en sprongen, en 
fonkelingen en zwenkingen". De geschiedenis 
heeft getoond, dat kerken kunnen leven met een 
behoorlijte mate van discrepantie tussen 
theorie en prat tijk. Het schijnt duidelijk — 
zo willen wij stellen — dat de grenzen van de 
discrepantie in de toetomst aanzienlijk zijn 
versmald door de helderheid, de kracht en de 
overeenstemming waarmee de christelijke sociale 
verantwoordelι j\heid werd bevestigd tijdens de 
laatste twee decennia door representatieve 
christelijte leiders in Rome, Geneve, in 
Latijns Amerika en in Azië. 
Parig Digan SSC 
ABBREVIATIONS 
ACFOD Asian Cultural Forum on Development 
ACPO Asian Committee for People's Organization 
AEC Asia Ecumenical Center (CCA) 
ASC-AMOR Asian Service Center Asian Meeting of Religious Women 
AMRS Association of Major Religious Superiors 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
BAA Bureau of (Jesuit) Asian Affairs 
BIRA Bishops' Institute for Religious Affairs (FABC) 
BISA Bishops' Institute on Social Action 
BMA Bangsa Moro Army 
CBCI Catholic Bishops' Conference of India 
CBCP Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines 
CCA Christian Conference of Asia 
CELAM Consejo Episcopal Latinoamericano 
CNL Christians for National Liberation 
CPP Communist Party of the Philippines 
EATWOT Ecumenical Association of Third World Theologians 
FABC Federation of Asian Bishops' Conferences 
IMCS International Movement of Catholic Students 
MNLF Moro National Liberation Front 
NASSA National Secretariat of Social Action 
NCCI National Christian Council of India 
NDF National Democratic Front 
NPA New People's Army 
OHD Office for Human Development 
PISA Priests' Institute for Social Action 
PPT Permanent Peoples' Tribunal 
SCM Student Christian Movement 
SELA Socio-Economie Life in Asia (Jesuit) 
SODEPAX Society, Development, and Peace (Vatican & WCC) 
URM Urban Rural Mission 
WCC World Council of Churches 
WCRP World Conference on Religion and Peace 
WSCF World Student Christian Federation 
YCW Young Christian Workers 
χ 
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM 
It is our resolve, first of all, to be more truly "the Church of the poor. " 
. . . We will not tie our hands by compromising entanglements with the 
rich and powerful in our respective countries [Message of the First Asian 
Bishops' Conference].1 
The major thrust. . . in the next few years should be in building up 
power for the powerless so that they can remedy the imbalance of power 
and work for a more just and humane society [Report from the Sixth 
Assembly of the CCA].2 
When theology is liberated from its present class, race, and sex preju-
dices, it can place itself at the service of the people and become a power-
ful motivating force for the mobilization of believers in Jesus to partici-
pate in Asia's ongoing struggle for self-identity and human dignity [Final 
Statement of the First Asian Theologians' Conference].3 
The above pronouncements have a number of things in common. They 
were all made in the 1970s—the first in 1970, the second in 1977, the third in 
1979. They were all made by Asian Christians undertaking to speak for 
Asia-wide constituencies of Christians: in the first case, by an assembly of 
Roman Catholic bishops representing some 50 million Asian Catholics; in 
the second case, by an assembly of non-Roman Christian leaders represent-
ing another 35 million Asian and Australasian Christians; in the third case, 
by one of the few Asia-wide Christian groups (a group of theologians) at-
tempting to transcend both national and confessional boundaries. They 
each moved—along quite separate lines—in a direction quite novel at the 
time for Asian Christians of any kind, so novel that it would have been 
impossible to predict ten years earlier that such an orientation would ever be 
proclaimed with any credibility in the name of such widely-ranging constitu-
encies. 
What was happening here could be considered a historical novelty on 
several counts. It was an absolute novelty that church movements of this 
kind anywhere should so boldly profess to switch sides—from that of the 
powerful to that of the powerless in state and society. It was a relative nov-
1 
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elty that church movements of this kind should take so distinctly transna-
tional a form." It was a local novelty that this should have happened in Asia. 
Let us come to grips first with this absolute novelty. It is the highly hy-
pothetical novelty of a "post-Constantinian" church. 
One of the historical legacies of the past century is a widely accepted con-
tention that Christian churches have an ingrained bias toward social conser-
vatism, so that they serve essentially as legitimators and perpetuators of 
currently dominant social forces and groups. The most militant proponents 
of this thesis have been the Marxists; but apart from the Marxists there has 
been a secular humanist tradition that regards the same thesis as historically 
well-founded. 
Does the record bear these critics out? It seems clear that they have an 
arguable case at least in regard to a certain historical phase of Christianity. 
It seems also that they could plausibly argue that this phase has extended 
over most of the history of Christianity and up to the present time. 
Recently it has become common to bracket the phase in question under 
the heading of "the Constantinian era." This is understood as the era since 
the transition in the fourth century A.D.—transition from a time when the 
Church was an outcast or at least an outsider to a time when it was "es-
tablished" as one of the pillars of society. This way of thinking implies that 
ecclesiastical social conservatism may indeed be inseparably linked with a 
situation in which the Church has a stake in the social status quo. But it also 
implies that such a situation is not the only one for the Church to be in, and 
that it may prove to have been quite exceptional when looked back on from 
a point in the more distant future. 
The rise of this new perspective on church history results from a double 
reaction of some Christians to the role in which they have seen the Church 
cast. On the one hand, they concede that the charge of social conservatism 
has validity for much, perhaps even for most, of the record of the Church in 
the world so far. On the other hand, they have undertaken to show not only 
in words but also in deeds that this church bias toward social conservatism 
is not so ingrained as to be impossible to change. A new emphasis in social 
teaching, providing motivation for change, has been articulated during this 
past century by globally representative spokespersons of the main Christian 
traditions. A new and relatively large-scale effort to match deeds to words 
has followed more slowly but has gathered momentum, especially in the 
past decade, and especially in one continent, Latin America. 
In another continent, Asia, things have been different. Yet there is an 
Asian dimension in the history of the attempt to move the Christian 
churches away from being forces for social conservatism and toward be-
coming forces for social change. It is that dimension this study undertakes 
to investigate. 
The field is large inasmuch as Asia holds more than half the human race 
and much of the world's contemporary ferment. At the same time it is small 
inasmuch as the Christian presence in Asia is only a small part (5 percent) of 
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the Asian scene, and only a small part (10 percent) of the Christian presence 
in the world. 
In other words, the subject deserves a degree of attention it runs some 
risk of not getting. Some parts of the story are relatively well documented 
and written about; others have hardly been brought to the attention of a 
wider public than the people directly concerned in them. Not much has been 
done to bring the pieces of the picture together, and still less to fit the Asian 
picture into a larger global one. 
Until recently it has been premature to attempt an appraisal of the situa-
tion. Now, however, enough has happened, especially in one decade, the 
1970s, to make it both useful and desirable to put together the outlines of 
what is already a matter of record, and to provide tentative indications of 
prevailing trends in this area of history as another decade is under way. 
Many major questions underlie this study. 
What ought to be the role of the Church in society, given the historical 
ideals of the Church on the one hand and the realities of society on the 
other? 
Among the ideologically conflicting answers to that question, from the 
conservative evangelical to the political radical, which has more right on its 
side? 
How much distance is there between the ideal and real role of the Church 
in history in general, in the contemporary world in particular, and in Asia 
most particularly? Is the distance too great to be bridged convincingly? Is it 
perhaps the real moral of the story that the Church would do better to re-
pair its strained relations with the powers that be in society and renounce 
any social pretensions altogether? 
Or, on the contrary, is there evidence enough in the teaching of the past 
century and the practice of the past generation to show that social concern is 
bound up inseparably with the self-understanding of the Church, and that 
the Church is capable of mediating concern for social change as effectively 
as it once mediated concern for social stability? 
These questions go far beyond the scope of this inquiry, although any 
findings it may bring together will have some bearing on them. The inten-
tion in this inquiry—to see what historical generalizations are possible on 
the basis of the Asian experience so far—leaves the larger questions open so 
as not to predetermine the shape of any conclusions and not to limit in ad-
vance their usefulness to readers with differing value systems. 
It will not be necessary to ask //there has been any protest among Chris-
tians in Asia against the social, economic, or political status quo. In any 
group of a hundred million people or so, there is bound to be some. Our 
question is more specific: has Christian protest been quantitatively and 
qualitatively significant! 
To be quantitatively significant, this protest would have to involve a pro-
portion of the Christian faithful large enough not to be entirely neutralized 
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by intensified conservatism elsewhere among the flock. To be qualitatively 
significant, it would have to involve a representative selection of the faith-
ful: those involved would need to have a claim to speak not only for them-
selves but in some degree for the Church itself as community and as institu-
tion. 
There can be no hard and fast rule as to what constitutes fulfillment of 
these conditions. A trend must at least have been set that shows signs of 
enduring—a trend not likely soon to be counteracted to the extent that it 
might as well have never happened. 
What we want to find out, then, is whether there was evidence by the 
early 1980s of an enduring trend of Christian protest in Asia against the 
social status quo there. (We shall be taking social in its widest sense to cover 
everything not merely individual. We shall also be taking proies/ in its wid-
est sense to cover every tendency to privilege change over the status quo.) 
We must first know what has been the status quo in Asia, and what about it 
could provide strong provocation for Christian protest. This will require 
some attempt to summarize the general historical background, the Christian 
historical background, and the Asian historical background, of the develop-
ments of the 1970s. 
There are different levels on which changes in Christian attitudes to the 
social status quo can be monitored. 
First, there is the level of individual attitudes among Christians them-
selves. Here there are rich mines of raw data, and some lodes of organized 
data, but little data controlled to measure changes in the same population 
over any period of time. 
Next, there is the level of recorded reflection among Christians, especially 
Christians who undertake to express the Christian conscience as thinkers or 
publicists. The data here are more manageable, but also more controverti-
ble. There is no sure way of knowing how representative such data might 
be. 
Third, there is the level of formal statements of position by individuals or 
groups with definable mandates to speak for different segments of the 
Christian community. Here we have the most easily controllable data, as 
well as the most accessible, in that much of it is already gathered in docu-
mentary collections at both the global and the Asian levels. 
Finally, there is the level of action relevant to change in the social status 
quo. This is the crucial test, whether by Christian or by Marxist criteria. It is 
a test that can be applied with relative clarity in the case of corporate Chris-
tian action, and with more ambiguity in the case of action by Christians 
having no mandate to act for more than themselves. It is in any case a test 
whose findings can be no more than provisional with regard to events that 
are very close in time. Historians writing in the year 2000 will be much wiser 
about these findings, not only because they will know what happened in the 
final decades of the century, but also because they will have a fuller histori-
cal perspective on what happened in the decades before it. 
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No one of these levels of monitoring Christian attitudes will be left en-
tirely out of account in this inquiry. The main focus, however, as indicated 
by our title, "Churches in contestation," will be on the corporate kind of 
statements and actions in the direction of change. 
It will quickly appear that there has been a potentially epoch-making 
change in the kind of statements to which responsible Christian bodies in 
Asia are prepared to commit themselves in relation to the issue of social 
stability versus social change. What will remain to be seen is whether this 
change is actually epoch-making. While there has been significant change in 
the actions as well as the words of the institutional churches, it is not so 
clear whether the distance between the two has been narrowed or increased. 
Temporarily at least, it might be the case that church promises have gotten 
further than ever ahead of church performance. 
There are peculiar difficulties in analyzing the data coming from Asia in 
the past quarter century. 
During that period free inquiry has been the exception rather than the 
rule. The aftermath of World War II left Asia divided into armed camps, 
with information strictly controlled in communist countries from the begin-
ning, and with situations of similar control existing or developing in the 
others. At one time in the mid-1970s (during the Emergency in India), a free 
press ceased to be accessible (even to the elite) among 95 percent of the 
Asian population. 
Even where restrictions were not imposed, or after they were lifted, they 
remained in the background as an inhibiting proximate possibility almost 
everywhere outside Japan. Even publications originating in areas free from 
direct restrictions (as in Hong Kong)—to the extent that they depended on 
circulation in other countries of Asia—have not been completely uninhib-
ited in their reporting. At the same time, publications that profess to speak 
for the grassroots usually exist in conditions that make it hard to judge their 
reliability or even their precise historical context. 
In short, investigators of such burning questions as the real or the ideal 
role of the Church in relation to the Asian status quo must live with a situa-
tion of polarization where words are weapons and the inviolability of truth 
is the first casualty in the war of words. They must live with the fact that 
they can never stand entirely outside the struggle, even if they feel they 
ought to. 
For all that, some understanding surely remains possible. It must be at-
tempted, if only because not to attempt it would be to accept the one thing 
that nobody accepts. For in a war of words the one thing that nobody ac-
cepts is that it makes no difference which side wins. 
Given the ambiguities of history, however, it had better be attempted 
without any illusion that any one side identifiable now is likely to be looked 
back on later as having been either entirely right or entirely wrong, or as 
having been either entirely vindicated or entirely discredited by events. 
1 
THE GLOBAL BACKGROUND 
The General Global Background 
Social protest would have a long history if it included everything that 
could go under that name. Karl Marx set the trend in that respect when he 
wrote in 1848, in the famous words of The Communist Manifesto, "The 
history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles." 
Many others, including many who would balk at that formula and its impli-
cations, would have no difficulty in recognizing the likelihood of a certain 
amount of resentment and resistance whenever and wherever there exists an 
unequal distribution of the good things of this world. 
The trouble is that history has always been written by society's victors, 
not by its victims. Those who had something to protest about had scarcely 
been heard from in history until a more or less coherent movement of 
peasant or proletarian revolution began to give them a voice during the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In a world that professes to believe in 
the uplifting of the oppressed, whether on the basis of Western or Eastern 
ideologies, there can be little doubt that far more oppression has gone on in 
history and prehistory than has ever come to light. The slave wars and 
peasant insurrections that have forced their way into the chronicles of exist-
ing societies can be no more than the tip of an iceberg of discontent.' 
The past two centuries have created a fundamentally new situation in 
terms of bringing the concerns of the "toiling masses" to light. It has been 
during this period that, thanks most immediately to the movement called 
Marxism, it has ceased to be possible for the agendas of the powerful to 
leave little or no place for the working men and women of the world. 
Some of the remoter historical sources of this development lie back much 
farther than two centuries, being derived from the Judaeo-Christian tradi-
tion itself. Yet it took something more than historical Christianity, some-
thing more even than the revolutionary Christianity of the Reformation, to 
6 
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give social concern the salience it has had in all public discourse in the wake 
of the modern social revolutions in England, America, France, Japan, Rus-
sia, Germany, China, and elsewhere.2 We shall have to return to the histori-
cal paradox implied in this. What concerns us for the moment is to spell out 
in some detail what has been involved in the widespread modern calling into 
question of hitherto prevailing notions of social order. 
The prevailing notions of social order that have been called in question 
may for our purpose be reduced to one: the notion that there is something 
sacrosanct about the social status quo by virtue of its mere existence and 
without regard to its inequality or injustice. 
How society came to be divided into "haves" and "have-nots" can be 
explained as a falling away from an original idyllic situation or ideal. As far 
as that idea goes, there is no essential difference between the first of the 
written Hebrew prophets, Amos, and the first of the prophets of Com-
munism, Marx. 
But the division can also be explained (especially when it has existed so 
long that it seems part of the nature of things) as having the sanction of 
whatever power is seen as guiding the affairs of humanity. That explanation 
naturally has commended itself to most of those who in history have had 
control of the explaining—that is, the "haves." The form of the ideological 
justification varies according to the culture; but the essential message gener-
ally corresponds to that embodied in a Victorian nursery rhyme: 
The rich man in his castle, the poor man at his gate— 
God made them high and lowly, and ordered their estate. 
Such an assumption as this could escape close scrutiny in a static, rural, 
preindustrial society, in which ultimate reality itself tended to be seen in 
static terms, whether it was called God or Fate or Dharma or Cosmic Har-
mony. By the same token, once the first Western societies had entered the 
current of modern change, it could no longer be so easy for anyone to get 
away with a pattern of acting that already appeared as a confidence game to 
Rousseau in the eighteenth century. As Rousseau saw it, that pattern con-
sisted of drawing a line around a piece of land; of declaring, "That's 
mine"; and of "finding people simple enough to believe it."3 
To get accustomed to living in a changing world is to cease to be "simple 
enough to believe" that any supposedly fixed past or present is an adequate 
standard to set for the future. The mere fact of change, by showing that the 
way things have been is not necessarily the way things will be, strikes the 
first blow at the assumption that things are necessarily the way they ought 
tobe. 
Since part of the change has consisted in the spread of information be-
yond the control of the people who had most interest in keeping things the 
way they had been, a point was bound to be reached when the dispossessed 
would be led to believe just the opposite of what they had been told before. 
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They would be led to believe that, even in the forcible overthrow of the 
entire existing order, they had nothing to lose and a world to win." 
Not all the have-nots were led all the way in that belief; and not all of 
those who wholly committed themselves to it found their commitment vin-
dicated. As is well known, no question is more fiercely disputed today than 
the question of whether the balance sheet of the first century and a third of 
Marxism is positive or negative. 
What is not in question is that the terms of the debate on social order 
changed during that period along with the changes in society. Today the 
debate is no longer between advocates and opponents of change; it is be-
tween advocates of more change and advocates of less, or between advo-
cates of revolutionary and advocates of evolutionary change. Insofar as the 
change in question is change in the direction of reducing blatant inequali-
ties, the debate is not about the need for change, but only about its proper 
pace. 
In short, we are now in a world in which both the fact of and the need for 
some kind of social change are taken for granted. 
It is a world in which the claims of the people to power are no longer in 
dispute, while the reality of the people's power is more disputed than ever.' 
It is a world more than half of whose population has recently passed from 
colonial domination to national rule, while the economic dependency of 
most of the human race has only been thrown into sharper relief.6 
It is a world whose inequalities are so notorious that new intercontinental 
interest blocs ("Group of Ten," "Group of 77") have been formed on the 
basis of them, while a plan for a New International Economic Order was 
endorsed without objection by the United Nations in 1974.7 
It is a world in which these inequalities have come to be denounced not 
only by the spokespersons of the poor majority and by the world-minded on 
both sides, but even by the spokesperson of the United Nations body most 
representative of the rich minority—the World Bank.' 
It is a world, in fine, in which the fact and the need of change are taken 
for granted, as is the global interdependence of structural relationships and 
of the mechanisms by which these influence each other. 
There is still room, of course, for fundamental differences in the moral 
and ideological assessment of these mechanisms. They can be seen either as 
being still capable of serving the general interest, or as being beyond re-
demption. 
In the eyes of that part of that world which is more acted upon than act-
ing, these mechanisms appear as irredeemably conservative and exploit-
ative. In a Marxist analysis, they appear as ultimately self-destructive. 
On the other hand, for those people who are at the administering rather 
than at the receiving end of these mechanisms, it is easier to accept the more 
reassuring view implicit in World Bank reports: that, while the rich have 
admittedly grown "on the back of the poor," the best hope of the poor still 
lies "at the tail of the rich.'" Even in that view there is a more sophisticated 
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recognition than has hitherto been forthcoming from capitalist quarters: 
that, in this newly interdependent world, new concessions in terms of global 
structural change are now demanded by the interests of both North and 
South.10 
It is in the setting of such a world that we must now see what has been 
happening within the Christian churches on the one hand, and within the 
Asian countries on the other. 
The Global Christian Background 
Is there a case for the division of Christian history into a pre-Constan-
tinian, a Constantinian, and a post-Constantinian phase? Is there a basis 
for the assumption implicit in such a division—the assumption that the 
Constantinian norm is not necessarily the permanent one? 
As an unsympathetic outsider might put it, Can the leopard change its 
spots? As a loyal churchperson might put it, Can the Church, consistently 
with its mission, make distinctions in bestowing its blessing on the powers 
that be? As a sociologist might put it, Is there any exception to the rule by 
which large institutions, such as churches, tend to favor the status quo in 
society precisely in the measure that the institutions are rooted there? 
Humanly speaking, it would be difficult to demonstrate any long-term 
and large-scale exception to this sociological rule. If self-preservation is the 
first law of individuals, it is still more the first law of collectivities and of the 
protective incrustations they develop. Whether we think in terms of the 
Marxist diagnosis of religions as "the opium of the people," or in terms of 
Max Weber's theory about "the routinization of charisma," we are re-
minded that it is the lot of religion to be "human, all too human," and that 
it can never wholly escape this lot as long as religion really enters into hu-
man life. 
In any case, large-scale phenomena require large-scale explanations, in 
which generalization must necessarily range far beyond all the facts that can 
be collected in any one head. If scholars were divided about the balance 
sheet of Christianity in the days of Celsus and Porphyry only a century or 
two after Christ, it need not surprise us that they have continued to be 
divided in the days of Voltaire, Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud. 
No end to the argument is ever really in sight, least of all in regard to the 
question of whether or not there is anything in Christianity that actually 
transcends history. To this day it can happen that the second thoughts of a 
"believer" can proclaim "the misery of Christianity" and launch "a plea 
for a humanity without God," at the very moment the second thoughts of 
an "unbeliever" proclaim that "God is not yet dead."" Given the mere size 
of the phenomenon called Christianity, while it lasts there is always bound 
to be this mixture of the most contradictory reactions to it. There will al-
ways be some who are disillusioned with it, even among those brought up to 
regard it as eternal truth; and there will always be some who are newly fasci-
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nated with it, even among those brought up to regard its pretensions as 
definitively discredited. 
We must limit our question to make it more manageable. An exception to 
the normal patterns of history or sociology is not, after all, the first thing we 
need to look for in order to establish that Christianity, after some sixteen 
centuries during which it was generally a force for social stability rather 
than for social change, may now be showing a capacity to play a different 
social role. It need not be the first thing to be looked for even by those who 
believe in divine providence, and who are satisfied that the purposes of 
providence would be best served today by a post-Constantinian Church, in 
the sense above indicated. For there is no need to suppose that the human 
mechanisms by which such a Church may emerge must be other than hu-
manly intelligible ones. 
In other words, it may not take a social miracle to produce a post-
Constantinian Church. In human terms, it may take no more than a change 
in the extent to which churches perceive that they have a stake in the social 
status quo. 
The "Pre-Constantinian " Period 
For every belief system there was a time when it had no stake in the social 
status quo. Before the existing society was ready to make room for it, and 
before it had created any social space of its own, it had nothing to gain from 
keeping that society the way it was. So it was in northern India at the time of 
the birth of Buddhism, and in Arabia at the time of the birth of Islam. Such 
also was the situation for Christianity in that period we call the pre-
Constantinian era—or at least at its outset. 
For every belief system, being socially an outsider or an insider also 
makes a great difference to the message preached. Sociologically it is not to 
be wondered at if Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam have in certain re-
spects been at their most uncompromising in relation to the societies they 
first faced. It would obviously not have been possible for later forms of 
these religions, as represented, say, by Japanese Buddhism, Renaissance 
Catholicism, and Indonesian Mohammedanism, to have made history in the 
way history was in fact made vis-à-vis the caste society of late Vedic India, 
the imperial power of pagan Rome, and the animism and polytheism of 
seventh-century Arabia. 
There are, however, both positive and negative sides to a religion's being 
a social outsider. 
On the positive side, in relation to existing injustice, oppression, corrup-
tion, and stagnation, the new religion's hands are clean and untied. Insofar 
as it stands apart from society, it is not inhibited in judging it. Like com-
munism in relation to nineteenth-century capitalism, Christianity in relation 
to persecuting emperors could well have felt that it had "nothing to lose but 
its chains." 
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On the negative side, a judgment made from a marginal position in so-
ciety may be quite simplistic, and even quite myopic, concerning the central 
realities of that society. As early as the Book of Revelation in the first cen-
tury, there was a strong perception of conflict between the values of Chris-
tianity and those of Roman imperial absolutism. Yet (to take just one exam-
ple) there was no such strong Christian perception of any need to make 
Paul's radical non-recognition of slave-free distinctions any part of the 
basis for the confrontation of Christianity with the society of that century, 
or indeed of at least seventeen centuries after it.'2 
What this shows is that any standing apart from society on the part of a 
belief system is illusory to the extent that the values involved on both sides 
are not brought out in the open. From the moment they take on a social 
dimension, and even before they consciously seek social acceptance, all 
religions tend to be simply mirrors of the existing society in all respects in 
which they do not consciously take a socially deviant stand. 
In the case of Christianity, when we consult its early spokespersons, we 
must not expect to find ancient answers to modern questions—though we 
may well expect to find ancient answers to perennial questions. We may also 
expect these answers to have more of the kind of single-mindedness that 
goes with relative freedom from social aspirations, social responsibility, or 
vested interest. Thus, for more or less radical denunciations of institutional-
ized poverty, we may turn more confidently to Saint James in New Testa-
ment times, or even to Saint John Chrysostom in patristic times, than to 
Saint Thomas at the height of the Middle Ages or to Saint Antonino at its 
close.13 But we need look neither to the Fathers nor to the Schoolmen for the 
kind of insight into the workings of society that was not available even to 
social insiders until society had evolved toward self-organization and self-
awareness. 
The "Constantinian"Period 
By the time the self-awareness of society had evolved far enough to found 
the social sciences as known today—having absorbed en route the influence 
of Renaissance thinkers like Macchiavelli, Reformation leaders like Calvin, 
and heirs of the Enlightenment like Adam Smith—Christianity had been a 
social insider in the West for a millennium and a half. For better or worse, 
the world is still in the shadow of that long interpénétration of the social 
and the ecclesiastical systems of Western civilization. 
Legend has it that Julian the Apostate brought to a close the last stand of 
imperial paganism in the fourth century with the words, "Thou has con-
quered, Galilean!" A certain kind of hindsight in a new pagan of the nine-
teenth century (Swinburne) gave these prophetic words a further twist: 
Thou hast conquered, О pale Galilean, 
And the world has grown grey with thy breath! 
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But the truth was still more complex than that. In terms of what Christ 
was taken as standing for during the Constantinian period, there had indeed 
been a kind of conquest, but at its heart there was also a defeat. The Church 
that had moved from the margin to the center of society was in a better 
position both to understand and to manipulate the workings of society—but 
only at the price of ceasing to be free to concern itself exclusively with the 
priorities of Christ. With every century that passed after that first church-
state entente, the world the Church saw itself called to be "in but not of" 
(John 17) was more and more a world of its own making, a world in which it 
had too great a stake to part from without pain. The very success that had 
given the Church the knowledge and power of an insider had muted its 
voice. 
In this process of increasing implication of the Church in the prevailing 
social system, only a couple of significant stages can be noted here. It is 
notable that as long as the social system was feudal rather than capitalist, 
and as long as the Church's leaders were more involved in land than in 
trade, the Church retained its power to criticize the abuses of usury longer 
than it retained its power to criticize serfdom. 
In neither of these areas of society was the "Christian" ideal ever given 
up. Strictly as an ideal, it was still as "communist" in the Decretum Gra-
tiani of the twelfth century as it had been in the original fervor of Pentecost 
in the first century. Yet in that same Decretum the system of serfdom ap-
pears as having the force of canon law. This reflects a society in which the 
Church had long been a leading landlord—and a landlord that was in due 
course shown to be just as much hated as all the others.14 
Thus far had the Church accommodated itself to the rural world it had 
lived in during the first millennium. It was only when the Church was 
halfway through its second millennium that a break began to be made with 
the solid stand of the moralists against that sin of the cities, usury; and it is 
not surprising that the break is associated with the theologian-archbishop of 
"the business capital of fifteenth-century Europe," Florence." More prop-
erly, it was only with John Calvin, the sixteenth-century reformer, that the 
traditional Christian curse on capitalism began to be lifted and gradually 
turned into a blessing. 
The question of the cause-effect relationship between the Protestant ethic 
and the spirit of capitalism has been a subject of controversy ever since Max 
Weber first wrote of it. But it is not in doubt that the Puritan strand in Prot-
estantism did play a leading role in disarming the misgivings of Christen-
dom over the new capitalist ferment in its midst. 
Puritanism put a new complexion on the gospel paradox about the 
shrewd use of the mammon of iniquity. It found in its stern faith a religious 
sanction for a sense of this-worldly calling, at a time when religious sanction 
still carried much weight in the world of affairs. Eventually, the world of 
affairs went its own way, and what was left of the Puritan sense of calling 
became better known as rugged individualism and ruthless acquisitiveness. 
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By the nineteenth century, the Church that had made its peace with 
feudalism had also made its peace with capitalism. The record is there to 
show how Christendom put up its own fight for centuries against what 
Marx was to call "the cash nexus." It is also there to show how hostility was 
turned into ambivalence and ambivalence into acquiescence under pressures 
from within and from without. When Marx's indictment of capitalism 
came, it caught Christians of all kinds on the anti-Marxist side of the argu-
ment about his labor theory of value, almost as if they had never had a la-
bor theory of value of their own.16 
The Period of Confrontation with Marxism 
It is in terms of this historical background that one must judge how revo-
lutionary or reactionary the Marxist protest really was. Was Marx actually 
as radically in rupture with the Judaeo-Christian tradition as he and his 
atheist followers have asked to have believed? The question will probably 
long continue to be a subject of Christian-socialist-capitalist polemics. 
On the one hand, it is understandable that Christians should be more 
conscious of the element of rupture: after all, Marx attacked their theism at 
a time when they saw no similar threat to that theism in their concessions to 
the capitalist spirit. On the other hand, it is understandable that later Chris-
tians eventually found cause for new misgivings about Christian conces-
sions to capitalism, and for second thoughts also about Christian objections 
to Marxism. It is even to be expected that there should be some wide swings 
in the pendulum of Christian opinion in the search for a new balance. So it 
has proved, in proportion as Christians have engaged in the novel exercise 
of actually reading the Marxist critique of capitalism, and of rereading their 
own tradition with the hindsight of the late twentieth century.17 
Today, any Christian consensus about Marxism is still in the future. It is 
beyond our scope here to anticipate what form such a consensus might take. 
We may only note, with Weber," that historical reality will always be more 
complex than the abstractions captured in our dichotomies between mate-
rial and spiritual factors and between causes and effects. One thing is clear 
in any case. The vehemence of the Christian-Marxist polemic has delayed 
for at least a century, for Christians and Marxists alike, the possibility of 
giving undivided attention to those goals that are genuinely common to 
both. If there are such goals, they were lost to view during most of that 
time. 
During Marxism's first century, all statements by church leaders have had 
to take account of its unfolding history. In particular, they have had to take 
account of the developing confrontation between the capitalist and the 
socialist blocs in the wake of the Russian and the Chinese revolutions and 
the division of Europe after World War II. Faced with a choice between the 
two sides, Christian leaders overwhelmingly leaned toward the former, 
rejecting Marxist sociology along with Marxist atheism and Leninist-
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Stalinist regimentation, and often implicitly accepting the Marxist premise 
that the defense of the Christian heritage was bound up with the defense of 
the bourgeois model of society attacked by Marx. To this extent the first 
effect of Marxism on the churches, Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox, 
was to reinforce enormously their post-Reformation accommodation to the 
political, social, and economic values associated with that form of the mod-
ern world that seemed least hostile to what the churches stood for. 
However, as the confrontation developed into a deadlock, and as the 
world's leaders began to search for ways to break out of it. Christians began 
to look further, both into the future and into the past. Geographically, the 
impetus came from all three of the groups into which the world was divided 
by the middle of the twentieth century. 
As Marxism-Leninism came to claim the allegiance of about one-third of 
the world, and as this Second World proved that it was a factor to reckon 
with for the foreseeable future, pragmatism modified the attitudes of 
church leaders toward it, beginning with those who lived under it, and com-
municating itself to the others, especially after the Orthodox churches en-
tered the World Council in 1961, and after the Second Vatican Council 
opened in 1962. This fait accompli was dramatized in 1978, when a Chris-
tian who had lived under Leninism was shown on the state television of his 
native Poland as he assumed the position of the first non-Italian pope in 455 
years. 
The Third World began to emerge on the basis of refusal of alignment 
with imperialism. In that world, imperialism was perceived more as some-
thing already suffered from the First World than as something to be feared 
from the Second. That perception began to be communicated from the 
Christians of the Third World—newly conscious as they were of constitut-
ing the Christian majority of the future—to the declining though still domi-
nant Christians of the First. A turning point in this development was 
reached and shown in the stand taken at the Conference of Medellin in 1968 
by the ecclesiastical leaders of Latin America, that continent where Chris-
tianity had most adherents and where imperialism most distinctly retained a 
First World face. Medellin stopped well short of endorsing the world's 
dominant socialist system, but it set a trend in official Christian repudiation 
of the world's dominant capitalist system." 
As the First World came to terms with the fact that it lacked the power to 
eliminate the Second or to absorb the Third, First World church leaders 
sought to envisage a Church that would not act as if its whole future de-
pended on First World dominance. There was a reciprocal influence in this 
direction between politics and religion. It was in the year, and indeed in the 
very month, of the opening of Vatican II—October 1962—that the two 
superpowers drew back from the nuclear brink in the Cuba crisis. Through-
out the next seventeen years there was no return to the worst tensions of the 
Cold War, either in the political decision-making circles of Washington or 
Moscow, or in the ecclesiastical decision-making circles of Geneva or 
Rome. 
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A "Post-Constantinian " Period? 
These events of 1962, of 1968, of 1978, would have been unthinkable less 
than a century before they happened. Before they could happen, the world 
and the Church, and Marxism too, had to take on new shapes. Once these 
events had happened, it was no longer enough to look to the patterns of the 
past in order to determine what was predictable for the future. 
It would be obvious to all that the Church had lost its pre-Constantinian 
innocence and could never recover it. It would seem obvious to many that it 
had also lost its Constantinian mandate, if indeed it had ever had any legiti-
mate one. If the Church had any future, other than as part of a rearguard 
action by the world's haves before the advance of the world's have-nots, it 
would have to be in some sense a post-Constantinian future. At least in 
terms of the global situation (the three-world division), whether judged in 
the light of the professed priorities of Christianity (for example, taking the 
side of the poor rather than of the rich), or weighed in the scales of a new 
kind of realpolitik (for example, taking the side of tomorrow's masters 
rather than today's), the first condition for far-reaching change in the 
churches' relations with society was already realized. The Church no longer 
had a long-term stake in maintaining what had been the global status quo of 
the third quarter of the twentieth century. 
Notice to this effect was being served throughout the latter half of that 
quarter century. It was served in the most general way through the trau-
matic change of consciousness brought about in the Catholic Church in the 
world by Vatican II. This change of consciousness carried forward the so-
cial concern of the popes (itself an early response to the Marxist challenge), 
and put that concern on the agenda of the whole Church. A new chapter in 
the relations of the Church with the world was opened in the first words of 
one of the major documents of that council: 
The joys and the hopes, the griefs and the anxieties of the men of this 
age, especially those who are poor or in any way afflicted, these too are 
the joys and the hopes, the griefs and the anxieties of the followers of 
Christ.20 
This was still a statement of what should be rather than of what was; but at 
least it represented a new declaration of Christian intent—an intent that was 
represented also in the trend of thinking and speaking of the World Council 
of Churches in that decade and after. 
The change could have remained at the level of lofty generalities; but 
something more than lofty generalities did follow, and not only in the posi-
tions taken by one denomination or in one continent. In the years after 
Vatican II and after Medellin, there was a newly reciprocal influence be-
tween the new kind of social thinking in Rome and Geneva and the new 
social thinking among Catholics and Protestants in Latin America. For the 
first time in modern Roman Catholic experience, a strong impetus from the 
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periphery began to set the pace for the center in terms of theological reflec-
tion as well as of action. A measure of the extent to which globally repre-
sentative leaders were now prepared to recognize a transformed sense of 
Christian social responsibility can be found in the Declaration of the 1971 
Synod of Bishops on "Justice in the World": 
Action on behalf of justice and participation in the transformation of the 
world fully appear to us as a constitutive dimension of the preaching of 
the Gospel, or, in other words, of the mission of the Church for the re-
demption of the human race and its liberation from every oppressive 
situation.21 
That manifesto could still be considered only a matter of words, words 
that still had to meet the Christian and the Marxist test of practice. For 
much of the world, when it came to a question of effective social concern, a 
century's experience had made it seem that Marxists meant business in a 
way that Christians did not. True, a tradition of Christian socialism was old 
enough to be scorned in the Communist Manifesto as being merely "the 
holy water with which the priest consecrates the heart-burnings of the aris-
tocrat." It lived on beyond the time when aristocratic motivation would 
have sufficed for it, but it could continue to be treated dismissively until 
quite late in the twentieth century. 
For social concern as voiced by the churches to be taken seriously as a 
threat to the capitalist system, the alarm had to be sounded from within the 
system itself. Such an alarm was sounded in 1969, the year after Medellin, 
in the Rockefeller Report on the Americas. a Ten years later, by the time of 
Medellin's successor conference at Puebla, it was commonplace among 
bishops of both left and right in Latin America to say what sounded so 
radical when Tawney first said it in 1922: 
Compromise is as impossible between the Church of Christ and the 
idolatry of wealth, which is the practical religion of capitalist societies, as 
it was between the Church and the State idolatry of the Roman Empire.23 
In sum: in terms of church thinking on social matters, there was a notice-
able shift in the 1960s and the 1970s in positions taken in the name of the 
Christian churches around the world. The pace was set in those continents 
where the need for social change was most evident; that is, the "underdevel-
oped" continents, and in particular the one "underdeveloped" continent 
(Latin America) that was also a Christian continent. 
In a world system in which support for social stability had been for some 
time synonymous with support for capitalism, the spokespersons of world 
Christianity had begun to reconsider their options. 
2 
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The General Asian Background 
Roughly a quarter of the surface of the globe is land, and roughly a third 
of that land surface constitutes the continent of Asia. But when we single 
out Asia for special attention, we are singling out something more than a 
twelfth of the world, more than the largest of the continents. If numbers of 
people matter, in Asia we have to do with the majority of humankind. Even 
if numbers were regarded as not all that important, it is still true that in Asia 
we have to do with a continental area which, more than any other single 
area in the closing decades of the twentieth century, makes a plausible cen-
ter of gravity for the world's affairs. 
It is not new for Asia to deserve to be central to the attention of world-
minded people. It is merely new for it to be given its deserts in the estima-
tion of those who have done most of the writing of world history. For a 
relatively short and recent period in that history, this writing concentrated 
on the European spur of the Eurasian landmass, or on the main overseas 
area of transplantation from that spur in North America. Today that period 
can be seen as an interlude of Western dominance, lasting only a century or 
two, between a much longer period before it and a new period that is now in 
the process of taking its place. 
At least fifty centuries passed after the rise of civilization in the valleys of 
the Nile, the Euphrates, the Indus, and the Yellow River, before European 
dominance became a global reality with the spread of industrialization from 
Britain. For as far back in that period as information goes, Asia has had a 
certain preponderance both in numbers of people and in elements of civili-
zation. On the eve of European expansion in the sixteenth century, and even 
on the eve of the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth, there was little 
indication of how the West would dominate the East in the nineteenth and 
the early twentieth centuries. This domination was like a tide that had arisen 
and had already begun to ebb within a tenth of the time in which history has 
been in the making.' 
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It need not seem strange, therefore, that around A.D. 1980 the Asian 
homelands of some 2.7 billion people could once again look like a natural 
focus for most of the action affecting the 4.4 billion people in the world. We 
are not free to forget the rest of the world when we focus on Asia, for the 
eras when human communities could develop in isolation have been at an 
end since travel, trade, industry, communications, and armaments have 
brought all parts of the globe within reach of one another. But Asia is 
too vast a subject to be introduced in more than the roughest outline in the 
space here available. We must content ourselves here with the minimum 
summary information that will serve to put Asia in context among the conti-
nents, and Asian Christianity in context among the Asian religions, and 
both in some fashion in context within the general global and the general 
Christian situation in regard to social protest and social change. 
Asia among the Continents 
Among the continents, only Africa and North America are more than 
half the size of Asia: these two have enough physical unity to justify their 
being regarded as continental geographical units. But in terms of what 
passes for a continent in the case of Australia, Europe, or South America, it 
would make more sense to distinguish five or six continental regions in the 
case of Asia. 
Geography and history have linked most of the northern half of Asia with 
Russia and its contemporary geopolitical frame of reference, the Soviet 
Union. Similarly, West Asia is linked with the Arab world of oil and of 
Islam. East Asia, for its part, has remained the homeland of the Chinese 
culture: linguistic and other links still underlie the differences between 
China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. South Asia, geographically marked off 
by mountain ranges, is more heterogeneous in its historical heritage, but is 
also not without a common fund of cultural and political experience. In-
deed, it was held within the framework of a single raj as recently as a 
generation ago. The region called Southeast Asia is defined by exclusion: it 
consists of those mainland and island areas left over when the Chinese and 
the Indian culture areas proper have been marked off. That is not to say 
that it lacks distinctive features of its own, apart from reflecting a varying 
mix of influences from both China and India. 
Such is the broad pattern. The details can be and are debated. There are 
borderline areas where classification can only be somewhat arbitrary— 
Afghanistan, for example, between South and Southwest Asia, and Burma 
between South and Southeast Asia. There are other points of debate with 
more important implications. Thus, some would count a sixth subcontinen-
tal region within the East Asian realm: "High Asia," including the western 
half of China in Tibet, Sinkiang, and Tsinghai, and also including Mongo-
lia. 
Some would even put High Asia first on the list of Asia's natural realms, 
as the one that is not only the most central and the most distinctive (there is 
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nothing quite like it anywhere in the world), but also the most decisive in-
fluence informing the character of all the other regions. For High Asia, 
together with the mountain chains of Southwest Asia, physically separates 
Asia's northern lowlands from the plains and plateaus of the three great 
peninsulas on its southern side, thus determining the extremes of cold and 
heat, and of dry and wet winds, among the many other climatic variations 
of the supercontinent as a whole. 
Physical features have determined Asia's climate. Both physical features 
and climate have determined the distribution of its population, giving the 
human map of Asia a shape notably different from the physical one. The 
human map of Asia is largely a map of alluvial valleys and plains, covering 
only fragments of its territory in the east and the south. The heaviest con-
centrations of population are found in plains of this kind in eastern China 
and northern India; the only comparably heavy concentrations are found 
on some of the islands, notably in Japan and Indonesia. In contrast, more 
than half the area of Asia, mainly in the north and on the plateaus of the 
center and west, has a population density of less than two persons per 
square kilometer. 
Physical and human geography and history, in their turn, have left their 
marks on Asia's political shape. In 1980 three-fifths of Asia's 2.7 billion 
people were accounted for by two giant nations—China, with a population 
close to one billion, and India, with close to 700 million. Two-thirds of 
Asia's total population are accounted for if we add the two next largest 
national populations—the 155 million of Indonesia and the 118 million of 
Japan. 
When we take economic production into account, it becomes clear why 
no list of nation-giants in Asia could omit Japan. In the mid-1970s Japan 
became the third nation in history (after the United States and the Soviet 
Union) to reach an annual gross national product (GNP) of US $500 billion. 
This was more than the combined production of China, India, and Indone-
sia. On a GNP chart of Asia, all countries except Japan, China, and India 
would fall far short of an annual rate of $100 billion—a rate reached during 
the 1970s by Australia while its population was still under 15 million. On a 
GNP per capita chart, all Asian countries except Japan, Saudi Arabia, and 
certain micro-states would fall far short of the rate of $4,000 per capita 
surpassed in the same decade by Australia and New Zealand. 
Thus, even the most cursory survey of Asia brings us quickly to one truly 
characteristic feature: its poverty. The continent that gave the world its 
cradle of civilization is today linked by its overall poverty with the under-
developed continents, Africa and Latin America, not with the rich conti-
nents of the West. 
The main departures from the pattern of poverty in Asia have hitherto 
been no more than marginal in terms of the vast populations involved. Ja-
pan remains the largest single departure, but the population it has lifted up 
to the level of the West still represents less than 5 percent of Asia's total. 
Soviet development has raised average income for about half as many more 
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people in Asia to a point about halfway between that of the Third World 
and that of the West. Oil has brought sudden relative prosperity to certain 
states in Southwest Asia embracing some further tens of millions of people. 
But even if this last form of prosperity were assured of being both broadly 
diffused and long-lasting (and it is not assured of either), the sum of the 
national or regional populations escaping overall poverty would still be less 
than a tenth of Asia's total. Asia is not only one of the poor continents: 
with 63 percent of the world's population, it supports, or rather it fails to 
support, more than 75 percent of the world's poor. 
The case of Asia confronts us with the question of why world develop-
ment should be so lopsided. 
One part of the answer evidently lies in certain natural handicaps existing 
in advance of any attempt to take cognizance of the question. Obviously a 
certain lopsidedness must result from the fact that there has never been any 
overall planning of the diffusion of world population and of human com-
munities. Presumably the world will long have to live with an arrangement 
in which over 60 percent of its people are confined to little more than 30 
percent of its land area and to considerably less than 30 percent of its at 
present usable land. 
Migration offers the hope of only gradual change in this regard, even if 
the whole apparatus of separate national sovereignties did not now exist to 
block it. Discovery of new resources, of new uses for wasteland, of new 
technologies, is a much less predictable factor, as is shown in the history of 
such discoveries so far. The demonstrated possibilities of increasing the 
productivity of resources already being exploited, such as farming and fish-
ing, make the land-to-people ratio a much less limiting factor for the Asia 
of the 1980s than would appear at first sight. 
There are limits to growth; but among the points clarified in the con-
troversy surrounding the question of growth, there is the point that a conti-
nent like Asia, even with half the world's population, contributes less to the 
problems of growth than a country like the United States, with less than a 
tenth of Asia's population but consuming resources at more than ten times 
the overall Asian per capita rate. In a world in which figures show 200 mil-
lion Americans consuming about four times as much of certain basic re-
sources as 2 billion Asians, it is clearly not enough to study the problems of 
growth in terms of global statistical aggregates without regional break-
downs.2 Some would even say it has proved illusory to aim at any such 
global perspective without regional bias. In that case the least distorting 
regional bias on humankind's predicament will presumably be that of the 
region where most of humankind is found. 
It is not really a matter for surprise if a balance is not to be easily found 
between global and regional considerations in the study of the problems of 
growth. What is important is the growing awareness that neither the whole 
nor any part can any longer be studied in isolation. Nobody would deny this 
point now, least of all those who provoked the controversy that clarified 
it—the authors of the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of 
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Mankind. Something of the developing focus of the discussion is reflected 
even in the titles in that series: The Limits to Growth; Mankind at the Turn-
ing Point; Reshaping the International Order; Beyond the Age of Waste; 
Goals for Mankind. 
What is the relevance of this point for us? We have already noted that 
part of the problem of the lopsidedness of world development, shown at its 
extreme in the case of Asia, can be attributed to natural handicaps existing 
in advance of any attempt to take cognizance of the question. What we 
must now note is that this is only part of that problem. The other part is the 
fact that Asians, handicapped by having less to live on to begin with, cannot 
even enjoy full control of what they have. 
This handicap is not at all due to the blindness of human diffusion, and it 
is only residually due to the naked force of old style colonialism. Instead, it 
is due to the internal logic of the world market, whose only blindness is with 
regard to the boundaries between continents and countries and to the hu-
man consequences of its genius for making all the world's wealth flow more 
and more into a single pool. Because of this factor, there can be no serious 
study of the crisis of change in Asia that is not set in the context of the late 
twentieth-century global crisis of change. 
Asia in the Global Crisis of Change 
It needs little reflection to see the explosive implications of a continental 
situation in which more than three-quarters of the world's poor, represent-
ing more than half the world's people, and concentrated on less than a quar-
ter of the world's usable land, are systematically deprived of control of 
much of the little they have.' Yet the situation had to exist for some centu-
ries, and to have been notorious for some decades, before the necessary 
reflection was forthcoming. 
Two centuries of social upheaval, carried on a wave of economic growth 
and greed, lie between those milestones of reflection marked by Adam 
Smith and Gunnar Myrdal. Smith looked at late eighteenth-century Europe 
and set a trend in economic thinking about the wealth of nations; Myrdal 
looked at late twentieth-century Asia and set a new trend in economic think-
ing about their poverty.4 
There is food for thought in this shift of attention from Europe to Asia, 
from wealth to poverty, from development to underdevelopment and to 
what is more recently labelled "the development of underdevelopment." 
What is coming to light is that there exists an insufficiently scrutinized rela-
tionship between the wealth of some nations and the poverty of others. It 
has been a sort of relationship for which scrutiny could only spell trouble. 
The trouble eventually had to come. We have noted earlier that the 
changes in human society have changed the terms of the debate on social 
order, putting the need for some kind of change beyond debate while sharp-
ening differences of opinion as to what kind of change it ought to be. We 
have found, in this newly interdependent world, a recognition even in the 
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rich North that there is a limit to the extent that it can continue to grow 
richer on the back of the poor South. 
It is one thing to have broad agreement on the facts of inequality, on the 
interdependence of world wealth and world poverty, on the need for a more 
sustainable relationship between North and South than the widening gap 
between the rate at which the rich grow richer and the rate at which the poor 
grow less poor. It is another thing to get agreement that the existing world 
system can only continue to make things worse. Even where there is formal 
consensus that things must be made better, it remains the prevailing thesis 
of the rich world that the rich must go on growing richer precisely in order 
that the poor may grow less poor.' 
Others have thought otherwise; and it has been Asia's fate to provide the 
world's largest testing ground for the rival theses. Seven decades after the 
Communist Manifesto, the revolution it proclaimed had captured its first 
country, Russia; and thus at one stroke its ideology became the official one 
for more than a third of Asia's territory. Three decades after the Russian 
Revolution, the Chinese Revolution had put almost all the rest of continen-
tal East Asia under the same banner. Three decades later again, the red flag 
flew over three of the nine countries of Southeast Asia, making the total of 
Asians placed on the socialist road to development come close to half of 
Asia's population, and to more than a quarter of the world's. 
In no other age had any continent known an upheaval on such a scale. In 
little more than an Asian lifetime, a number of people comparable to the 
whole of humankind a couple of lifetimes earlier had been recruited or im-
pressed into a movement aimed at nothing less than the total overthrow of 
the existing order of relations between nations and within them. If anything 
could banish complacency from the theories of history rooted in the origins 
of the Industrial Revolution, it should be the spectacle of those masses of 
humanity in twentieth-century Asia erupting out of misery in the midst of 
all the horrors that accompanied that process. 
Asia's message to the world, conveyed through that upheaval, was that 
there were other voices hitherto unheard in the debate on the world's future, 
and that now these voices would not wait to be assigned a time to speak. 
They would command attention by making it impossible for any present 
agenda to proceed without them. Sooner or later the Asian contribution 
would have to be considered on its own merits. 
It was not to be expected that one lifetime would suffice before this mes-
sage was fully accepted. In fact, the first effect of the Asian upheaval was to 
turn the continent into two armed camps—or, rather, to break up and im-
mediately realign the two armed camps of World War II. 
In World War II, an imperial coalition led by Germany in Europe and 
Japan in Asia was crushed by an antifascist alliance that had seen the forces 
of the Soviet Union and of Communists and Nationalists in China fighting 
on the same side as the democracies of the West and their dependencies in 
Asia. Though World War II dwarfed all wars before it in its scale and cost 
to both victors and vanquished, it was as if it had only cleared the way for 
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confrontation on a still larger scale. The first real global war was no sooner 
ended than the first global "cold war" began. The elimination of the vic-
tors' common enemy, the Axis, came to seem only a temporary diversion 
from the real trial of strength between the global forces of capitalism and 
communism. 
In the Cold War, Asia was only one of the areas of confrontation. While 
the fate of Europe hung in the balance, the fate of Asia was of secondary 
concern to the superpowers. At one period in the 1950s, the confrontation 
united Russia, Mongolia, continental China, North Korea, and North Viet-
nam on one side, while all the rest of East, South and Southeast Asia was 
claimed in the name of an equally solid front representing the "Free 
World" on the other. The most prominent Asian leader of the period, Mao 
Tse-tung, said the only thing about the situation that seemed true to all 
concerned at that time: that there was no third way between what he called 
revolution and what he called counterrevolution; that political loyalty was 
entirely a matter of leaning to one side out of two. 
But that did not long remain a very complete description of the Asian 
situation. In the 1950s the appearance of Free World unity dissolved with 
the rise of the movement of nonalignment (led in Asia by Prime Minister 
Nehru of India), while the communist bloc also came apart in Asia along 
the line of the China-Soviet dispute. Asia was a multipolar continent by the 
time of the new communist conquests in Indochina in 1975. Mao's own 
country, after Mao, seemed to be taking sides anew with its former enemies, 
the United States and Japan, and against its former allies, the Soviet Union 
and Vietnam. All this could not but blur the original postwar line of con-
frontation, complicating the options even for those who still thought in 
terms of revolution versus counterrevolution. 
What did remain true was that the great question in Asia was still the 
question of change—not whether there had to be more change, but how 
much more and how soon and according to what model. The originally 
imported capitalist and socialist models still loomed large on the Asian 
scene, but there was a new proliferation of Asian variants. 
On the capitalist or free enterprise side, the world market economy con-
tinued to sink its roots and extend its reach even within the socialist coun-
tries, seeding such economic growth as was compatible with its essential law 
of profitability: that is, capital-intensive, export-oriented growth, tending 
to the creation of economic enclaves. 
Within Asia, Japan remained the first Asian economic success story: a 
story of mass prosperity free from gross subjection to foreign control or 
domestic coercion, but a story that was raising new questions of viability 
and justifiability even as it answered others. 
Taiwan, South Korea, and the countries of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) were moving at variously accelerated speeds into 
the same world market, at corresponding prices to their populations in 
terms of economic dependence, political repression, and enforced deferring 
of the full sharing of prosperity. 
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This pattern was still further accentuated in the oil-rich nations of West 
Asia, which in the 1970s left the rest of the world far behind in rates of in-
come growth. At the same time they left the mass of their populations far 
behind in income distribution. 
On the socialist or centrally planned side, North and Central Asia had a 
less unbalanced share in the development achievement that made the Soviet 
Union the world's second richest nation—though national statistics did 
mask a certain pattern of regional imbalance unfavorable to the Asian quar-
ter of the population. 
China, for its part, had been the great Asian laboratory of a distinctively 
Asian socialism; and the shock waves were all the greater for that, through-
out Asia and the world, when much that had been most distinctive about its 
development approach began to be reversed or called in question after the 
death of Mao in 1976. 
A third major socialist variant was Vietnam. A land with a generation of 
war behind it, it was still embattled up to the early 1980s, still affirming its 
separate strength as a communist power in Asia. But the crowning drama in 
its dramatic history since World War II was the change in the identity of the 
enemies it was confronting by 1978: after its "imperialist oppressors," 
France and the United States (eliminated respectively in 1954 and 1975), it 
had taken on its fellow communist neighbors, China and Kampuchea. 
Such was the flux of alignments in Asia after the communist victories in 
Indochina and after the passing of Mao Tse-tung. It is misleading even to 
speak of the "capitalist" side and the "socialist" side, unless it is noted that 
not every country in Asia would accept a single label. 
Besides those that are categorical in professing some form of socialism— 
the Soviet Union, Mongolia, China, North Korea, Vietnam, Kampuchea, 
Burma—there are several that have borrowed the language of socialism to a 
greater or lesser degree. The term has appeared at one time or another in 
national constitutions, as in those of Iraq, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. 
Among the first countries professing to favor a "mixed" economy, and 
by far the most notable case (if only because of its size), is the Republic of 
India. India has been seen by some as the one great test case, on a scale 
comparable to China's, of whether there is a way out of the poverty trap 
that might leave more room for individual freedom and a private economic 
sector than the "democratic centralism" of the communist countries. After 
five five-year plans India was still an uncertain contender, not least because 
no other contender had proved decisively less uncertain.6 
The Asian Christian Background 
Christianity among Asian Religions 
The continent that has given the world most of its people has also given it 
most of its traditional cultural heritage, insofar as this is embodied in the 
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great world religions. If we confine ourselves to those religions and quasi-
religions whose followers are numbered today in hundreds of millions, it is 
well known that all of them are Asian in origin. Indeed, of the five cases 
conventionally cited—Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Christianity, 
and Islam—only the last two have any major part of their following outside 
of Asia. 
Herein lies the crux of the problem of the relationship of Christianity to 
Asia. The other main traditions have less difficulty in establishing their 
Asian credentials. 
The problem is least in the case of Hinduism and Confucianism, each 
being identified not only with one continent but also with one ethnic ensem-
ble, and almost with one country, India or China. Buddhism has had a 
wider diffusion both inside and outside Asia, while remaining over-
whelmingly an Asian phenomenon. Islam, from its birth in seventh-century 
Arabia, always remained an Asian religion even as it became a non-Asian 
one; its followers today are mainly concentrated in a belt crossing northern 
Africa and southern Asia from Morocco through Indonesia. By comparison 
with all these, Christianity can make a much more plausible claim to world-
wide diffusion throughout every continent except, precisely, the largest one. 
If we give credence to Christianity's claim to continuity with the Old 
Testament tradition, that makes its Asian roots no less deep and ancient 
than those of any other religion. But the point is hardly significant, since 
"Asia" is an abstraction, its boundaries being ultimately a matter of arbi-
trary convention. The area called West Asia or the Near or Middle East, 
which gave the world Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, can just as well be 
considered (and commonly is considered) a cultural watershed between East 
and West, or a natural region in its own right between the regions of further 
Asia, Africa, and Europe, as it can be considered part of a geographical 
unit called Asia. What matters is that Christianity, unlike Islam, did not 
spread eastward during its first two millennia on the same scale in which it 
spread westward. 
There was indeed an early eastward expansion of Christianity before and 
even after the rise of Islam; there was even a period when the future might 
have gone in that direction rather than in the opposite one. Around the 
middle of the first millennium, Christianity was finding its earliest impor-
tant footholds outside the Roman Empire—in a Roman form in the west in 
Ireland and in a Coptic form in the south in Ethiopia. It was at the same 
time moving out in a Nestorian form in the East from a foothold in the 
Persian Empire along the trade routes through central Asia and through the 
Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. 
Christianity had reached as far afield as China and Sumatra as early as 
the seventh century, and had taken root on the Malabar coast of India as 
early as the fourth century (or even as early as the first century according to 
the tradition of the Thomas Christians of India). There was a period when 
the Nestorian Christianity of western and central Asia may well have been 
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the most flourishing form of Christianity in the world. It was the period of 
the Dark Ages in the West; but by the time the Christianity of the West 
emerged from its Dark Ages, early in the second millennium, the promise of 
Nestorian Christianity was fading. 
Islam was the crucial factor in this change of fortunes—first because 
Islam dominated the region from its rise in the seventh century, breaking 
the links between the Christian populations of Europe and far Asia; but 
more because its tolerance towards its Christian minority turned to active 
persecution after the crusades. Long before the advance guard of the mod-
ern missionary movement reached Asia in the sixteenth century, carried on 
the wave of European expansion, the Nestorian heritage in Asia had 
vanished from sight everywhere except among the Syrian Christians of Saint 
Thomas in India and in its own Mesopotamian homelands. 
Herein lies the handicap of Christianity in Asia. Offered to Asia ori-
ginally in a form untainted by Western dominance, it was eclipsed when 
might became right on both sides of the Fertile Crescent. Reduced to a rem-
nant in its oldest homelands in West Asia, given a new lease on life only on 
the European spur of the Eurasian landmass, detoured in its expansion 
around the west and south of Asia's Muslim shield, Christianity had to 
make a new beginning in Asia. And this time it arrived late, a stranger and 
in unwelcome company—the company of Western might and dominance.7 
Christianity had arrived late, of course, in other continents also, and in 
the same unwelcome company; but that was to become less an issue in the 
other continents in the measure that they became de facto Christian. In Asia 
the difference was that even Western dominance failed to make Asian 
Christianity a large-scale fait accompli. By the time the quarrel about colo-
nialism was deepening the divisions between the continents, Christianity 
had still not become as undeniably Asian as it had become European or 
American or Australasian or even African. It could therefore only resign 
itself to being held at arm's length in Asia until such time as it might live 
down its alien and imperialist image in Asian eyes. 
After nearly two millennia, Christianity's net gains in Asia amounted to a 
number of footholds on its fringes. It could indeed count certain Asian 
achievements that it might prize: its half-hold on Lebanon, surviving as that 
did from the earliest centuries; its long roots in one part of India, the single 
lasting legacy of its earlier expansion; its mass success in the Philippines, the 
single Asian case where a country as a whole was won to Christianity during 
its later expansion. It might well cherish these achievements not least be-
cause it had no others like them, and because without them its following in 
Asia today would be not much more than half its present 140 million. As for 
the other half, they have represented national minorities of nowhere more 
than a tenth (except possibly in North Asia), tracing their origins back no 
farther than the sixteenth century (except in West Asia). 
In short, as an Asian religion or as a force of any kind in Asia, Christian-
ity has more than its share of reasons for a certain diffidence. 
Numerically, Christianity's strength in Asia is less than a sixth of what 
THE ASIAN BACKGROUND 27 
would be a representative global share. In a world over 60 percent Asian, 
Christianity is only 10 percent Asian. At the same time, in a world over 30 
percent Christian, Asia is only 5 percent Christian. 
On top of that, Christianity is much more compromised by its colonial 
background in Asia than in any other continent, even Africa. Though its 
following in Africa is not very different in absolute terms, it encompasses a 
much larger share of the continental population and is confident of encom-
passing an even larger share in the future. 
On top of that again, Christianity is overshadowed in Asia more than 
elsewhere by alternative religions and ideologies having more plausible 
claims to represent authentically Asian mass movements. 
Clearly, on the basis of its Asian strength alone, Christianity in the early 
1980s was'not equipped to be a major actor on the Asian scene. At the same 
time, given Christianity's global role, and given the global scale and rele-
vance of Asia's problems, the role of Asian Christianity could not fail to 
have some special significance for Christianity as a whole, for Asia as a 
whole, and for the world. It is not in itself a disadvantage for a movement 
to be the world's most conspicuously transnational religion when the world 
itself is entering a new transnational era. 
Christianity in the Asian Crisis 
Any special significance of Asian Christianity, or any special limitations 
on it, must be sought in its historical background, in its present extra-Asian 
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connections, and in its geographical location and institutional insertion in 
Asia. 
The measure of the importance of Christianity in Asia is greater than the 
5 percent of the 2.7 billion Asians represented today by its 140 million fol-
lowers there. There is the fact that Christianity came with the Western con-
queror, except in West Asia. There is the fact that it found its still surviving 
footholds in far Asia in close association with Western power, except in 
certain pioneering ventures in pre-modern India, in the pre-conquest Mo-
luccas, in pre-conquest Vietnam, in Japan, in Korea, in pre-treaty-port 
China. There is the fact that its extra-Asian connections today dwarf those 
of every other religious or cultural movement in Asia, and that its access to 
Western financial resources had no counterpart among other faiths until oil 
revenues in West Asia and North Africa began to show what money could 
do for the promotion of Islam. All this has served to give Asian Christianity 
a special visibility from which it has not ceased to profit, though at a cost 
that in post-colonial times has threatened to outweigh the benefits. 
Political decolonization in Asia has now created strong pressure for the 
decolonization of Asian Christianity. To this extent Asia's colonial back-
ground has become more a liability than an asset. But it has not proved 
possible for a Christianity of footholds to stand immediately on its own 
feet. 
At the most general level of Asian Christian policy, there was once much 
talk of "missionary adaptation," and there has more recently been much 
talk of "indigenization" or "contextualization." The level of practice is 
another matter. In the era of adaptation, the churches in Asia never in fact 
managed to be culturally much more than replicas of the parent churches. 
Without a change in that pattern, the intercontinental connection in Chris-
tianity could only serve to reinforce the North-South dependency relation-
ship, at a time when everyone is at last aware of the need to counteract it. 
That need is acknowledged in the present-day acceptance on both sides of 
the more radical ecclesial goal of indigenization. Once again, however, it is 
one thing to agree that it should be Christian policy to counteract the depen-
dency of the South on the North, but it is another thing to ensure that Chris-
tian practice does not in fact still reinforce it. 
What has been said above about Christianity in general in the period of 
confrontation with Marxism (pp. 13-14) may be applied to Asian Christian-
ity, though of course with appropriate differences. 
Given, in particular, the extremely weak and derivative character of 
Asian Christianity on the one hand, by contrast with the extremely strong 
and dynamic character of Asian communism on the other, it was only to be 
expected that the shift in Christian attitudes from "Free World" anticom-
munism to Third World anticapitalism would take longer in Asia than in 
Latin America. At the same time, what had happened in Vatican II, in the 
World Council of Churches, and in the Latin American churches in the 
1960s and 1970s (pp. 15-16 above) could not but eventually have Asian 
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Christian repercussions. It could only be a matter of time until Asian Chris-
tian spokespersons made their own contribution to the reconsidering of 
options between conservation and change that was going on all around 
them in their dual Asian and Christian fields of reference. 
These Asian contributions would be localized according to the geographi-
cal pattern and the institutional form of the Christian presence. In practice 
this meant that they would be limited to some of the Asian territories on the 
fringes facing east and south—Korea, Japan, Hong Kong, the Philippines, 
Indonesia, Singapore, Indochina (for a time), Thailand, Sri Lanka, and 
India. 
Insofar as state toleration of any social role for the churches was a pre-
condition for such contributions, their chance had passed by 1949 in all of 
North and Central Asia, and in all of continental East Asia except the tip of 
the Korean peninsula. The Marxist judgment on the churches was that they 
had proved incapable of being other than instruments of reaction. Having 
appeared ineffective against past oppression, they were now to pay for it by 
being made more captive to the communist political establishments than 
they had ever been to the capitalist or the feudal ones. In this way social 
protest was excluded as a practical option for some 5 million Christians in 
China, and for perhaps over 12 million on the Asian side of the Soviet 
Union. 
In a less absolute manner, social protest was also excluded as a practical 
option for another 5 million Christians in West Asia and in Muslim South 
Asia. This was a region of the Muslim world where Christians were about as 
small a minority, in the region as a whole, as they were in communist Asia 
as a whole: a minority of perhaps 2 percent. (The one exceptional case is 
that of Lebanon, where more than half of the 3 million people have been 
credited to Christianity. In the 1970s, these Christians, by an oversimplifi-
cation with a factual basis, were cast in the role of reactionaries against the 
social radicalism of the Muslim half.) 
There remained the rest of South Asia, exclusive of the Himalayan states; 
the countries of Southeast Asia, exclusive of Burma and Malaysia; and the 
rest of East Asia, exclusive of Taiwan. The exclusions were cases where 
Buddhism and/or Hinduism, socialism, Islam, and anticommunism, re-
spectively, were in various degrees effectively intolerant of any critical so-
cial role for Christianity. 
It will be seen that the exclusions are the most conspicuous thing about 
the social role of Asian Christianity. The effect of these inhibiting pressures 
of communism or anticommunism, of Islam or another of the prevailing 
religions, was to make Christian social protest a fairly total irrelevance for 
more than four-fifths of Asia's territory, for more than half of Asia's peo-
ple, and for about one-fifth of Asia's Christians. When we speak of Asian 
Christian social protest, we are speaking of a phenomenon essentially re-
stricted (and duly chastened by its restriction) to a minority within a 
minority—a Christian minority drawn from some 100 million Christians, 
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among an Asian minority drawn from some 1.1 billion Asians, concen-
trated on less than a fifth of Asia's territory forming a crescent on its 
southern and eastern sides. 
Among the states in that crescent of Asia where at least a limited possibil-
ity existed for Christian social protest at the outset of the 1970s, the Chris-
tian proportion of the national population was not nearly as low as it was in 
the rest of Asia, except in Thailand, Laos, and Kampuchea, where it was 1 
percent or less, and in Japan, where it was less than 2 percent by official 
count and more than 3 percent according to censuses and surveys. Even in 
giant India, with its overwhelming Hindu majority, 27 million Christians 
representing 4 percent of the population retained in 1980 a precarious 
freedom of action. In the other countries in question, apart from the Philip-
pines, Christianity represented a less minuscule minority, ranging upwards 
from about 7 percent to about 15 percent of the population in Vietnam, Sri 
Lanka, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Indonesia, more or less in that order, 
and to perhaps over 20 percent in South Korea. In terms of absolute num-
bers, the most substantial of these Christian minorities around 1980 were 
the 17 million Christians of Indonesia, the 11 million of South Korea, and 
the 4 million of Vietnam. These were in turn dwarfed in numbers by the 
nearly 50 million Christians of the Philippines, the one country in Asia 
where Christianity dominated the religious field.8 
Our direct concern, therefore, will be with the countries of this Asian 
crescent. It is these that we must observe at closer range, though never to the 
exclusion of the others. We are not free to forget the rest of Asia when we 
focus on the areas of more significant Christian presence, any more than we 
are free to forget the rest of the world when we focus on Asia. We are faced 
everywhere with the fact of interdependence. 
There are implications for history in the very unevenness of the Christian 
presence in Asia—in the fact that, to begin with, Christianity represents 
only 5 percent of Asia's population while representing about three-quarters 
of the rest of humankind; in the further fact that Christianity is propor-
tionally even weaker in Asia's and the world's two largest national popula-
tions, those of China (less than 1 percent Christian) and of India (less than 4 
percent Christian), and also in Asia's most economically advanced nation, 
Japan. 
To be still more specific, there are implications in the fact that after two 
Christian millennia there was less than a 1 percent overlap of the most nu-
merous single race on earth, the Chinese, and the most numerous body of 
believers, the Christians. If one may suppose that things could be notably 
different after three Christian millennia, it follows that only provisional 
generalizations can be made at present as to what constitutes the charac-
teristic features of these two groups. What we have seen so far may repre-
sent only a larval stage, relatively speaking, in the evolution of the historical 
identities of the Christians or of the Chinese. And for all we know the same 
might need to be said of the Indians, the Russians, or the Japanese. The 
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changes all these peoples have undergone in the twentieth century alone 
could hardly have been imagined in any previous century. 
Christianity in the Asian National Security States 
We are not free to forget the rest of Asia for another reason—that is, not 
only because it may interact differently with the Christian element in Asia 
tomorrow, but also because its shadow falls darkly over even the strongest 
redoubts of Asian Christianity today. Blurred though time has made it, the 
line of confrontation in Asia between the partisans and the enemies of revo-
lution still underlies all the lines of proliferation. Without a sense of apoca-
lyptic crisis, of "a life-and-death struggle on which the fate of the whole 
world depends" (to use a Chinese Cultural Revolution way of putting it), 
Asian history could not have been the same on either side of the line in the 
generation after World War II. 
Nothing looms larger in that stretch of history, after the rise of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, than the Korean War and the Vietnam War. They 
are a measure of the hardening of positions on both sides, which in turn 
gave substance to the charges exchanged—charges of blind intransigence, of 
mass hysteria, of totalitarian terror. On the communist side, the sense of 
siege was intensified by the break between the Soviet Union and China in 
the 1960s; this helped to give the Chinese Cultural Revolution its singular 
virulence. On the other side, the sense of siege was intensified by the ebbing 
of the American military presence in Asia in the 1970s; this accelerated the 
process by which, after Taiwan in 1949, South Korea in 1961, and Indonesia 
in 1965, one state after another in Asia suspended one or other or all of the 
forms of democracy. 
This last trend of events has come to be spoken of as the rise of the na-
tional security state. As befits a phenomenon overtly related to "the threat 
of communism," there is nothing peculiarly Asian about it. It has been not 
without its effects even within the Western democracies, notably in the 
United States during the period of the McCarthy campaign against "Com-
munist infiltration," and in the West Germany of the "berufsverbot" or 
security screening of state employees. But the conditions that best suited its 
development were found only in the Third World, where government was 
still traditionally the preserve of the powerful, and where democratic ideas 
were not yet deeply rooted. 
In the Third World, restrictions that would be intolerable to Western 
democratic instinct gained Western acquiescence, or connivance, or protec-
tion, or even instigation as the lesser evil, for countries supposed to be 
vulnerable to communist influence. 
So it was that Latin America—a continent that had known one Marxist 
government that lasted (in Cuba from 1961) and one that was forcibly over-
thrown after three years (in Chile in 1973)—became the continent most 
systematically submitted to the ideology of national security. 
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So it was also that the United States responded to the communist chal­
lenge in Asia—by arming Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan, Syngman Rhee and 
Park Chung Нее in South Korea, Suharto in Indonesia, and a series of simi­
lar strongmen in South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand. 
So it was, finally, that when it became U.S. policy from 1969 to phase out 
U.S. troop involvement on the Asian mainland, the power vacuum quickly 
began to be filled by regimes armed with new emergency powers in the Phil­
ippines, in South Korea, in Thailand, and also, under the further stimulus 
of other local crises, in Pakistan, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Singapore, and 
Bangladesh. By mid-1975, when India entered a period of emergency rule 
(terminated by elections in 1977), the only fully functioning democracy left 
in Asia was Japan. 
This trend of events confronted the churches with the spectacle of "free 
world" alternatives to communism that had come to look more and more 
like mirror images of the tyranny they claimed to oppose. Thanks largely to 
their confrontation with communism, the churches were already in the busi­
ness of denouncing political repression. Now they were faced with the fact 
that the repression they felt called on to denounce might be found as well on 
the right as on the left. They were still accustomed to the assumption that 
the preponderant threat to society lay more on the left than on the right. But 
the way was now open to call even that into question. 
As it happened, reasons for such a calling into question were not far 
away. Besides the overt justification for "free world" restrictions on 
freedom (that is, "the communist menace"), examination showed other 
functions, less easily avowable, that were being served by the emergency 
regimes. 
In an earlier stage of the relations between the industrialized and other 
nations, finished goods were traded for raw materials in a pattern of ex­
change that gave an entrepreneurial minority in the preindustrialized coun­
tries a vested interest in becoming those countries' new power elites. In a 
later stage of these relations, within the framework of the transnational 
corporations, it was found more profitable to transfer the simpler forms of 
industrial production to the preindustrial countries. The pattern thus 
created was one of industrialized enclaves based on cheap labor and rela­
tively primitive working conditions, whose maintenance became a shared 
vested interest for the transnational corporate head offices and for the 
branch countries' new elites. 
To the extent that this system could not be shown to benefit more than a 
minority, its continued functioning required coercion of the majority. 
Hence the new line of confrontation that was becoming more manifest in 
the 1970s in the southern and eastern countries of Asia—between a modern­
izing minority on one side, whose interests lay more and more in the world 
market, and a marginalized majority on the other, who now needed the 
persuasion of the police and the army to keep them cooperative as long as 
their marginalization was to last. 
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As long as their marginalization was to last? Was there, then, a fair pros-
pect that it would not last indefinitely? Did the capitalist horn of plenty 
have plenty still in store for everyone? Or could it promise at best to bring 
prosperity eventually to the majority in the poor world, as it had brought 
prosperity to the majority in the West and in Japan? 
Or was the latter achievement bought strictly at the price of leaving a 
poor majority in the world as a whole? Or were capitalism's recurring 
crises—and especially its mid-1970s crisis, touched off when a part of the 
poor world learned to play the capitalist game by charging what the market 
would bear for oil—sufficiently damaging to the performance and promise 
of capitalism to make the socialist alternative take on a newly competitive 
appeal? Or was the socialist alternative itself too compromised, first by the 
legacy of Stalinism in Russia and elsewhere, then by the disconcerting 
swings of the Chinese ideological pendulum, then again by the degeneration 
of international relations within Asian socialism into international wars? 
Or, if these questions admitted of no easy or immediate answers, what in 
the meantime was the responsibility of Christians in Asia, confronted with 
(or rather, immersed in) the ordeal of Asia's two thousand million poor? 
Such were the questions that confronted the Asian churches as they pro-
ceeded in the 1970s to take their own part in the worldwide Christian recon-
sideration of options between social stability and social change. 
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Attitudes toward change among Asian Christians have obviously shifted 
in some way along with those of other Asians and other Christians. Asian 
Christians could not have stood entirely apart from the ferment that has 
affected the rest of the world. What we need to examine at closer range is 
the particular kind and degree of shift that is observable in Asian Christian 
attitudes, as compared with the change observable in its Asian and in its 
Christian fields of reference, and as compared with its own point of depar-
ture. 
More must be said first about this point of departure. To know some-
thing of the setting of Asian Christianity is not necessarily to know much 
about Asian Christianity itself. We are given an idea of what to expect from 
it, by way of its response to the crisis of change in the 1970s, when we ex-
amine the wider Asian and the wider Christian context of that crisis. But 
within the limits set by that complex of contexts, we still have to ask what is 
there that has been particularly distinctive about Asian Christianity and that 
might give us some further idea of what to expect from it. We must then 
examine more particularly some precedents and counter-precedents for a 
critical social role for Christianity in Asia, before seeking to identify any 
new turning points in its experience in the 1970s. 
Some Features of Asian Christianity as It Has Been 
We have seen how much the geographical pattern of Christian distribu-
tion in Asia differs from the pattern of population distribution. In more 
intrinsic ways also, the profile of Asian Christianity is something other than 
a miniature of the profile of Asia as a whole. As its history has led us to 
expect, Asian Christianity counts among its adherents a larger-than-typical 
minority of Europeans and Eurasians, a higher-than-typical level of educa-
tion, a larger representation in the cities and towns than in the country, and 
a larger representation among some ethnic minorities than among most 
national majority races such as the Han, the Hindi-speaking, the Javanese, 
the Thai, the Burmese, the Malays, and the Taiwanese.1 
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A Double-Edged Marginality 
It would be a fair enough conclusion from all this to say that Asian Chris-
tianity is marginal to Asia in many ways. However, it should also be clear 
that it is not always marginal in ways that detract from its potential. In level 
of education and degree of urbanization, for example, it is untypical in 
ways that put it on the cutting edge of modernization. 
There are two sides to the urban bias of Asian Christianity, as indeed 
there are two sides to the urbanization process itself. The facts of the case 
are clear-cut enough: in Asia, the countryside is still where the people are, 
generally in a measure of over 70 percent of the total population; the city or 
town is where the Christians are concentrated.2 Therein lies a particular 
weakness of the Church in Asia, inasmuch as it is not where the people are 
today. Therein also lies a particular opportunity of the Church in Asia, 
inasmuch as it is where the people are likely to be tomorrow. 
In Asia it is certainly too soon to discount the importance of the peasant. 
If the Chinese revolution is any indication, the West has learned from the 
East (and Marxism has learned from Maoism) that sometimes the levers of 
history can lie in the countryside. If the wars of Indochina had proved any-
thing by 1975, it was that superpower force and skill can avail nothing 
against peasant determination and endurance. The mere fact that people in 
Asia are still mostly peasants should be reason enough for peasants to get 
priority in movements like Christianity, which claims to give priority to 
people, regardless of their degree of importance in global politics. 
However, if Christianity ever lives up to that claim in Asia, it will perhaps 
be less because it has taken deeper root among the peasants in the country 
than because the peasants have uprooted themselves from the countryside. 
For the fact is that the world as a whole is on its way to town, under capital-
ism and under socialism alike. The world's urban population is nearly 80 
percent in the industrialized market economies, and nearly 60 percent in the 
centrally planned economies outside the Third World. Even the Third 
World is on its way to town, though starting from far away from it. Indeed 
the pathological pace of its urbanization is one of the most conspicuous 
symptoms of its mal-developing condition. 
Is the urbanization process reversible? There are those who believe that 
the telecommunications revolution will reverse it; but such a source of relief 
will surely not be effective in Asia very soon. In Asia recourse has been had 
to some forceful government efforts at dispersal of population—in the 
Soviet Union, in China, in Indonesia. The effect has scarcely anywhere been 
on the scale of the problem. In any case, since it has been shown that less 
than 5 percent of a population is needed to produce its food, there is no 
long-term prospect of a real return to the land. 
The situation, then, is that the average Asian is on his or her way to town, 
with the average Asian Christian a bit ahead. In another respect, however, 
closely related in its implications, Asian Christianity is still where the rich 
world was yesterday and where the poor world remains today. In the indus-
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trialized countries, including the centrally planned ones, only a shrinking 
minority live by farming; moreover, only a minority are by any definition 
young. In Asia as a whole, however, the peasant-born majority must remain 
a majority at least for this generation, since the bulge in its population 
structure has not yet moved up beyond the earliest decades. 
In other words, as if it were not enough for Asia to be producing more 
than its share of the world's job seekers, it is doomed to increase their num-
bers at perhaps twice the rate of the West for at least the rest of this century. 
A Politically-Patterned Conflict of Creeds 
A minority of 5 percent in Asia as a whole; a minority of about 9 percent 
on the southern and eastern fringes of Asia; a minority of some 15 percent 
on the fringes exclusive of India (though of only 6 percent on the fringes 
exclusive of the Philippines); a minority distinctively tinged with Western 
ways, distinctively rarer in the countryside than in the towns and cities, 
distinctively marginal ethnically as well as numerically and geographically, 
and distinctively youthful by comparison with Western Christians, though 
not by comparison with other Asians—these are some characteristics of 
Asian Christianity that keep that term from being a mere abstraction. 
And here is another. If the average Asian Christian is marginal in ways 
not common to Christians of other continents, and young and poor and 
trapped in poverty in ways shared at least with two other continents, she or 
he has inherited one more characteristic shared by all Christians every-
where: the characteristic of being more or less grievously at odds with half 
or more of all the other Christians in the world. 
The two main historic splits in European Christianity—between East and 
West in the eleventh century, between North and South in the sixteenth— 
have had the effect that twentieth-century Christians have generally identi-
fied themselves not as Christians but as particular kinds of Christians: as 
Catholics, in a global proportion of about 56 percent; as Protestants or 
Anglicans, in a proportion of about 33 percent; as Oriental (mainly Ortho-
dox) Christians, in a proportion of about 11 percent. 
This pattern has been reproduced in Asia, with about the same propor-
tion of Oriental Christians (mainly in Soviet Asia, India, Lebanon, and 
Syria), and with a smaller proportion of Catholics (about 50 percent), who 
constitute nearly 90 percent of all Christians in the Philippines and Vietnam 
alone. These two countries together contribute about two-thirds of the 70 
million Catholics in Asia. The countries of Protestant strength are chiefly 
Indonesia and South Korea, where Christianity is about 75 percent Protes-
tant and where about half of Asia's 50 million Protestants are concentrated. 
For the bulk of the remainder of the Protestants, one must look to India, 
the Philippines, Japan, and Taiwan. (Here and elsewhere, if only three 
categories of Christians are distinguished, we count as Protestants all those 
not categorized as Catholics or Orientals.) 
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Thus has Asia inherited the family quarrels of Christendom along with 
much else that has come to be thought of as more Western than Christian. 
Political power rather than theological reflection determined that Catholi-
cism would have a head start in the ex-colonies of Spain, France, and Portu-
gal; that Protestantism would prevail over Catholicism in the Indonesian 
archipelago when the Dutch superseded the Portuguese there; and that 
Christianity would take a mainly Orthodox form where the Russian flag 
flew across Siberia. 
To be sure, the pattern of Christian belonging did not follow the flag with 
equal predictability everywhere. There were other factors. It could happen 
that an Asian colony remained beyond the immediate reach of any Western 
flag. Such was the case of Korea, whose colonial masters were Asian instead 
of European. Or it could happen that the colonial power itself ceased to 
attach political importance to religious belonging. Such was the case in 
British South Asia in the nineteenth century. 
Wherever modern Christianity entered Asia without having overriding 
political power behind it, perhaps the next most decisive single factor for its 
fortunes and forms was the presence or absence of powerful opposition. In 
all of monsoon Asia, where this opposition existed, it was held in check by 
the colonial power to a sufficient extent to enable Christianity to put down 
roots, survive independence, and generally prosper as much or as little 
afterwards as before. Opposition existed also in the case of Korea; but its 
effect there was counterbalanced by the exceptional revolutionary role 
played by Protestants, including Protestant missionaries, in the anticolonial 
struggle. 
Korea was the Asian country where Christianity was least associated with 
Western imperialism. It was also the Asian country where Christianity was 
most associated (certainly in its Protestant form) with the nationalist strug-
gle against a colonial power (in this case Japan). It thus provided one of 
those rare cases in Asian history in which nationalism worked in favor of 
Christianity rather than against it. For it was in Korea, to a greater extent 
than in any other Asian country, that Christianity (again mainly in its Prot-
estant form) gained a share of public influence out of all proportion to its 
share in the national population.3 
A Beginning of Ecumenical Convergence 
As the age of colonialism was coming to an end, the age of ecumenism 
was being inaugurated. Having bequeathed its denominational divisions to 
Asia, Western Christianity began to put its own house in order even as it 
was ceasing to have full control over anyone else's. 
Ecumenism was partly a lesson learned in missionary lands. Since it was 
as novel for the parent churches as for their offspring, the latter were 
enabled to contribute to it on a less unequal footing. Most of the early na-
tional unions of Protestant denominations took place in Asia—in China in 
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1927, in the Philippines in 1929, in Siam in 1934, in Japan in 1941. The 
formation in 1947 of the Church of South India, a more far-reaching ecu-
menical venture, was a milestone for all non-Roman churches on all con-
tinents. The formation in 1959 of the East Asia Christian Conference 
(renamed the Christian Conference of Asia in 1973) gave the non-Roman 
Christian world another lead from Asia, this time on a continental scale, in 
the task of bringing Christians together. 
The EACC/CCA idea did not long remain the novelty it was in 1959. 
Another continent took a similar path when the All Africa Conference of 
Churches was formed in 1963. The other half of Asia's Christians were put 
on a parallel path when the Federation of Asian Bishops' Conferences 
(FABC) was formalized in 1972. The lead the FABC was following had 
been given by the Catholic hierarchies of Latin America in the formation of 
CELAMinl955.4 
A parallel path? At the point of departure of this path in 1972, the isola-
tion of the Catholic Church and the Protestant churches from each other in 
Asia was about as complete as it could well be twenty-four years after the 
formation of the World Council of Churches and seven years after the close 
of Vatican II. It was not to be long, however, before the paths of the CCA 
and FABC showed some signs of converging. 
The state of official relations did not always reflect exactly the state of 
relations at the grassroots: these conditions could vary well beyond the 
current officially approved range of firmness and flexibility. The impetus 
for change came not so much from ecumenical negotiations between Chris-
tian bodies as from the pressure of forces from the larger society. And what 
force could have exercised greater pressure than that which overshadowed 
all others in the later decades of the twentieth century—the force of the 
movements for social change? 
Here we touch a reality whose implications have yet to be fully assimi-
lated. Even in its internal relations, even in its self-understanding, Asian 
Christianity was to be profoundly affected by its immersion in Asia's strug-
gle for self-realization. Ecumenical barriers that seemed impervious to 
direct penetration often seemed to be simply left behind for those Catholics 
and Protestants who found themselves side by side on the social front. 
People with such experience might be pardoned for feeling that direct 
efforts at self-understanding on the part of the churches had created more 
problems than they solved. The assumption that many Christians were led 
to act on, rightly or wrongly, consciously or otherwise, was that the true 
role of the Church, the role in which it could both be itself and understand 
the world, lay much more than had previously been thought in turning out-
wards to the world, and much less in turning inwards upon itself. 
Some Precedents and Counter-Precedents for a Critical Social Role 
In the matter of social attitudes the background of Asian Christians is as 
varied as is their national and denominational background, within the limits 
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of what is common in the Constantinian heritage. To consider what Asian 
Christians have brought with them to the social confrontations of the 1970s 
will require taking some account, in the general context of the social role of 
religion in Asia, of the social attitudes rooted in the Catholic and the Prot-
estant experience in the West and in Asia. 
The Social Role of Religion in Asia 
Understood in [a] realistic and comprehensive sense, religion usually acts 
as a tremendous force for social inertia. The writer knows of no instance 
in present-day South Asia where religion has induced social change. 
The writer was Gunnar Myrdal. The judgment was set down in the period 
from 1960 to 1967, the period of the drafting of Asian Drama. The state-
ment introduces a section on "the role of religion" (p. 103) under the 
broader heading "the wider field of valuations" in the general introduction 
in Volume I. 
It has the merit of giving us a clear-cut point of departure. On the face of 
it, it is a devastating judgment on the social role of religion in Asia. 
Whether it is ultimately justified or not, it cannot be dismissed as ill-
informed or ill-considered. On the contrary, it would be hard to think of a 
more obviously appropriate source of judgment on such a question than 
this classic survey of the problem of socioeconomic change in Asia in the 
period immediately prior to the decade that concerns us. If it is not a true 
judgment, the question is nevertheless posed as to how it came to appear 
true to one of the most careful investigators of the broader theme. 
Myrdal himself makes it clear that the judgment is not made on religion 
as such. As he puts it (p. 105), "no religion on the 'higher' level need be in 
conflict with the modernization ideals." Without going as far as that in 
open-mindedness on the subject, even those theories of society that expect 
least from religion would have recognized the antecedent possibility that in 
one context or another religion might be a force for social change, or at 
least an agent of social protest, rather than a force for legitimation and 
reinforcement of the social status quo. Marx was explicitly allowing for that 
possibility when, in the same passage in which he called religion "the opium 
of the people," he also called it "the sigh of the oppressed creature."5 
Is Myrdal, then, telling us not to expect to find in Asia even the minimal 
degree of religious influence for change that might be expected on the most 
negative hypothesis? On the face of it, that seems to be the general implica-
tion. Research on the broader background of religion and social protest in 
Asia is sufficiently scarce to leave room for a range of opinion on the point. 
However, a survey of religion and "pre-capitalist modes of production" 
does find material for inquiry on religious movements of social protest in 
some of the main religious traditions.' 
As it happens, the findings here are also fairly consistently negative. His-
toric Hinduism is seen as the legitimizing ideology of the archetypal caste 
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system. Historic Buddhism, in whatever form, is found incapable of provid-
ing a basis for social protest. Contestation in general is seen as having 
gained religious sanction, as a rule, only in an elitist or an ineffective popu-
lar millenarian form. 
The one significant exception identified in this analysis (a professedly 
Marxist analysis) is the case of Judaism (and, by implication, the Judaeo-
Christian tradition in general). For reasons that are explained in terms of 
history, this tradition is seen as having a unique prophetic strand strong 
enough to bear the weight of a genuine movement of social protest.7 
These findings are defined as applying more properly to religion inpre-
colonial Asia. What has been the effect on the social role of religion in Asia, 
of the experience of colonialism and nationalism, of capitalism and social-
ism? It has been a disruptive effect, though not in the same way in each 
case. 
What is perhaps best known to the world at large is how the colonialist-
nationalist struggle has injected a new political dimension into the Asian 
religions, dramatized in Buddhism in phenomena like the self-immolations 
of monks and nuns in embattled South Vietnam, and in Islam in the resur-
gence of Muslim fundamentalism, one of whose most sensational feats was 
the 1979 toppling of the Shah of Iran. In fact one could speak of a "new 
face of Buddha"' in countries of Theravada and Mahayana, and for that 
matter of a new face of Islam in both Sunnite and Shiite lands. 
What concerns us here is whether there has been anything that could be 
called a transformation of the social role of religion in the direction of mak-
ing it something more than the "tremendous force for social inertia" of 
which Myrdal wrote. It does not appear that the evidence on this has been 
persuasive to those who have examined the ferment in the main Asian reli-
gions with a critical eye from the outside. 
Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Confucianism, Shinto—all can be cited in 
particular circumstances as having been effective as vehicles of nationalism. 
But only Islam and Buddhism have lent themselves significantly to the rhet-
oric oí socialism, and in both cases the shift in preaching has been more 
noticeable than any shift in practice. 
Thus, Holmes Welch, a Buddhist and an authority on Buddhism in 
China, while strongly discounting assertions of decline in Chinese Bud-
dhism in late traditional China, is rather inclined to believe the worst about 
Buddhism under Mao, both as to the credibility of its conversion to social-
ism and as to its hopes of a socialist future.' 
Similarly, Maxime Rodinson, a Marxist who writes with some authority 
on Islam, has this to say on what he calls its "inconclusive correlation" with 
"any particular economic system": 
In India, it is true that the Hindus threw themselves with more ardor and 
earlier than the Muslims into the adventure of capitalism, as in Europe 
the Protestants before the Catholics. But it was not religious precepts in 
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the pure state that were involved here. . . . God and the gods, rules for 
living, sacred or semi-sacred moralities, all in turn bow down and in the 
end prostrate themselves before triumphant Mammon.10 
As observations on the social role of religion in Asia, the above are not 
necessarily either definitive in themselves or representative for Christianity, 
precisely inasmuch as it has been so marginal to the Asian mainstream. 
They do serve, however, to put us on guard against any easy assumption 
that the Asian Christian experience would not be open to similar criticism. 
If it is to be shown that the Christian God in Asia does not "bow before 
Mammon," there is a weight of evidence to be confronted for which 
another sentence of Rodinson (otherwise far from being the most doctri-
naire of Marxists) may serve as a summary: 
What is most likely is that, once again, the religious authorities will fol-
low the movement of society, and will supply their governments with 
ideological justifications in strict conformity with the requirements of 
the economic policy these governments will have chosen." 
The Critical Dimension in Catholicism 
In one sense, the last thing that medieval Catholicism could be accused of 
was forgetfulness that God judges all human systems. Even its involvement 
in temporal affairs was its way of affirming the kingship of Christ over the 
whole of creation. It was this critical principle that made a pope humiliate 
an emperor at Canossa, a bishop challenge a king in the person of Thomas 
Becket, a laywoman defy a political-ecclesiastical alliance in the trial of 
Joan of Arc. 
Even where the roles of Church and State were most comfortably con-
certed (and in Catholicism the accommodation to the secular power did not 
generally go as far as it did in the Church-State relations of the Orthodox 
churches), there was always an assumption of accountability before a higher 
power. Even where the Church seemed to serve for little more than blessing 
the swords of the conquistadors, it always represented at least a feeble re-
minder to these latter that they could never be entirely a law unto them-
selves. Such work as was done for social amelioration, in Europe and in 
Asia, was mostly done within the limits of implicit acceptance of the pre-
vailing European or Asian temporal order. 
In another sense, of course, it can be said that the medieval Catholic con-
fidence in the redemption of the temporal order led directly to the imprison-
ment of the Church in a particular temporal order, one from which the 
Reformation later fought to set it free. Historically the Reformation was the 
largest-scale demonstration that an ultimately irrepressible dimension in the 
Church had been repressed to a point where restoration of the balance had 
to take an explosive form. 
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In the short run, this explosion could only have the effect of walling what 
was left of the old Church behind even more unyielding institutional ram-
parts. The habits of power, and of partnership or rivalry with power, re-
mained the most natural reflexes of the missionary extensions of the Catho-
lic Church, as long as the existing political power had a place for such 
partnership or rivalry. As a whole, the institutional Church proved no ex-
ception to the rule that power is never given up freely, but only yielded un-
der pressure of force majeure. 
In 1511, the Portuguese admiral Albuquerque, who was the founder of 
the Portuguese empire in Asia, struck the keynote for most of the modern 
missionary movement when he said: 
As the King of Malacca . . . makes no endeavor to negotiate with us , . . . 
Our Lord is blinding his judgment and hardening his heart, and desires 
the completion of this affair of Malacca.12 
Four centuries later, in 1898, the same keynote was still being struck in 
the very last days of the Spanish empire in Asia, in the words of the repre-
sentatives of the main Spanish religious orders in the Philippines, which had 
been the most effective agencies of religious and political control in that 
colony. In a memorial addressed to the colonial minister in Madrid, these 
representatives made their last stand in the name of "the just and benevo-
lent, and Catholic and Spanish regime," affirming it as their obligation "to 
watch over Spanish interests, which are not at variance, but perfectly amal-
gamated, with religious interests," and on these grounds demanding the 
crushing of sedition by unrelenting refusal of the freedoms denounced in 
the papal Syllabus of Errors of 1864." 
Was this the best that could be hoped for from medieval or Counter-
Reformation Catholicism by way of a critical attitude to a social or political 
status quo? Even if it were, perhaps the mere fact of its arrogating to itself 
the role of an independent guide to the uses of state power planted a creative 
tension at the heart of Western civilization that played a part in the dyna-
mism of the West at a time when the Muslim and the Chinese civilizations 
seemed to have passed their prime. 
But there had to be something more than a parallel power structure in a 
form of Christianity that had a place for Old Testament prophets as well as 
kings and for New Testament saints and sages as well as political prelates. 
There was in fact more even to a pope like Hildebrand (the pope of 
Canossa), to a bishop like Becket, and certainly to a phenomenon like Joan 
of Arc than could be accounted for simply in terms of political Catholicism. 
The prophetic dimension in historical Catholicism, inhibited in hierarchi-
cal structures, found its main institutional outlet in the religious orders and 
congregations. Like Chrysostom in fourth-century Asia, Las Casas in 
sixteenth-century America could thunder against abuses of power more 
freely outside the hierarchy than inside. When the friar-missionaries 
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reached Asia, the tradition of championing the oppressed returned to Asia 
with them. It remained with them as long as their identity was not entirely 
bound up with that "perfect amalgamation" of "religion and the father-
land" of which the friar memorial was to speak. In the early years, the role 
of the "voice of the voiceless" could be played as well by Bishop Salazar of 
Manila in the Asian part of the "Indies" as by Las Casas in the American 
part. 
Much more diffuse was the paternalistic social concern expressed in the 
kind of missionary community building that sought, rather generally 
throughout the Spanish empire, to make the missionary Church the exclu-
sive screen and filter between the imperial power and the native popula-
tions. This took its extreme form in the Jesuit reductions of Paraguay. This 
too could be called a form of social protest; but in practice, while it combat-
ted exploitation, it only reinforced dependency. 
Would something similar need to be said about the most diffuse institu-
tional influence of all the churches in all the empires—that of their educa-
tional institutions? 
Within the Spanish system, the only protests these institutions could utter 
against the ills of society were those that were part of the official policy of 
the Royal Patronage. Within all the colonial regimes, colonial control 
tended to keep them forcibly within the limits of colonial policy. Where 
they existed beyond the limits of direct colonial control, as in China, Japan, 
Korea, Siam/Thailand, and Iran, they were limited by national policies of 
their host governments without being altogether free from state influence 
from home countries. 
Under post-colonial regimes, church school systems had to pay the price 
of having conspicuously too great a potential, whether as thorns in the side 
or as tools in the hand of the powers that be, to be left to their own devices 
by these powers. Where they were not simply nationalized, the threat of 
nationalization or of crippling taxation could normally be counted on to 
neutralize them as possible threats to the existing balance of social forces. 
In general, then, Catholic school systems in missionary lands fell into the 
pattern that eventually brought a radical criticism of the whole school sys-
tem to the point of finding the only hope of social salvation in the "de-
schooling" of society.14 A similiar pattern could be found in Catholic medi-
cal services and communications media—in short, in all those areas where 
Catholic institutional influence was particularly effective. It was precisely 
their institutional prominence, set in sharper relief by their top-heavy struc-
tures of authority, that exposed them to the possibility of being coopted as 
agents of social consolidation and control. 
The Protesting Tradition in Protestantism 
It might be thought that the "protesting" principle in Protestantism 
would make for a substantial break with the Constantinian heritage. But we 
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have already noted the role of the Calvinist tradition in the evolution of 
capitalism; it is also well known that all the mainstream traditions of Pro-
testantism have in some ways lent themselves even more than the Catholic 
Church to an accommodation with the powers that be in state and society. 
Historically, it can now be seen that there was both loss and gain for Chris-
tian freedom in the repudiation of a supranational center of religious 
authority—loss of the check it could provide on national political power 
and local narrowness generally, and gain in terms of relief from abuse of the 
supranational power itself. 
It might still be thought that Protestantism would prove more fertile in 
protest than Catholicism, in virtue of its capacity for producing, or provok-
ing into existence, a constant stream of new sects rejecting ties with all es-
tablished institutions, Protestant or Catholic, ecclesiastical or political. 
Again history has unfolded a pattern not quite predictable on the basis of 
any simple theory. As noted earlier (p. 10), in practice it is not enough for a 
movement to be marginal to a society in order to be more a force for social 
change than a force for social inertia. On the contrary, a movement that 
opts out of social and political concern tends quite naturally to reinforce the 
social or political status quo. 
It is not by accident that the two words conventionally combined to 
describe some of these "reformations within the Reformation" are the 
words conservative and evangelical. The words describe accurately, even in 
ways that were hardly intended, the tendency shown by most movements 
that have sought to bypass human tradition in order to link up directly with 
what is taken to be the word of God. Unless these movements find motiva-
tion for social radicalism in the gospel message they affirm, their professed 
unconcern with institutional forms and forces turns out to be the surest 
prescription for the most rigid and reactionary kind of institutionalization. 
It has been argued that this historical link between biblical fundamental-
ism and sociopolitical conservatism is a historical accident, and that its 
"great reversal" of the radicalism of the gospel, which admittedly occurred 
in the evangelical movement in the course of the last hundred years, could 
be reversed in its turn." Certainly that stream of world Christianity conven-
tionally called "evangelical" has not managed to remain unaffected by the 
later twentieth-century pressures for greater Christian recognition of social 
concern. It has, however, offered greater resistance to these pressures—a 
resistance that has tended to range its more fundamentalist representatives 
among the most categorical supporters of right-wing regimes. 
Occasionally, as in Chile and South Korea in the 1970s, manifestos to this 
effect have complicated matters still further by identifying their stand as the 
Christian stand. Such claims do not bear close investigation. As a rule, these 
fundamentalist church groupings, even when they represent a majority in 
the list of churches in a country, represent only a minority of the Christians 
there, and are not represented at all in the national or international ecu-
menical network. 
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The Social Gospel in Colonial Asia 
It is clear that all the main historical forms of Christianity, whether they 
found their point of reference in Rome or Constantinople or Moscow or 
Geneva or Canterbury, were unfavorably preconditioned in regard to any 
critical social role in the missionary world. But what has been said about the 
survival of a critical dimension in Catholicism and a protesting tradition in 
Protestantism does not exhaust the record of precedents provided in pre-
1960s Asia for a critical social role for Asian Christianity. The most obvious 
precedents predating the Latin American contribution come from the very 
muted influence of a socially conscious Catholicism arising out of post-
Revolution France and the post-Risorgimento papacy, and from the much 
more tangible influence of "the social gospel" in Anglo-Saxon Protes-
tantism. 
In the eighteenth century the Enlightenment had polarized Protestantism 
between a pietist instinct to turn inward and let the world pass by, and a 
rationalist instinct to seize the leadership of modernizing change. The latter 
tendency had an ambivalence of its own. An earlier form of it had produced 
the Puritan accommodation to capitalism; and now a post-Darwin, post-
Wellhausen, post-Marx form of it produced, via Ritschl, Harnack, 
Troeltsch, and interpreters like Kingsley in England and Rauschenbusch in 
America, a new enthusiasm for Christian socialism and the social gospel. A 
Roman Catholic counterpart of the same modernizing tendency was driven 
underground by Pope Pius X in 1907, and kept there by his successors until 
1962. 
In Protestant preaching, the gospel in Asia on the whole had a pietist 
accent in the nineteenth century and a rationalist accent in the early twen-
tieth. 
The pietist, fundamentalist strain was not without drastic social effects. It 
could be the bearer of nationalism, as in Korea,16 of an evangelical work 
ethic, as in Iran,17 or even of a genuine social revolution, as in the Taiping 
rebellion in mid-nineteenth-century China.18 It has never been sufficiently 
marvelled at that a fundamentalist form of Christianity has been the pro-
fessed ideology of that largest of social upheavals in Asia before the twen-
tieth century. Had it achieved its aims, not only China and Chinese Chris-
tianity, but Christianity in general and the world in general, would wear a 
very different face today. Protestant China today might have far out-
weighed even Catholic Latin America in the world scales of Christianity. Up 
to half the world might have been aligned with a truly multiracial and inter-
continental Christianity. No more than a fraction of the other half, and 
presumably no more than a negligible fraction of the Asian half outside the 
Soviet Union, might have been aligned with atheistic socialism. 
The reason all this is not marvelled at, of course, is that the final defeat of 
Taiping Christianity was so overwhelming as to ensure that the next Chinese 
revolution would seek a different inspiration, and even to ensure that the 
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next wave of Protestant missionaries would have little temptation to look 
back to its example. In China, moreover, even more spectacular auguries of 
success attended the shift in Protestant missionary emphasis from funda-
mentalism to what one of its historians calls modernism. Protestant funda-
mentalism could claim the Hungs, the leaders of a great if abortive rebel-
lion; but Protestant modernism could claim Sun Yat-sen and Chiang 
Kai-shek, two of the three chief father figures acknowledged in one or both 
of the Chinas to this day." 
In the end the Christianity in Sun Yat-sen's legacy was repudiated by his 
communist heirs, and that of Chiang Kai-shek's was banished with him to 
Taiwan in 1948, where its appeal remained quite limited. But in the Nanking 
decade up to 1937, when Chiang's writ ran on the mainland without major 
challenge from the communists or the Japanese, much had been hoped for 
from the modernizing influence of the Christian colleges, from the Mass 
Education movement of the YMCA, and from the rural reconstruction 
pursued with Chiang's blessing by Y. C. Yen. 
Given the odds against it in China—in particular, given the fact that rela-
tive normalcy ended in 1937 there, as the Japanese moved in force to take 
over the whole country—it seems fair to say that the social gospel never got 
a real chance in China to show what it could do. In Meiji Japan it got a 
better chance, and for a time enjoyed a rosy promise. Perhaps nowhere else 
in Asian Christian history can we find a movement that bears closer com-
parison than Meiji Christian socialism does with the Christian social protest 
of today. 
It is not as if the odds against Christian socialism in Japan were not also 
overwhelming. A century ago, when the movement began, Christianity in 
Japan looked even more like a drop in the ocean than it does today.20 Even 
among its .2 percent of the population in the 1880s, the vast majority of the 
people, including the pietist Protestants and the new and old kinds of 
Catholics, would have been quite out of sympathy with it. In the nation as a 
whole it found itself confronting a military-industrial establishment in the 
making. 
Yet in the liberal Protestant "New Theology," bequeathed especially by 
American Unitarianism, the inspiration was found for Japan's first socialist 
party in 1901 and its first socialist premier in 1947. In the period from 1880 
to 1910 especially, this Christian socialism was "aprimum mobile in the 
agrarian, labor, and socialist movements in Japan."21 It has not ceased since 
then to leave some mark on opposition politics in Japan, though from a 
position more convergent with that of Christians in democratic politics 
elsewhere in the world in the middle decades of the twentieth century—that 
is, on the left of the prevailing center, but on the right wing ofthat left. 
4 
THE POST-COLONIAL SETTING 
Tomorrow began yesterday, as the aphorism has it. If this holds true for 
Asia and for Christianity, then by our rapid review of what their yesterdays 
have been, at a point about two-thirds of the way through the twentieth 
century, we have already learned something of what the future then held in 
store for them—something that could not be learned simply by looking at 
the subsequent record. 
If we can keep in mind those overlapping backgrounds—the global, the 
Asian, the global Christian, the Asian Christian—we shall be better pre-
pared to take a closer look at the Asian Christian experience of social pro-
test after the mid-1960s. We shall be less likely to forget how diverse are the 
tributaries that have fed the river of that experience—some of them distinc-
tively Asian, many derivative from outside the continent, and many others 
showing in various measures a cross-fertilization of Asian and Western 
influences. 
By the same stroke we shall be prepared to see how the Christian move-
ment, already transnational and even transcontinental and transhemis-
pheric to an extent not paralleled in any other of the major religions, could 
find a place of its own in a new era of nationalism and transnationalism in 
Asia. 
The Postwar Generation in the World and in Asia 
There are watersheds in history as well as in geography. World War II is 
the historical watershed that lies across the middle of the twentieth century 
like a ridge of scar tissue, dividing what went before from what came after 
as markedly, in its way, as the geographical watershed of Eurasia divides 
north from south, or as that of the Americas divides east from west. As we 
have already seen, the global society that gradually took shape after World 
War II did so in a new, post-imperial, post-colonial setting, and also devel-
oped new political fault lines of its own. 
If we try to take a bird's-eye view of the global historical landscape in the 
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generation after World War II, ignoring all but the most towering historical 
peaks in that landscape, and taking no particular account of either Asia as 
such or Christianity as such, what are the unfolding features that thrust 
themselves first on our attention? 
If we had to answer this question in a paragraph, we should have to single 
out for special mention the new bloc confrontation in Europe marked by 
the rise of the NATO alliance and the Warsaw Pact; its broadening into an 
East-West conflict with major flash points in Korea and Vietnam; the re-
sounding advances of communism in Eastern Europe, in China, and (by 
1975) in Indochina; and the eventual fragmentation within the socialist bloc 
that set China at odds with the Soviet Union and later with Vietnam. 
However, lest we should make it appear that all postwar developments 
are related to only one line of division, the East-West one, we must mention 
in the same breath the emergence of a new consciousness of North-South 
separation. This follows a vast process of decolonization and the rise of a 
nonaligned bloc; it is complicated by an endemic Arab-Israeli conflict and 
the rise of an oil cartel in a region vital to the West because of oil; in its turn 
it complicates the tensions between the splintered East and the faltering 
West as the flash points shift to Iran and Afghanistan. 
If we had to chart the postwar scene in further detail, while still confining 
the record to developments of major global historical salience, we should 
have to draw up a set of chronologies along the lines of Appendix 1 of this 
study. It might then be instructive to find out to what extent the continent 
called Asia and the religion called Christianity naturally find places in such 
a record. 
With this question in mind, let us look first at the first quarter century of 
the postwar generation. 
It turns out that Asia is a looming presence in it, while Christianity is an 
inconspicuous one. So large does Asia loom already in contemporary his-
tory that, even in this quarter century, most events of major global rever-
beration turn out to be events that occurred in Asia. 
In the case of Christianity, perhaps no more than three distinctly church-
related developments in the same period pass the same test of global politi-
cal salience. These would be the formation of the World Council of 
Churches in 1948, the galvanization of Roman Catholicism through Vatican 
II from 1962 to 1965, and the emergence of the new Christian social concern 
reflected in the international church assemblies of Beirut, Uppsala, and 
Medellin in 1968. But these events alone were portentous: they set the scene 
for a return of world Christianity in the 1970s to a higher and sharper pro-
file in world politics than it had had for some hundreds of years. 
Let us next look at the political record of the period since 1969. 
In this period too, even when viewed in a global perspective, it is clear 
that key world events turn out to be Asian events in a majority of cases. 
As for developments in the churches in the same period, perhaps only two 
THE POST-COLONIAL SETTING 49 
are on a comparable level in terms of deep and lasting public impact. These 
would be the papal succession that ended a centuries-old Italian monopoly 
in 1978, and the continental confrontation of Christian social attitudes in 
the Latin American church assemblies of Oaxtepec in 1978 and Puebla in 
1979. But then again, these alone suffice to certify the return to high-profile 
visibility of Christianity in general and of Roman Catholicism in particular 
as an actor on the global political stage. 
With these considerations we have enough data to place post-colonial 
Asian Christianity in transcontinental perspective. It is clear that we are not 
dealing with a marginal continent or with a marginal movement in world 
affairs. We are not at all leaving the center of the world stage when we focus 
on Asia. We are hardly doing so even when we focus on the Asian prolonga-
tions of the movement called Christianity. 
"Prolongations" is the word to bear in mind, for the sake of a realistic 
appraisal of Asian Christian social protest in its earlier manifestations. As 
we have seen, there is little Asian Christian social protest to report before 
1965, except by way of the prehistory of the subject. There is little that was 
not heavily dependent on extra-Asian Christian influences for another dec-
ade after that. 
Asian Christianity is derivative in this respect as it is in so many others. It 
would be strange if it were otherwise. One does not normally look to 
marginal minorities in a population for a lead in social protest, any more 
than one looks to the passenger nearest the water to be the first to rock an 
overloaded boat. 
One does not look either for such a lead to a putative Christian majority, 
if it is found only in a small country like Lebanon, when that country itself 
is on the fringe of a Muslim mass. One does not look for it even from an 
overwhelming Christian majority, if it is found even in a fair-sized country 
like the Philippines, when that majority is alone in its relative Christian 
strength, and is dwarfed by the Asian mass to whose margin it clings, and is 
marginal even in relation to the Latin American mass to which it is cultur-
ally more akin. 
The wonder is that it was not later when the phenomenon surfaced, and 
that it did not take longer to acquire some distinctively Asian features. The 
wonder is that there is so much to report so soon, as can be seen from the 
Asian items in the lists of "Other Events Relevant to Asian Christian Social 
Protest" in Appendix 3. 
We have here, in fact, an illustration of a phenomenon now widespread 
in world affairs—namely, acceleration in the diffusion of transnational 
influences—when we observe that Christianity in Asia had already devel-
oped transnational organs of its own, for militant social concern, at high 
and low levels alike, not within decades but within years of the upsurge of 
social ferment in the great Christian clearinghouses of Geneva and of Rome 
and in the awakening Catholic heartland of Latin America. 
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The Rise of Transnational Christian Bodies in Asia 
The postwar proliferation of transnational linkages in Asian Christianity 
—for communication, for consultation, for financing, for reflection, for 
action—goes well beyond the scope of a summary such as this one. Even a 
list of all kinds of transnationally organized expressions of Christian social 
concern, from "relief and rehabilitation" through "development" to "con-
scientization," would be too inclusive for our purpose. We shall have to 
confine our attention to two categories: the most representative bodies gen-
erally and the most representative ones on the social protest front specifi-
cally. 
In Asia, by the middle of the 1970s, there were three organizations that 
between them aspired to represent all kinds of Christians in all parts of the 
continent: the Federation of Asian Bishops' Conferences (FABC), the 
Christian Conference of Asia (CCA), and the Middle East Council of 
Churches (MECC). All three had been formed within the previous two 
decades—the CCA in 1958, the FABC in 1972, the MECC (at least under 
that name) in 1974. Except as an illustration of this transnational trend, the 
MECC need not concern us further; its (non-Roman) constituency is too 
tiny and too intimidated by circumambient Islam. As for the other two, 
their story is inseparable from the story of the Asian rise of militant Chris-
tian social concern. 
Because of the breadth of their claims to representativeness, and because 
of their identification with the institutional side of the Christian movement, 
the FABC and the CCA raise plausible questions as to the depth and 
strength of their roots in the Christian communities. A priori it is quite 
conceivable that they are following a social line of their own, at their rare-
fied national and transnational altitudes, without organic relationship with 
anything that is really germinating at the base. 
To check on this possibility, we need to look in two directions: on the one 
hand, at the FABC and the CCA, as the most widely representative bodies 
at the highest institutional levels within Asia; on the other hand, at move-
ments representing Christian activists (workers, peasants, students, intellec-
tuals, religious, clergy), as the most widely representative ones at levels 
closer to the Asian grassroots. 
In fact, due regard for chronological order in recording the rise of Chris-
tian activism, at least on the Catholic side, requires us to give first place to 
certain transnational initiatives at levels no loftier than that of a particular 
religious order or that of pastoral clergy in general. These go back in their 
origins as far as the CCA. They antedate the FABC by more than a decade. 
In 1962, the year of the opening of Vatican II, 40 million Asian Catholics 
made up about one-fourteenth of 540 million Catholics then in the world.1 
They were represented at the first session of the Vatican Council by some 
three hundred prelates, themselves making up about one-eighth of the 2,540 
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Council Fathers actually present.2 Those 40 million Asian Catholics were as 
little involved in the preparation of the council as the faithful elsewhere, 
and social activism is as little in evidence in reports of their activities up to 
that time as it is in those of the other 500 million Catholics.3 
In short, there were few ripples on the surface of Catholic life in Asia in 
1962, either when the bishops went to Rome or when they first came back. 
They returned to a church whose social role was seen by friends and enemies 
alike as that of a minor bastion of the prevailing order, feudal though that 
was;4 to a church seen even by the occasional church leader as preyed on by 
the demons of power, prestige, and property.5 
How isolated, at such a time, any struggle for social justice had to be, if it 
really sought to strike at the roots of injustice, is illustrated by the case of 
Father Joseph Vadakkan of Kerala. His struggle against peasant eviction 
and landlordism (by his own estimation in 1961) ranged "90 percent of the 
bishops against" him, while only one Kerala bishop spoke openly in his 
favor.6 
Such was the pattern in South Asia. In East Asia too there were those 
who were prophets before their time. One of them was Walter Hogan, 
the prime mover in the pioneering Jesuit social action network, Socio-
Economic Life in Asia (SELA). SELA dates back to 1959, anticipating by a 
decade the establishment of the more general Jesuit transnational Asian 
network, the Bureau of Asian Affairs (BAA). Here already we have the 
beginnings of a new pattern, a pattern of transnational thinking deriving its 
urgency from social concern, and expressed in the rationale that "national 
boundaries could no longer be the only basis for effective work in Asia."7 
Activists of this vintage—prophetic and ahead of their time—whether 
they were Asian-born like Vadakkan or missionaries like Hogan, were to 
find that they would have to spend a time in the wilderness before receiving 
a kind of vindication in the 1970s.' 
Is there a single date that can be said to mark the turning point, the point 
at which the social action scene in Asian Catholicism became something 
more than a silence broken here and there by voices in the wilderness? Inso-
far as there is such a date, it might best be set in 1965. 
This was a landmark year in many fields. In the East-West conflict it was 
the year of a fateful escalation of the Indochina war. In China it was the 
year of the launching of the no less fateful Great Proletarian Cultural Revo-
lution. In global Catholicism it was the year of the ending of Vatican II—an 
ending that was really a beginning for so much more than was then fore-
seen. And in Asian Catholicism it was the year of the launching, in Hong 
Kong, of the first transnational movement involving Asian diocesan priests 
in social action. 
This was called PISA, or Priests' Institute for Social Action. It was one 
of the earliest initiatives sponsored by SELA. 
The PISA meeting was something less than a media event.' No one would 
have been surprised had it proved as modest in its fruits as in itself. As 
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things worked out, however, it was not destined to sink into oblivion, not at 
least for another couple of decades. A whole series of developments related 
to Christian social protest in these decades gave proof that PISA repre-
sented something more than a passing trend. It has a logical place at the 
head of a list of some dozens of these developments in Appendix 3. 
With PISA, social concern found a point of entry into the mainstream of 
the Catholic apostolate. Many scattered initiatives of Catholic inspiration 
now began to come into their own: farmers' and workers' movements, re-
search and training centers, a Brotherhood of Asian Trade Unions, a 
Federation of Free Farmers, an Asian Social Institute, an Indian Social 
Institute, an Institute of Social Order. 
By 1966, as a direct result of PISA, the Philippine half of Catholic Asia 
had its NASSA, or National Secretariat of Social Action, which was later to 
play a crucial role in the social struggle. By 1967, training courses had been 
held in the Philippines for the first set of diocesan directors of social ac-
tion.10 By 1970, when the Asian bishops met in Manila for the first Asian 
assembly in their history, some winds of change were blowing not only from 
Rome, Geneva, and Medellin, and not only from the fronts of hot and cold 
Asian wars, but also from the Asian Catholic grassroots in the Philippines, 
Korea, India, and Vietnam. 
At least they blew strongly enough to evoke from the bishops assembled 
in Manila the commitment to be more truly, in Asia and with the Asians, 
"the church of the poor . . . the Church of the young."11 
The Representative Asian Body for Rome-Related Christians: the FABC 
What has already been said about the Federation of Asian Bishops' Con-
ferences (p. 38) shows the sense in which the FABC can be called the repre-
sentative Catholic body in Asia. 
In the absolute sense there is no such thing, of course, as a truly repre-
sentative body for the Asian majority of humankind, or for the followers of 
any religion in Asia. Catholics in particular have long been accustomed to 
being represented by church leaders in whose selection they have had no say 
whatever. In the fifth century Pope Leo the Great could say that people in 
charge in the Church should be subject to acceptance by all those they were 
in charge of ("Quiprofuturus est omnibus ab omnibus eligatur"). By the 
twentieth century, at least up to the twenty-first Catholic Council, this tra-
dition had long been lost sight of, and neither pastors nor flock saw a need 
for any mandate for the former from the latter beyond a passive assent to a 
particularly authoritarian ecclesiastical system. 
The Catholic pastors in Asia, however, did have that kind of unques-
tioned mandate from the Catholic faithful. They were also much better 
organized to make use of their mandate in the 1970s than they had been 
before. 
The case of the FABC presents us with another of our transnational nov-
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cities. Neither in Asia nor elsewhere have Catholics been accustomed to 
having levels of representation above bishops but below the Holy See. For 
most countries the development of even national conferences of bishops 
does not date back much further than the middle of the twentieth century; 
and the development of continental federations of bishops is more recent 
still. The Latin American bishops were breaking new ground when they 
formed their own transnational structure, CELAM, in 1955. The Asian 
bishops, for their part, had never gotten together en masse anywhere before 
the 1960s, when they did so during the four sessions of Vatican II. They had 
never gotten together in Asia before 1970, when some 180 of them gathered 
in Manila in advance of Pope Paul VI's Asian-Australasian tour. 
Formal approval of the FABC by the Holy See did not come until 1972. 
Strained exchanges behind the scenes reflected an awareness on both sides 
that something substantive was at stake. As an innovation in horizontal 
communication in the Church, the FABC had to overcome formidable 
obstacles of distance, of differences in language and culture, and even of 
Catholic and of Roman conditioning; for it ran counter to a structure in 
which, even at the level of bishops, communication was almost exclusively 
vertical. 
Thus, the mere birth of the FABC was a portentous change in Asian 
Christian history. Once that change had come about, the whole outlook for 
change was no longer the same. 
So signs of change began to multiply. For data on them we turn to three 
sources, in descending order of institutional authority: the contributions 
from Asia at the Synods of Bishops in Rome; the general assemblies of the 
FABC; and the field of action of the FABC social office. But we shall have 
to go beyond the public record of all of these for evidence of an important 
rift in the FABC on the social question. 
Asia at the Synods of Bishops 
The Synods of Bishops in Rome were another novel transnational eccle-
siastical structure of the post-conciliar period. Inaugurated in 1967, preoc-
cupied with internal problems in 1969, the Synods began to look outward in 
1971. 
The session of 1971 was on justice and ministry; that of 1974, on evan-
gelization; that of 1977, on catechetics; that of 1980, on the family. The 
score or so of Asian bishops present each time amounted to only about 5 
percent of the FABC and only about 10 percent of the Synod participants; 
but the overall evolution of the Synods was a primary reference point for 
the overall evolution of the FABC. Thus, the 1974 FABC Assembly cited 
the 1971 Synod, as we shall see; and the 1978 FABC Assembly was careful 
to note that it defined "liberation" according to Pope Paul's Evangelii 
Nuntiandi, which filtered and synthesized the Findings of the 1974 Synod.12 
Among statements emanating directly from the Synods, we have already 
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seen (p. 16) the landmark formulation in the declaration of 1971 affirming 
"action for justice . . . as a constitutive dimension of the preaching of the 
Gospel"; and in the 1974 declaration we are given a reaffirmation of this, 
reworded as "the intimate connection between evangelization and libera-
tion."13 Among statements made by Asian bishops at the Synods, two in 
particular were widely noticed and have particular relevance for our inquiry 
—one by Cardinal Kim of Seoul in the 1974 Synod, and one by Archbishop 
Binh of Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon) in the 1977 Synod. 
At the 1974 Synod Cardinal Kim stated the case for wholehearted church 
commitment to action for social change in perhaps the boldest terms yet 
heard from any Asian hierarchical source. Let us hear him at some length, 
remembering that these words have not come cheaply from a churchman 
whose government was holding one of his fellow bishops in jail at the very 
time he spoke in Rome. 
We are here to seek ways of making the "Christ-event," the reality of 
Christ, a reality in the hearts of the people of this age, in such a way that 
our world is really transformed by the Gospel. . . . Evangelization in 
any given historical context must always be conceived in such a way that 
it really corresponds to the needs and aspirations of the people of the 
period in question. 
When we apply this to Asia . . . [with] its daily increasing multitudes 
. . . it is unthinkable that this most urgent of tasks (promotion of social 
justice) should be treated as peripheral, or as secondary to "direct 
evangelization," since in fact it is the chief demand made of the church 
of our time. This task was already declared by the 1971 Synod of Bishops 
" a constitutive dimension" of evangelization; still better, it must come 
to be seen as the concrete actualization of the sacramentality of the 
Church. 
That the Church may be really the "great sign of credibility" spoken 
of by Vatican II, it must become more and more a Church not for itself 
but for the life of the world. Especially in Asia it must be manifested to 
all, and especially to the poor and to the young, as a community that 
voluntarily exposes its own life to the greatest damage and danger for the 
sake of meeting mankind's most pressing needs. . . . 
As the miracles of Christ were signs of reconciliation and salvation, so 
also the promotion of justice in the world today can manifest the power 
of the resurrection of the Lord, and can reconcile all men and make all 
things new. This is in fact a sign of great credibility; it is the true Gospel; 
it is real evangelization. . . . 
This is the unanimous view of the Episcopal Conferences of Asia as 
reflected in the statements made [in this Synod]. . . ."' 
At the 1977 Synod it was the turn of a church leader from the other side 
of Asia's ideological line of confrontation to contribute a notable state-
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ment—one of the few statements, in fact, that made a jaded public take 
some notice of that Synod. Archbishop Binh undertook to speak to and for 
those who have to address the gospel to a milieu dominated by Marxism. 
Nobody at such a level had yet spoken on that topic as forthrightly as he 
did. For Catholics "impregnated with Marxism-Leninism," he said, there 
should be no hesitation about translating the gospel into Marxist terms, any 
more than there was hesitation about translating it into Aristotelian or exis-
tentialist terms.15 
Binh's voice was not only a lonely one for that Synod or any other. It was 
a lonely one even among the voices of bishops in Vietnam itself. As can be 
seen from a glance at Appendix 3, a solitary supporting voice, that of a 
fellow archbishop in Hue, had changed its tune from support to criticism of 
the government that same year. Of course the Binh manifesto had enor-
mous significance for Christians already looking forward to seeing the 
"new leaven" (of Marxism) "at work in the Church." Such at least were 
the terms in which Canon François Houtart of Louvain congratulated the 
clergy and religious of Binh's diocese the following year. 
More than any other church which is living the beginning of socialism, 
you here in Vietnam bear the hopes of millions of Christians throughout 
the world." 
It will have been noticed that a claim to wide representativeness is made in 
connection with both Synod speeches. For our purpose here, representative-
ness is not the point. The word unanimous actually disappeared from the 
translation of Cardinal Kim's speech when it appeared in an FABC-
sponsored collection. When questioned about it, the cardinal conceded that 
his original sensus unanimus had been a bit too strong.17 Similarly, for bet-
ter or worse, it would be hard to prove that "the hope of millions of Chris-
tians throughout the world" has been invested more in the Church of 
Vietnam than in, say, the Church of Poland. But both Synod speeches are 
of some consequence even if taken only as high water marks of boldness in 
Asian ecclesiastical statements. 
The FA ВС Assemblies 
Apart from the Manila meeting of 1970, there were only two occasions in 
the 1970s when the FABC spoke as a body. Its two plenary sessions of the 
decade were held in Taipei (1974) and in Calcutta (1978). The Manila state­
ment spoke for all who were present. With 180 bishops present, that as­
sembly was the largest Asian episcopal gathering up to that time. The Taipei 
and Calcutta statements were endorsed by the voting participants, who had 
a well-defined mandate from all the bishops (about double the Manila num­
ber) in fourteen Asian countries. 
What line, then, emerged as the voice of the FABC? In the texts of 1974 
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and 1978, the commitment of 1970 to be "the Church of the poor and of the 
young" was "wholeheartedly reaffirmed.""The 1974 document included 
in this reaffirmation the conclusions of the first Bishops' Institute for Social 
Action (BISA)—the only BISA that had taken place by that date. No BISAs 
were mentioned in the 1978 document, which was concerned with prayer 
(the 1974 meeting had been concerned with evangelization) and which in 
any case "wholeheartedly reaffirmed" the recommendations of 1974. 
The statements thus endorse both the prevailing line of the BISA meet-
ings and the prevailing social emphasis of the episcopal voices emanating 
from Rome, Medellin, and Puebla. Thus, the 1974 statement, citing the 
1971 Synod on "action for justice . . . as a constitutive dimension of the 
preaching of the Gospel," went on to say: 
We affirm this teaching again, for we believe that this, in our time, is 
part and parcel of "preaching the Good News to the poor" (Matt. 11:5; 
Lk. 4:18). . . . Engaged in tasks for justice in accordance with the spirit 
and the demands of the Gospel, we will realize that the search for holi-
ness and the search for justice, evangelization, and the promotion of true 
human development and liberation are not only not opposed, but make 
up today the integral preaching of the Gospel, especially in Asia." 
Similarly, the 1978 statement related its topic, prayer, to the concern for 
"total human liberation" in these words: 
Far from alienating us from sharing in man's responsibility for the world 
and for the establishment of just and loving relationships among men 
and groups in society, prayer commits us to the true liberation of per-
sons. It binds us to solidarity with the poor and powerless, the margin-
alized and oppressed in our societies. It is prayer which brings us to the 
understanding of how injustice is rooted in the selfishness and sinfulness 
of men's hearts. It is prayer which will help us to discern the tasks and 
deeds which can call on the Spirit to create within us both the courage 
and the love to bring about conversion in men's hearts and the renewal of 
societal structures.20 
To be sure, it is only realistic to reserve judgment as to how seriously 
these words were meant, or as to whether the FABC could ever live up to 
them even if it were unanimous in wanting to do so. It was never to be ex-
pected that church leaders, in the Asian Catholic or in any other church, 
would suddenly make the break that had been promised in 1970 with the 
"compromising entanglements" of the past. 
The weight of the past was in fact to lie heavily on them. The choice of 
Taipei as the venue for the first assembly meant that the FABC would make 
its debut before the world as the honored guest of Asia's longest-running 
martial law regime. Nobody could pretend that this had not been foreseen. 
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Similarly, the choice of prayer as the topic for the second assembly was 
bound to be interpreted by some as masking a retreat from social commit-
ment, assertions to the contrary notwithstanding.2' And the country-by-
country record of the hierarchies left plenty of room for skepticism about 
that commitment. 
All this is only to say that the FABC was taking shape in Asia, not on the 
moon. The assemblies could hardly be blamed for taking account of the fact 
that Asia was still politically polarized in 1974, or of the fact that it was still 
the continent of the great religions in 1978. We must look further before 
forming any firm impressions as to what was the overall tilt of the FABC by 
the end of its first decade. 
The FABC Office for Human Development 
The outlook for change was itself changed by the mere establishment of 
the FABC, and it was on the social front that change went furthest in the 
first years. Among the specialized service agencies set up by the FABC, the 
first to move into action and generate a whole series of further actions was 
the one called the Office for Human Development. It was an idea whose 
time had clearly come, thanks to the intercontinental Christian prise de 
conscience focused for Catholics in Vatican II and in the Synods of 
Bishops, and thanks also to the specifically Asian conditioning already 
outlined. 
True to the pattern we have seen already—new breakthroughs in trans-
national thinking spearheaded by urgent social concern—the FABC Office 
for Human Development (OHD) was organized and ready for action before 
the FABC itself was formally constituted. A survey tour in 1972 by its first 
chairperson, Bishop Labayen of the Philippines, found something to report 
by way of church structures for promoting development in Hong Kong, 
Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, but more par-
ticularly in Indonesia, the Philippines, India, and Thailand. An overall 
appraisal by the OHD's first executive secretary noted the presence of 
"three perspectives of social welfare"—relief, development, and liberation. 
As for the liberation perspective (the only one involving social protest in our 
sense), the secretary found that, with scarcely an exception, 
. . . there is no national committee [of the OHD] where the "liberator" 
feels at home in a development office or atmosphere.. . . Hardly ever 
will a committed liberator accept a function in development work. . . . It 
is hardly possible to obtain funds from funding agencies for liberation 
work.22 
Why the uneasiness about the "liberator"? It is worth pausing on this 
question, since it highlights the interplay of international influences we have 
been considering in the Asian context. 
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Fundamentally the reaction in question must be seen as the stiffening 
common to all social institutions when faced with a substantive threat to the 
social status quo in which they have been rooted. More specifically in the 
Asian Christian case, it must be seen as the fear of the concrete social al-
ternative. 
In no country in the region, and at no time in the period in question, does 
the institutional Christian leadership cease to look over its shoulder at the 
"menace" of communism. Where the menace has been felt to loom largest, 
as in South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Indonesia, Christian leadership 
attitudes will range from firmly to obsessively anticommunist. Elsewhere 
outside the socialist states, as in the Philippines, India, Sri Lanka, and Ja-
pan, an anticommunist priority among church leaders will still command 
solid national majorities, but no longer entirely to the exclusion of minori-
ties who rate the need for social change above any risk of "communist in-
filtration." On occasion, as attested by the Houtart citation above, a 
minority among these minorities will make an explicit option for a Marxist 
or a Marxist-Leninist political model. But few among these will claim that 
their hour is near to striking. 
If the period has witnessed any letting down of the guard of "the 
Church" in this sense, that probably happened before the mid-1970s rather 
than after. With the dismantling of the mystique of Maoism in China and 
the outbreak of intersocialist wars in Indochina, it was as if some scales had 
fallen from Christian eyes on Asia's maritime fringe. In the matter-of-fact 
words of the General Secretary of the Christian Conference of Asia in 1980, 
"today it is harder to sell Marxism to Christians in Asia."23 
But let us return to the 1972 appraisal by the OHD secretary. At the time 
it was written, seven years remained of the 1970s. In that period, if the 
OHD made a mark on the Asian Catholic consciousness, it is safe to say it 
was made mainly through the five seminars held in that period in the series 
called the Bishops' Institute for Social Action (BISA) on the Social Dimen-
sions of the Gospel. 
BIS As I through III were held on a sub-regional basis in 1974 and 1975. 
Together they involved over 60 bishops from over 20 countries and a total 
of 147 participants. Feedback from BISA I showed that the idea that had 
sunk in best was "the need to be a Church of the poor."" Further feedback 
was made possible by the Asian Seminar held near Bangkok in 1977, in 
which sixty-one people involved in Catholic social action in ten countries 
discussed the practical application of the "BISA document" summarizing 
the thinking of the first three BISAs. 
What emerged was that, while no one quarreled openly with the theory, 
all countries had some trouble with the practice, including those where the 
action groups were most committed. Thus, a Korean consensus reported 
"deep doubt about the possibility of realizing this ideal in practice," while 
the Thai group tempered its "eager welcome" for the ideal with the still 
bleaker comment, "The teachings seem unrealistic." The Thais confessed 
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to a time-honored concern that church social work should be done "equally 
with the rich." The Koreans touched a nerve less often probed: "The 
present church structure cannot be poor."25 
BISA IV was held near Manila in 1978 with thirty bishops present; BISA 
V in 1979 in Baguio with thirty-seven. Each of these meetings originally 
aimed at representing the entire FABC region, as well as including observers 
from outside the region; each also provided for exposure of bishops to con-
ditions of poverty in several countries. 
The overall effect was a deepening of commitment and a deepening of 
interconfessional and intercontinental solidarity. In their final statement 
after BISA IV, the participants echoed the theme of the 1977 CCA As-
sembly of their Protestant Asian counterparts, Jesus Christ in Asian Suf-
fering and Hope. They recognized the risks of both solidarity with the poor 
and the gospel command "to risk everything for the growth of God's 
Kingdom." In their final statement after BISA V, the participants echoed 
the consensus of their Catholic Latin American counterparts (reaffirmed in 
the 1979 Puebla Assembly) "that our preferential option should be for the 
poor." They proposed Human Rights in the Contemporary World as a 
theme for the Synod of Bishops.26 
The BISA seminars had involved about one in four of the FABC bishops. 
These bishops were not necessarily simply the left wing of the Asian episco-
pates; the selection process ensured a certain representativeness that in fact 
excluded a certain number of the most socially radical bishops. At the same 
time, some consideration had to be given to involving bishops who were 
positively interested in being involved; and this opened the way for a "BISA 
line" to emerge which might not be representative for the FABC as a whole. 
It was on a geographical basis, however, that the clearest evidence of 
strain emerged in the relationship of the OHD to its parent body. 
The East- West Rift in the FABC 
Historically, in Asia, the chief rivalry for influence has come from the 
two giant cultural ensembles, China and India. The cultures of these two 
countries dominated the regions now called East Asia and South Asia, and 
carried into the space between them a competition for cultural dominance 
reflected in geographical terms like Indochina and Indonesia. 
In postwar Asian Catholicism the pattern had to be different, given the 
relative weakness of Catholicism in East Asia and its lopsided strength in 
the Philippines. Hence the main polarity that developed was between India 
and the Philippines. Two factors combined to sharpen it. 
On the one hand, the social question took on an urgency in the client-
state, martial-law Philippines that was partly deflected in India by the 
professed nonalignment and eclecticism of that country in relation to the 
capitalist and the socialist blocs. At the same time, the majority status of 
Catholicism in the Philippines made for a relative boldness in prophetic 
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social witness by its church leaders, as compared with that of church leaders 
in continental South Asia. There the leaders tended to be cowed by minority 
insecurity into toeing the line of whatever regime was in power. 
The moment of truth came in each country with the assumption of emer-
gency powers by its current chief of government—by Ferdinand Marcos in 
1972 in the Philippines, by Indira Gandhi in 1975 in India. When the dust 
settled, a certain distance had developed between the political responses of 
Filipino and Indian church leaders, both Roman and non-Roman. 
There were other factors—notably the greater Indian predisposition to 
favor the contemplative over the active dimension in religion, and the factor 
of caste. It could only be a matter of time before the tensions would come to 
a head. They were already present among the Asian theologians when they 
met at Wennappuwa in January 1979 to formulate a common response to 
the Asian challenge. They had come out in the open in the OHD by May 
1979, when a chapter of semi-accidents ended in switching the site for BISA 
V from India to the Philippines, and in the concerted though not quite com-
plete abstention of the South Asian episcopates from participation in that 
seminar. There followed a four-year hiatus before a sixth conference in the 
series was successfully assembled in 1983. 
No hint of this high-level dissension can be seen directly in the record of 
the common organs of the FABC—FABC Newsletter and Info on Human 
Development. To know of it, one would have had to hear the copious 
private comment on both sides from 1979 on. It was like the rift that devel-
oped the following year in Latin America between the Brazilian episcopal 
leadership and the official CELAM leadership; it was an open secret, but it 
was in nobody's interest to make it more official than it had to be. The 
furthest that any side went towards formalizing it was in the following, 
from "The Report of the Standing Committee" in the record of the biennial 
meeting of the Indian bishops of October 1979: 
. . . The first meeting . . . of Bishops of the South Asian Region (India, 
Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Bangladesh) from March 24-27, 1979 . . . of-
fered the occasion to consider the forthcoming BISA V and the slanted 
composition of the panel of animators. 
The Bishops of India declined to take part in . . . BISA V. . . . The 
non-participation of the Indian Bishops raises the important question of 
the way the entire FABC is organized and the weightage to be given to 
the pronouncements and doings of its subsidiary organizations.27 
Clearly this was not a happy moment for the FABC dream of 1970. Must 
we read in these words the thud of a heavy body coming back to earth after 
a doomed attempt to take to the air? 
Before we do that, we ought to take account of subsequent attempts to 
patch things up, both through new protestations of unity and through 
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further efforts to make OHD pronouncements and doings (and personnel) 
more representative of the whole FABC region. Let us therefore reserve 
judgment until we can put both the early euphoria and the later malaise into 
a larger perspective. 
The Representative Body for Other Christians: the CCA 
We have noted that Roman Catholicism accounts for about half of all 
Asian Christians. About two-thirds of the remainder are Protestants, leav-
ing some millions of Oriental Christians. These latter are not found in sig-
nificant numbers in the crescent of countries relevant to our inquiry, except 
in the case of the couple of millions of Syrian Christians in India. 
We have noted also the rise of an organization representing Christians in 
Asia not in communion with Rome—the organization known today as the 
Christian Conference of Asia (CCA). When launched in 1959, this structure 
was something new on the non-Roman horizon, just as the Latin American 
CELAM, when launched in 1955, had been something new on the Christian 
horizon. Both were not only transnational but also transcontinental. 
CCA and FABC: Comparisons and Contrasts 
The FABC and the CCA are only roughly comparable, even in geographi-
cal scope. Like the FABC, the CCA excludes the countries of Southwest 
Asia; unlike the FABC, it includes Australia and New Zealand. If these 
latter are not counted, the CCA had in the 1970s an Asian constituency of 
about 40 million Christians. 
Other parallels also are only approximate. As the FABC finds its chief 
extra-Asian point of reference in the Vatican, in the Second Vatican Coun-
cil, and in the Synods of Bishops, so also, but in a much looser way, the 
CCA finds its chief extra-Asian point of reference in the World Council of 
Churches, in the WCC General Assemblies (Amsterdam 1948, Evanston 
1954, New Delhi 1961, Uppsala 1968, Nairobi 1975), and in the interim 
activities of WCC bodies. 
We shall give some prominence to that point of reference, partly because 
Asians are prominent in their own right on the transcontinental Christian 
scene, and distinctly more so in the Protestant world than in the Catholic 
one. At the same time we must bear in mind that, true to their stronger sense 
of ecclesial autonomy and Asian equal dignity, CCA leaders would be at 
pains to correct any impression that the CCA is in any sense a branch office 
of the WCC. 
The dissymmetry shown in the comparison of the CCA with the FABC 
goes still further. The linkages in the CCA are no more hierarchical in rela-
tion to local churches than in relation to transcontinental bodies. The 
FABC, for its part, has no collective binding power over its constituent 
churches beyond what its members have individually; but Catholic bishops 
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and hierarchies do have more local leverage over the implementation of 
their collective resolutions than CCA delegates have. A certain feeling of 
being relatively rootless and free-floating is in this sense more characteristic 
of a Protestant than of a Catholic transnational structure. 
The negative side of this relative freedom in the Protestant structure is 
isolation from the mass base (though only in terms of formal power). The 
positive aspect is the freedom from inhibition that goes with lack of formal 
jurisdiction. A General Secretary of the CCA, unlike a Secretary General of 
the FABC, has no difficulty in remarking casually and cheerfully: 
We're not so dear as to what we're for.. . . We're not so concerned 
about what was said before.. . . We're more concerned with action than 
with spinning phrases.28 
That "spinning phrases" suggests a still more crucial dissymmetry. The 
great phrase-spinner of the CCA was its Sri Lankan father figure, D. T. 
Niles. His phrases continue to adorn CCA information folders and to in-
spire its orientation. His vision of the CCA would make of it an institution 
dedicated to going against the grain of institutions: 
The churches as institutions are geared more to conserving the gains of 
the past than to attempting the tasks of the future. The necessity, there-
fore, is for the churches to have those frontiersmen who are willing, as it 
were, to venture into uncharted territory, whether of thought or action 
or organization. To give these frontiersmen a sense of solidarity, en-
couragement and sharpened insight is a prime concern for such an or-
ganization as the CCA.29 
Brave words, these! Some would even call them quixotic on the part of an 
enterprise that after two decades had yet to raise a tenth of its annual budget 
from within its constituency.30 But the enterprise bears watching all the 
more because of that. It should give us a chance to see whether there is such 
a thing as an institution capable of defying successfully the supposedly iron 
laws of sociology and economics. 
The CCA counted six assemblies by the end of the 1970s. As in the case of 
the FABC, there was an "antenatal" assembly two years before the CCA's 
formal inauguration; as the FABC idea was launched in Asia's country of 
chief Catholic strength, the Philippines, so the CCA idea was launched 
(though under mainly South Asian leadership) in Asia's country of chief 
Protestant strength, Indonesia. The inaugural session of the CCA was in 
Kuala Lumpur in 1959; it was followed by two assemblies in Bangkok. The 
1970s assemblies took place in Singapore in 1973 (when the present name 
was adopted) and in Penang in 1977. The seventh assembly was held in 
Bangalore in 1981. 
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CCA Christians on the World Christian Scene 
Can we trace a shift in social attitude in the CCA as in the FABC? The 
question is complicated by the dissymmetries referred to above. Assemblies 
representing Christians other than those in communion with Rome cannot 
speak with one voice in the way that has been possible for representative 
Catholic bodies. There is nothing on the Protestant side to compare with the 
organic development of official Catholic social teaching in a series of papal, 
conciliar, and synodal pronouncements. 
But that is not to say there is any less evidence of a shift in social attitude 
in the global Protestant leadership than in the global Catholic leadership. 
On the contrary, the winds of change on that front have blown more 
strongly around the churches linked with Geneva than around the churches 
linked with Rome. The more participatory structures of Protestantism have 
left doors and windows wide open to them. 
The pressure for a more militant social stand in the WCC came first from 
the Third World churches. The Third World had provided an Indian chair-
person of the Central Committee by 1968 and a black General Secretary by 
1972. A tribute from the latter to the former, made at the 1977 CCA As-
sembly, provides us with one perspective on the Asian contribution to 
Christian social protest in the world: 
For us Christians, it was Asians, led by M. M. Thomas, who in the 1940s 
and 1950s started the process of analyzing the social revolution from a 
Christian basis and with the tools of Marxist critique, and thereby as-
sisted us in other areas of the Third World to begin to pay attention to 
the justice of God as an essential part of the message of the Kingdom of 
God." 
This Third World influence reached the point in 1970 where the WCC 
Fund to Combat Racism began to be shared with black guerrilla movements 
in Africa. Throughout the 1970s, despite vehement controversy, there was 
no retreat from this policy. 
Third World militancy, however, is only one of the pressures at work in 
the WCC. Another pressure has been brought by the Orthodox churches 
since their entry in 1961. This has tended in the direction of keeping social 
concern from going "too far," especially wherever it has involved any criti-
cism of the policies and practices of the Warsaw Pact. 
Moreover, among the Protestants themselves, there has been a sizable 
minority that has rejected altogether the conciliar-ecumenical-activist ten-
dency in favor of a conservative-evangelical-pietist spirit. This minority 
found its rallying point in the World Mission Congress of Lausanne in 
1974—which nevertheless expressed "penitence" for having formerly op-
posed evangelism and social action, and affirmed instead that both were 
"part of our Christian duty."" 
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These tensions remained unresolved throughout the decade. They were 
reflected starkly in 1980. Before that year was out, the increasingly shared 
desire for a common world congress on mission had resulted not in one but 
in three international mission congresses: a Roman Catholic one in Manila 
in December 1979, a WCC-sponsored one in Melbourne in May 1980, and a 
Lausanne-inspired one in Pattaya, Thailand, in June of the same year. 
It is notable that all three congresses found some common ground in the 
notion of a providence that privileged the poor. In Manila the poor were 
called "ultimately the privileged community and agents of salvation." In 
Melbourne the participants declared themselves "challenged by the suf-
fering of the poor." Even in Pattaya the idea surfaced, though more 
obliquely, that "God is biased in favor of the poor."33 
What is the clue to the future here: the persistence of divisions, or the 
emergence of this overarching consensus on the providentially privileged 
role of the poor? 
Only the future can answer that question. If events should show that the 
apparent consensus transcended not only national and confessional bound-
aries, but even the chasm between ecumenicals and evangelicals within the 
confessions, that would have truly major social implications. Certainly 
events showed no such thing within 1980—not at least within the American 
heartland of evangelicalism, where in that same year a self-styled Christian 
Moral Majority resoundingly repudiated any departure from the Puritan 
spirit at Pattaya or elsewhere. 
But let us return to the ecumenical mainstream. As in Catholicism, so in 
Protestantism, the new language in high places on social questions took on 
its contemporary tone in the mid-1960s. 
A measure of the willingness of the WCC to take a radical social turn was 
shown in the WCC Conference on Church and Society, held (with Roman 
Catholic participation) in Geneva in 1966. It talked of "theology of revolu-
tion," which went beyond anything that would have found such a high-level 
forum in official Catholic circles at that time. 
Two years later the WCC joined forces with the Vatican in Beirut in an 
Ecumenical Conference on Development (their first on an international 
scale) and in the joint agency for social concerns, SODEPAX. (SODEPAX 
lasted till 1980; it remains to be seen whether its demise in that year was 
another sign of a turn-of-the-decade ebbing of the activist tide.) 
Social concern loomed large in the WCC Assemblies of Uppsala (1968) 
and of Nairobi (1975), though by no means large enough to transcend the 
tension between ecumenicals and evangelicals. 
Uppsala spoke of "the ever-widening gap between the rich and the poor" 
as being "the crucial point of decision today."34 Nairobi's program guide-
lines spoke of "the basic Christian imperative to participate in the struggle 
for human dignity and social justice." Nairobi also gave currency to a for-
mula that became the special WCC contribution to defining the goal of 
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Christian action in the world: "a just, participatory, and sustainable global 
society" (JPSS). 
On the relation, however, between what it called "social action" and 
what it called "evangelism," Nairobi found nothing new to say: it simply 
reaffirmed both, essentially as Lausanne had done. In general, first impres-
sions of observers tended to see the transition from Uppsala to Nairobi in 
terms of a shift from militancy to "moderation," from radicalism to "con-
solidation."" 
The social-gospel trend nevertheless held firm in other ways. There was a 
continuing willingness to let the agenda of the Church be set by the world, 
and especially by the Third World and its major component, Asia. When 
the WCC held its World Mission Conference of 1973 in Bangkok, "the 
challenge of social revolution" was cited as one of its "starting points for a 
new day."36 This was more a question than an answer in the CCA's Fifth 
Assembly, held in Singapore the same year, on the theme Christian Action 
in the Asian Struggle: 
Where should the weight of the support of the CCA, with its prophetic as 
well as its pastoral concerns, fall—on the radicals, on the majority, or on 
the silent ones on the middle path?37 
The WCC 1975 Assembly could have been a good occasion for clarifying 
the matter, especially since that Assembly was originally supposed to have 
been held in Asia (in Jakarta), having as its theme the slogan "Jesus Christ 
Frees and Unites." But the organizers failed to reckon with Indonesian 
Muslim opposition, or perhaps rather with the capacity of Christian and 
Muslim fundamentalists in Indonesia to provoke each other beyond endur-
ance. In 1974 the venue for the Assembly had to be switched to Nairobi. 
The embarrassment was seen by the outgoing Chairperson of the Central 
Committee—M. M. Thomas, himself an Asian—as "a judgment on church 
growth propaganda in Indonesia."38 
The Nairobi Assembly was more representative of its constituency than 
any comparable Catholic body. According to figures released, of its 700 
delegates (among some 2,300 participants), 40 percent were lay, 20 percent 
women, and 10 percent under 30 years old.39 It also more faithfully reflected 
the divisions of its constituency; and these divisions effectively muffled any 
social clarion call that might have come from the Asian fraction (a fifth or 
so) of its delegates. When these took time off in Nairobi for Asian gather-
ings, they found unbridgeable differences precisely where a common voice 
seemed most urgently needed—among the Koreans, the Indians, and the 
Filipinos.40 
Reviewing at Nairobi the course of recent events in the Christian world, 
the retiring Central Committee Chairperson claimed to find a certain con-
vergence in the thinking represented at Rome in 1971 (the Synod of 
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Bishops), at Bangkok in 1973 (the WCC World Mission Conference), and at 
Lausanne in 1974 (the evangelical World Mission Congress). He described it 
as a convergence in favor of an emphasis on "the whole Gospel for the 
whole man in the whole world"; in favor of relating evangelical and eccle-
sial questions; and in favor of an "affirmation of the realities of the con-
temporary world."4' Given the strains of its unwieldy constituency, it was 
perhaps achievement enough for Nairobi to allow that assessment to stand. 
The Evolution of the CCA 
All this is part of the background of the progressive prise de conscience of 
the CCA. A further part of that background is the lead given for links be-
tween the CCA and the FABC by the shared operations of the WCC and the 
Vatican—from 1965, a Joint Working Group; from 1968, Roman Catholic 
membership in the WCC Faith and Order Commission; from 1968 through 
1980, joint RC-WCC sponsorship of SODEPAX. 
Structures for such CCA-FABC links were part of the plan of both from 
the beginning—a CCA program unit for unity, an FABC Office of Ecu-
menism. But, in keeping with the pattern by which it has been on the social 
front that transnational trails have tended to be blazed, contacts were devel-
oping on that front well before the FABC Office of Ecumenism had any-
thing to report.42 By the time of the Penang CCA Assembly of 1977, these 
contacts had become accepted to the point where one of the principal ad-
dresses of that Assembly was given by Bishop Labayen, who was then the 
chief FABC spokesperson, not on ecumenism, but on social action. 
Between Nairobi and Penang, the CCA found itself with no real reason 
for euphoria in its preparation for its Sixth Assembly. As a CCA commen-
tator put it, "the Christian community remains largely a barking dog 
without much bite."4 ' Africans and Asians had questioned the African and 
Asian credibility of the Nairobi slogan, Jesus Christ Frees and UnitesM; no 
such questionable claim was embodied in the Penang theme, Jesus Christ in 
Asian Suffering and Hope.45 
The Penang venue, like the Nairobi venue, was not the original choice; 
the meeting had been planned for Manila. The fact that this plan had to be 
abandoned is in some degree a measure of the growing divergence between 
political trends in regimes like Manila's and political thinking in organiza-
tions like the CCA. Even this "non-biting dog," the CCA, at this point in 
its and in Asia's history, could no longer easily find a place where it could 
feel free to bark. 
The General Secretary of the CCA before and after Penang was Yap Kim 
Hao of Malaysia. By way of emphasizing what a long way the organization 
had come in its twenty years, he told the Assembly: 
In a real sense ours is one of the most important religious gatherings in 
A s i a . . . . No other Asian Christian meeting is as fully and officially 
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representative of the established churches as this Assembly. No other 
Asian Christian group can claim as many recognized leaders as this As-
sembly. No other Asian Christian voice is as authentic an expression of 
Orthodox and Protestant views as this Assembly. No other Asian Chris-
tian conference is also as diverse in its composition as this Assembly.4* 
Of the concrete assertions here, the last two at least are beyond any seri-
ous question. What is more to our purpose is to inquire whether and how 
the growth of the CCA has modified its nature. 
One could find a hint on this in the question cited earlier in connection 
with the 1973 Assembly: where should the weight of the support of the 
CCA, with its prophetic as well as its pastoral concerns, fall—on the radi-
cals, on the majority, or on the silent ones on the middle path? The mere 
posing of this question is in itself an evidence that time had not stood still 
for the rhetoric of the CCA. Where the frontier image could still be ap-
pealed to up to the end of the first decade, in the second it became appropri-
ate to speak of pastoral concerns as well as prophetic ones. Where support 
for the radicals would seem to follow naturally from the frontier role, it had 
become a question rather than a premise by 1973. 
Does the CCA then turn out to be, after all, one more case of the iron 
Weberian law of the routinization of charisma? 
One thing at least is evident and acknowledged: the concerns of the 
leadership of the second decade could not be exactly the same as those of 
the first. The Presiding Chairperson of 1977, T. B. Simatupang of Indone-
sia, a veteran in both military and ecclesiastical affairs, had his own way of 
explaining it. He had presided over the passing from a first- to a second-
generation leadership in the CCA at a time when he saw Asia as a whole 
passing from a revolutionary to a "post-revolutionary mood"; and already 
in 1975 he had "called CCA to a listening and dialoguing task to balance the 
pioneering and initiating role it had played." Far from being a retreat from 
the creativity of the frontiers, this was the only way for the CCA to remain 
at once "a community of memory and hope."47 
How widely this understanding was consciously shared is one thing. Not 
all the CCA leadership, in fact, was entirely happy with that "post-
revolutionary mood," or with that "balance." How things worked out in 
practice was another thing. 
The fact was that the CCA's leverage was limited, not only over Asia's 
orientation, but even over its own. Nothing in the 1977 Assembly could 
change that. Its members might express impatience, as they did express 
impatience, with "imported theologies and structures." Women and youth 
might struggle, as they did struggle, for stronger representation in the 
leadership. The leadership might resolve, as it did resolve, "to raise 25 per-
cent of its administrative budget from the region." The program guidelines 
might say, as they did say, that "the CCA should continue to give priority 
to human rights in its programmes," and that "the major thrust of CCA-
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URM [Urban Rural Mission] in the next few years should be in building up 
power for the powerless so that they can remedy the imbalance of power 
and work for a more just and humane society."48 
The problem with all this was an old one: Penang spoke loud, but events 
spoke louder. Over all these conferences—Manila, Bangkok, Singapore, 
Taipei, Penang, and Calcutta alike—lay the shadow of what had actually 
been happening in Asia and Asia's churches. In particular there was the 
shadow of the moments of truth precipitated for these churches by the use 
of emergency powers in the Philippines, in Korea, in Taiwan, in India, in 
Indonesia, and in a dozen other countries. 
What, for example, lay behind the Penang guidelines that said: "The 
churches have a responsibility to speak to each other in love about their 
perceptions of human rights violations in their own countries and in the 
region"? A particularly painful story lay behind it, centering on the expe-
rience of the Emergency in India (1975-77). As will be noted in more detail 
later, the role of the churches in that crisis was less than heroic all around. 
The official CCA-related leadership in India, in particular, had actually 
shown itself readier to criticize the CCA and WCC criticisms of Emergency 
abuses than to criticize the Emergency abuses themselves.4' 
In other words, for any Asian Protestant/Orthodox body, at least as 
much as for any Asian Catholic one, any move to come to grips with 
"Asia's suffering and hope" was doubly daunting. In biblical terms, it was 
not only the move of a David taking on a Goliath. For the Asian David, 
unlike the biblical one, was still entangled in King Saul's armor, and still 
between two minds as to the wisdom of renouncing its protection. 
These difficulties continued to be highlighted in the CCA's own organ, 
CCA News. Its editor up to 1981, T. K. Thomas of India, referring to those 
who called on the Church to tell the State, "Thus far and no further," per-
mitted himself no complacency on that account. "These and similar 
voices," he observed, "are not the only Christian voices heard in India. 
There are other voices, more numerous and perhaps more representative, 
that support the status quo.'"0 
In short, divided counsels at high levels on social questions were still a 
major mark of Asian Christianity at least up to the end of the 1970s. This 
was a decade after the pledge of the Asian Catholic bishops not to "tie their 
hands" with "compromising entanglements"; yet Thomas could point to 
examples of entanglement on the FABC side as easily as on the CCA one. 
How much, then, is already clear about Asian Christian social attitudes in 
the 1970s? 
Unprecedented stirrings of change, yes; decisive overall change in one 
direction, no. The foregoing account of the FABC and the CCA, cursory 
though it has been, is still enough to show that any simple linear image of 
increasing Asian Christian mobilization under a banner of social protest 
would not fit all the known facts even for the period from 1965 to 1982. 
What remains to be seen is whether a "two steps forward, one step back-
ward" model may fit those facts better. 
5 
THE TRANSNATIONAL 
AVANT-GARDE 
Scouts for the Asian Frontier 
Poles and Roles within the Church 
Let us pause at this point to review our concept of the Church. Hitherto 
we have made do with a designedly adjustable notion, depending for its 
particular focus on the context, as is customary in historical writing. 
Only one piece of terminological shorthand has been consistently em-
ployed. The term the Church is used only where there is question (at least in 
the minds of agents of religion whose positions are being reported) of the 
ecclesial phenomenon as a whole, complete with its claim to be something 
more than a mere historical phenomenon, though always without judgment 
as to the validity or invalidity of that claim. Otherwise we speak only of the 
churches—concrete historical realities, occupying a determinate social 
space, inseparable of course from their theological pretensions, but consid-
ered only in the light of whatever is their empirically verifiable interaction 
with their economic, social, cultural, and/or political environment. 
What we need to do now is not only to make that distinction explicit, but 
also to recall that when we shift our focus from the most official (FABC, 
CCA, for example) to any less official embodiments of the Church, there is 
still no theological presupposition one way or another. That is to say, it is 
not necessarily as if we were turning from the Church to the churches or any 
parts thereof; neither is it necessarily as if we were moving in the opposite 
direction. A priori, we are in no position to say that the FABC or the CCA 
are more real or less real as representatives of the Church than the local 
churches or their activist avant-garde. 
As a historical question, to ask, Which is more real? is to ask, Which has 
played a more significant role in history? The answer may vary from con-
text to context. For that matter, even as a theological question it is an open 
one, whether we take our theological criteria from Protestantism as a whole 
or from Catholicism as reinterpreted by Vatican II. 
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One thing only is clear and decisive for our inquiry. With the FABC and 
the CCA we have disposed of those transnational structures that claim an 
overall mandate from Roman and non-Roman Christians respectively in 
maritime Asia. In the case of all other movements or structures, we must 
remember, on the one hand, that they do not claim to represent the whole of 
the Christian community, and, on the other hand, that they may throw 
more light than more representative bodies on what is really happening in 
particular areas of Christian activity, or even at the Christian "rice roots" 
in general. 
The point is not purely academic. When it comes to the question, Who 
speaks for the Christians? the historical evidence is always less categorical 
than the claims of the protagonists. The more exalted the status of the 
spokespersons, and the more they claim a mandate from God rather than 
from humankind, the less it can be taken for granted, on purely natural 
grounds, that the faith they assign or attribute to the people is the faith 
these actually live by. 
This is not to say there is ever a total dissociation. As long as Christians 
even passively acknowledge the legitimacy of their spokespersons, they are 
signifying at least a minimal willingness to be associated with the positions 
taken by these latter, and even a preference to be represented by these 
spokespersons rather than by any others. 
The essential point is that we must avoid prejudging the question of what 
Christians effectively stand for. To do this we must work with a less tidy 
mental model of the Church than that which is implicit in the view from the 
top or from the center. We must also avoid prejudging the relative impor-
tance of one or other of the poles of activity in the Church. To do this we 
must bear in mind that at any given moment there are several poles and 
several roles, some being at cross-purposes with others, but all having some 
share in determining any overall orientation the Church may have. 
In general, for the purposes of the historian, the sociologist, or the politi-
cal scientist, it is simply not useful to think of the Church as a fixed point in 
the firmament. That Church, if it exists, is not accessible to empirical study. 
What we have under actual observation is more like a rather scattered mov-
ing pilgrimage in the midst of a larger mass of people also on the move. 
Working with this pilgrimage paradigm of the Church, we may well recog-
nize a certain unity in the procession, or at least a certain will to unity, but 
only within the limits of a permanently precarious distance between the 
head and the tail of the procession, and between the standardbearers and 
the scouts. 
Standardbearers and Scouts 
We have seen something of the standardbearers in the post-colonial pil-
grimage of Asian Christianity at the transnational level. Though they see 
themselves as being at the head of the procession, it remains to be seen 
whether they are nearer its head or its tail. To balance any bias inherent in 
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the view of the standardbearers, we must now try to see how the situation 
looks from the vantage point of the scouts. 
Scouts, of course, are essentially the very kind of people we have heard of 
already—the people on the frontier. We have seen how that role was pro-
jected explicitly on that out-of-the-ordinary church body, the CCA, by its 
own chief assigner of roles. Some speculative theology in Catholicism 
would go further: it would assign the very same ideal role to the ordinary 
church officebearer, referred to in some places in scripture as the episcopos 
and in some streams of church history as the bishop. In sum, for CCA and 
FABC alike, a theory exists that would situate their leadership precisely on 
the frontier between the Christian community and the wider world. 
That may be the theory, but even the short history of the CCA shows that 
there is a long step between it and reality. The broader sweep of church 
history in general (see pp. 9-16) conforms even less convincingly to that 
ideal pattern. We must pause on this discrepancy, because it goes to the 
heart of the problem of Asian Christian social protest. For the heart of the 
problem of Asian Christian social protest is that it seems to involve a basic 
contradiction in terms. 
Call them what you will, define their mandate as coming from God or 
from humankind, mandated church representatives are still essentially per-
sons invested with responsibility for the institution. Accordingly, the 
measure in which they gain access to the levers of power in the institution 
tends to be precisely the measure in which they put the interests of the insti-
tution above all other interests. In other words, the measure in which they 
get to be in positions to make the institution serve society tends to be pre-
cisely the measure in which they are committed to make it serve itself first. 
Conversely, the measure in which other church members are disposed to 
make the church institution serve any object beyond itself tends to be pre-
cisely the measure in which the institution will seek to deny them access to 
its levers of power. Far from being in a good position to combine the roles 
of scout and standardbearer in the pilgrimage, the church standardbearer 
seems foredoomed to bear the standard away from its front and its flanks 
toward its place of greatest safety—its rear. 
Hence, if we were depending exclusively on Asian standardbearers, and 
despite anything they might say to the contrary, we should have good 
grounds for skepticism about any proclaimed or apparent departure from 
the traditional pattern of their relationship with power in the institution and 
in society. It is not merely a question of historical improbability, that is, the 
unlikelihood of any sudden change in the habits of centuries in the history 
of the Church. It is even arguably a question of sociological impossibility— 
the impossibility of any deliberate break between a large social body and the 
social power center on which its survival depends. 
To be sure, presumption must yield to evidence, and evidence may force a 
redefinition of probabilities and possibilities. But where are we to look for 
that evidence? Short of a social miracle or an overall change in the percep-
tion of institutional interests (see pp. 10f.), we are compelled to look for it 
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among scouts who are not standardbearers, that is, among bearers of reli-
gious influence whose role is not effectively circumscribed by responsibility 
for the interests of the church institution. 
That word effectively leaves open the question of whether on occasion 
church officebearers may also play a pioneering role, even to the extent of 
subverting institutional interests. For it is not the individual but the system 
that tends to push the standardbearer to the tail of the procession, thereby 
creating an innovation vacuum that tends in its turn to be filled by individu-
ally and corporately different scouts. 
Scouts for the Asian Frontier 
On the Asian Christian scene, then, where are the scouts? We must look 
for them on those fringes of the Asian Christian pilgrimage where move-
ments originating within that pilgrimage encounter the flow of Asian life 
around it at those points where that flow is most truly and densely repre-
sentative of Asian life. In one word, that encounter will be with the poor; in 
two words, with peasants and workers; in four words (covering overlapping 
categories), with peasants, workers, youth, and intellectuals. 
To speak of the first three categories is to cover the overwhelming major-
ity of Asia's people; to speak of the fourth is to speak of the meaning-
makers, of those who give voice and direction to that otherwise impersonal 
millionfold mass. The workers were put on the map by Marx; the peasants, 
by Mao; the youth, by the Chinese Cultural Revolution and the worldwide 
student upheavals of the late 1960s. The intellectuals, by their nature, have 
been recognized historical forces ever since such things were first thought 
of. Marxism only changed the direction of the crucial role it acknowledged 
in them by seeking to steer it or suppress it. 
Doubts might remain about the importance of the youth role. After all, 
youth is a very recent and untried invention as a social category. 
Doubts remain too about the relevance of the intellectuals. Myrdal, no 
Marxist, could plausibly say that "the volatility of the intellectuals in some 
of the South Asian countries certainly does not reflect the mood of the 
masses."1 
Doubts also remain about the historical potential of the masses them-
selves, and particularly of the rural masses, even after the evidence of China 
and Indochina, and despite the fact that the rural population in Asia ac-
counts for about three-quarters of the total. Much of Marxism still takes its 
cue on peasants from Marx's own expression, "rural idiocy"; and Myrdal, 
looking at South Asia, insisted that "poverty, inequality, and a lack of 
development have no foreordained and definite roles in the process" (of 
modernization).2 
However, there is evidence of change here. We may speak of a genuinely 
significant rise in the dammed-up waters of rural discontent in Asia in the 
decade after Myrdal wrote. That was a theme often on the lips of the World 
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Bank president of that period. Another reluctant witness to it is the report 
on the first decade of the Asian Development Bank (1967-76), which pro-
fessed to see "the impetus for equality . . . rapidly becoming . . . a revolu-
tionary force."3 
To elicit such an admission from such a source the evidence had to be 
compelling. It was read as an indictment of the Bank's own policies and a 
vindication of the Bank's critics. Except by repudiating it, the Bank could 
no longer treat the notion of ' 'economics as if people mattered" as if it were 
romantic and impractical. The premise of the humanists now had certifica-
tion from the technocrats. 
To this kind of Asian frontier, let us now see the approach of the Chris-
tian frontierspeople. 
Urban Rural Mission 
As noted earlier (p. 35), while the average Asian is still in the country, but 
beginning to get on the way to town, a larger proportion of Christians are in 
town already. This urban bias of Asian Christianity and its ambivalent 
implications are reflected in the nomenclature used for what has been the 
main social arm of the CCA. Originally known as Urban Industrial Mis-
sion, it has from time to time or from place to place had other labels, such 
as Christian Industrial Mission or Christian Industrial Committee. Only 
since 1973 has it settled at CCA level for the more inclusive label Urban 
Rural Mission (URM). 
The reality covered by these labels has varied widely too—from pietistic 
evangelism among urban workers, through an approach sometimes called 
in-depth evangelism, which is conservative evangelical with a social empha-
sis (a significant minority trend in both Latin America and Asia), to ecu-
menical concentration on social justice issues in relation to workers, 
peasants, minorities, women, youth, and, most recently and problemati-
cally, power. 
Power for the Powerless 
To speak of power, of course, is to go to the heart of the matter. The 
question is, in the popular phrase, to what extent did the CCA put its money 
where its mouth was? 
If one were to consult only the evidence of overall financial accounts, it is 
welfare that loomed largest on the CCA horizon through its first two dec-
ades. Over the period from 1974 to 1976 (a period straddling the change of 
power in Indochina), close to half of total CCA expenditure went for the 
Indochina program called Asian Christian Service. 
This need not have had much to do with standing budget priorities. More 
perhaps than most other budget items, it reflected (current) availability of 
(designated) funds. If we remove the ACS account from the total, we find 
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that in the same period expenditure for URM rose from a quarter to a third 
of total payments, becoming the leading item. Thus, if we compare the 
funding situation of URM within the CCA with that of the OHD within the 
FABC (judging by whatever is informally known in the latter case), it would 
be similar on two counts. On the one hand, for all funds involved, the 
origin was overwhelmingly non-Asian. On the other hand, from all non-
designated funds the lion's share went to the agency on the cutting edge of 
social action. 
Within the URM account, the largest single item of expenditure was the 
Asian Committee for People's Organization (ACPO).4 ACPO, as the name 
implies, was the focus for organizing the powerless for power; here again 
the CCA's budget priorities can be considered consistent with its policies. 
By focusing on power, it was touching a raw nerve; this accordingly pro­
duced a violent reaction in places where it was strong enough to be a threat, 
as in South Korea. 
A Strong-Minority Pattern: the Korean Case 
Let us look briefly at the case of South Korea, as a test case of where 
organizing the powerless for power in post-1965 Asia was likely to lead. 
South Korea was one place where URM had muscle to flex and judged 
that it could dare to flex it. It was also a place that could claim an indige­
nous Christian practical ideology of its own—minjung от "people's" 
theology, defining itself over against Western bourgeois theology, Latin 
American liberation theology, and the Marxist inmin ideology from North 
Korea.' Furthermore, it was a place where support for militancy from the 
Christian community was more broadly based than elsewhere in Asia, as 
shown by the fact that only in South Korea did repression need to be ex­
tended to the sentencing and jailing of interdenominationally representative 
national Protestant leaders, as well as of a Catholic bishop. 
What actually happened in Korea was traumatic, and the question must 
be asked whether it had to be as traumatic as it was. On the one hand, 
URM in fact made use of imported techniques such as Saul Alinsky's 
confrontation-oriented Community Organization. Its way of doing this was 
discriminating according to its partisans, but not so according to its critics, 
though some of these latter were themselves Christian activists. On the 
other hand, whereas by 1979 the Christian activists and the Park regime had 
to some extent taken each other's measure, and knew what to expect from 
each other, nobody foresaw the ferocity of the regime that eventually con­
solidated power after Park's assassination. 
Ever since World War II the Korean peninsula has been a major flash 
point on the left-right line of division running through Asia. Ever since the 
devastating war from 1950 to 1953, a million soldiers had faced each other 
along a neck of land a couple of hundred miles wide. After American power 
lost its other foothold on the East Asian seaboard in Indochina in 1975, 
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Korea became even more a place of superpower stakes and terrible possibili-
ties. It was a situation guaranteed to breed paranoia. 
All this must be taken into account in assessing the political judgment of 
the Korean Christian activists. What, then, is the verdict on it? Three things 
must be said. First, on the whole their judgment, more broadly based than 
that of other Christians in Asia, was also more militantly critical of the 
regime in power. Next, apart from a couple of star performers on the 
Catholic side, this militancy generally was stronger among Protestants, and 
more particularly among URM-related ones. Last, the events of 1980 did 
not prove the realism of their rhetoric of the immediately preceding period. 
The question is commonly posed whether the new wave of activist Chris-
tians in the Third World are not too politically innocent for their own good. 
The question remains posed in the light of the crisis of the Park regime in 
Korea more directly than it had been posed by the crisis of the Thanom 
regime in Thailand. 
In URM circles, as things stood in the immediate aftermath of General 
Chun's bloody seizure of power, hindsight more easily credits the activists 
with integrity and courage than with shrewdness and foresight. The more 
militant among them were insisting at the end of 1979 that the tide of popu-
lar demand for democratization could not be turned back; and even among 
the more temperate of them there was no anticipation of the way in which 
their hopes were to be devastated in 1980.' 
Setbacks like these provide occasions for patient endurance, a virtue in 
which Korean and other Christians have much practice. Setbacks also pro-
vide lessons, and not only for Korean Christians, in the novel exercise of 
adapting Christian social idealism to the refractory realities of history and 
politics. 
A Weak-Minority Pattern: the Indian Experience 
The Korean pattern was of course not the only URM one. There are les-
sons to be learned too, for example, from the URM experience in Hong 
Kong, where it has been not a negligible force, and in India, where it has 
been quite marginal. 
The Indian case is illustrative less of URM as an organization than of 
ACPO as an idea. Nothing could have been more relevant than the notion 
of "organizing the powerless for power" under the Indian Emergency of 
1975 to 1977. There was even an Indian Christian ideology to embody it, or 
at least an Indian mix of Gandhism, Marxism, and liberalism, articulated 
by a voice of World Council fame, that of M. M. Thomas.7 Under his in-
spiration, via the challenge of the Emergency, there came into being a na-
tional Fellowship of Justice Concerns with local constituents such as the 
Delhi Forum for Christian Concern for People's Struggle. Meanwhile 
another ecumenical figure in the ACPO framework, M. A. Thomas, 
launched a continuing movement and bulletin called "Vigil India." 
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The thinking of these movements may or may not have reflected Myrdal's 
"mood of the masses," though roots in the villages were not at the outset 
the most evident thing about them. In any case it is clear that these move-
ments did not reflect the mood of the officebearers in the Indian churches— 
Protestant, Catholic, or (with one partial exception) Oriental. Instead, the 
Church leadership came close to assuring the leader of the Emergency that 
they would not complain about whatever happened to human rights in 
general, as long as nothing happened to their minority rights in particular. 
They came close to acting accordingly in the way they successively propi-
tiated the Emergency regime, the Janata government, which dismantled the 
Emergency measures, and the restored Indira government of 1980." This 
was in stark contrast to their response to a direct threat to their minority 
rights two years after the Emergency, when massive Christian mobilization 
against discriminatory proposed legislation brought tens of thousands of 
Christians out on the streets. 
When Christ sent his apostles "like sheep among wolves" (Matt. 10:16), 
he told them to be "as clever as snakes and as simple as doves." A certain 
redistribution of these qualities, as between India and Korea, might well 
have been desirable among the Asian apostles of "power for the power-
less." 
But the differences were not only in the Christians, or only in the degree 
to which their assessment of their minority status permitted them to be 
"prophetic." There could be no Christian realism or idealism that would 
not take account also of the differences in the internal and external chal-
lenges these countries faced. Given the complexity of any people's predica-
ment, there could never be any a priori criterion of whether it was better to 
play the dove by flying in the face of the obstacle (in the manner of the ac-
tivists among South Korea's strong Christian minority), or to play the snake 
by wriggling round it (in the manner of the spokespersons for India's weak 
one). 
One thing, however, remained clear in Korea and became clear in India: 
Christians could not ultimately separate their own fate from the fate of the 
whole people. 
There was food for thought for Christians everywhere in the heart-
searching that followed the Indian Emergency, no less than in the sacrificial 
suffering that accompanied the Korean one. Faced with the manifest mix of 
wheat and cockle inside the Church as well as outside it, some of the reflec-
tion harked back to "the hidden brotherhood of Christ" implied in Mat-
thew 25, and spoke of "a double election of the Church and of the poor as 
instruments of God's Kingdom," while some went so far as to redefine the 
Church itself as being precisely that "emerging paradigmatic fellowship" of 
faith and solidarity which "can speak to the powers critically and propheti-
cally" in the name of the powerless. For where else could the true Church be 
found, given "the abdication by the Indian church bodies of their position 
as 'the Church in the power of the Spirit' "? ' 
We have heard of a "Church of the poor." Are we now hearing of a 
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"Church of the pure"? That is one way of reading this line of thinking; it 
would have plenty of Latin American parallels. Another way of reading it is 
in terms of the political reality underlying it. In any struggle of the power-
less for power, the churches as power structures could no more claim immu-
nity from internal strains and stresses than could any other part of the fab-
ric of society. 
We have seen this verified in CCA as well as in FABC circles. At the 
transnational level, the Protestant/Orthodox pattern differed from the 
Catholic one in that no conflict came out in the open between URM and the 
CCA like the conflict that surfaced in 1979 between the OHD and the 
FABC, or at least the South Asian side of the FABC. This was evidence of 
the relative success of the CCA in identifying with the scouts rather than 
with the standardbearers. But that is only to underline the fact that in 
neither case could the main transnational body escape the necessity of some 
taking of sides. 
The alignments might differ, but the source of conflict remained. Once 
again it was South Asia that provided the most clear-cut example, this time 
ranging the powers in State and Church together against the WCC, the 
CCA, and the local defenders of the powerless. For that was what was 
spelled out during the Indian Emergency most explicitly at the level of the 
National Christian Council of India (NCCI), when on the one hand, in 
1975, "about 90 percent of the assembly were for going the whole way with 
the P. M." (i.e., Prime Minister Gandhi), while on the other hand, in 1976, 
notice was served on the CCA and the WCC that "the Churches of India 
are mature enough to handle a matter like this on their own," and that 
"outside help need be offered only when the Churches here ask for it."10 
The words might have been borrowed from the national spokespersons of 
the Russian Orthodox Church or the Chinese Three-Self Movement, inas-
much as they represented an option coinciding with that of the local politi-
cal power rather than with that of any churches abroad. 
Youth and Student Movements 
We have singled out the URM as the particular continentally commis-
sioned front of Asian Christian social protest ambitious enough to extend 
its reach in principle to the entire nine-tenths of Asians who are rural poor 
or urban workers. It is logical to look next for something with a similar 
continental reach or mandate, this time extending to the seven-tenths of 
Asians who are still in the first half of an average human life span: the 
youth. 
Young Christian Workers 
The majority of youth and peasants or workers are the same people. Ac-
cordingly, we must look first for forms of the Christian social apostolate 
that give their range of concern the double demarcation of rural youth or 
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young workers. Both in fact figure in the Life and Action programs of the 
CCA. The ecumenical convergence on this frontier is such that a Catholic 
nun has headed the CCA program for Asian women workers. 
Politically, however, the highest profile in this area belongs to the move-
ment called Young Christian Workers (YCW) or Jeunesse Ouvrière Chré-
tienne (JOC or Jocists). 
We have considered URM at the transnational level as the CCA's coun-
terpart of the OHD, mainly in view of the comparable breadth of its social 
mandate and the contrasts in the structure and evolution of its relations 
with its parent body. We could consider the YCW at the local level as the 
Catholic counterpart of URM; here again both comparisons and contrasts 
would be in order, and in fact are commonly made, where both movements 
have struggled on more or less equal terms on the same front, as in South 
Korea or Hong Kong. 
Drawing on a larger overall Christian constituency, and remaining less 
associated with Alinsky-style specializations in its social approach, the 
YCW in Asia tends to claim greater overall effectiveness than URM (though 
in fact any difference is dwarfed by the marginal character of both move-
ments in the vast world of Asian workers). It is not for nothing that the 
YCW figures repeatedly in the earliest events relevant to Asian Christian 
social protest (Appendix 3), notably in South Korea and South Vietnam. 
Perhaps the chief interest of the YCW for an inquiry into the workings of 
Christian social protest is the precarious balance it endeavors to maintain 
on the frontier between "Church" and "world," while keeping one foot in 
each. 
The URM experience fails to pose this problem sharply because, while 
URM gets its mandate from the CCA no less directly than the OHD gets its 
mandate from the FABC, and acquires a certain transnational identity and 
consistency through the same connection, the CCA could never operate as 
an ecclesiastical superbody (even if it did not repudiate any such pretension) 
in the way the FABC embodies and deploys the institutional authority of 
the Catholic hierarchy. URM, as we have seen, meets quite enough eccle-
siastical resistance at national and sub-national levels; but the YCW meets 
resistance both there and transnationally. 
The YCW carries the blessing and the burden of having pioneered in the 
world of Catholic Action on the industrial scene. Having grown up in and 
survived through the period between the repression of Modernism and the 
Second Vatican Council, the YCW painfully earned the respect and the 
sanction of the ecclesiastical authorities. Its founder was even named a 
cardinal in 1965. But from the point of view of the workers' struggle, this 
official ecclesiastical mandate might be said to have strengthened its right 
arm while tying its left behind its back. 
In the post-conciliar period the YCW became a microcosm of the tension 
between the jealous embrace of a parental institution and the consuming 
demands of the human promotion to which the institution is supposed to 
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contribute. More particularly, it became a focus for the tension between the 
intersecting transnational forces of Catholicism and Marxism. Further-
more, because of the Marxist factor, it was guaranteed an uneasy relation-
ship with the governments of the national security states. But since that 
problem is common to the YCW and other youth movements, it can be 
considered in common for all of them. 
Schools and Students 
To speak of the student world is to speak also of the intellectuals— 
especially if we take account of the Gramscian connotation, which tended 
to bestow the title of intellectual on worker and peasant leaders, and the 
Chinese Cultural Revolution connotation, which tended to bestow it on all 
students from the secondary level up. Certainly at the university level, no 
Asian government of the period could afford not to monitor the goings-on 
in student circles, any more than it could afford not to keep an eye on any 
organized activity among farmers and workers. Whether in professedly 
socialist countries like China or Burma, or in professedly anticommunist 
ones like South Korea, Thailand, or Indonesia, it was on the student scene 
that mass discontent could be most easily ignited. 
To speak of the Asian student world is also to speak of an area where 
Christians are not as marginal as they are among peasants or workers—not 
merely because Christians have more than an average share of education in 
Asia, but because the churches have had more than an average share in the 
provision of education for Asians. 
We touched earlier (p. 43) on the ambivalence of the role of Christian 
schools in colonial and post-colonial Asia. On the Catholic side, we have 
noted that it was precisely their institutional prominence, set in sharper 
relief by their top-heavy structures of authority, that exposed them to being 
coopted as agents of social consolidation and control. It is only against such 
a background that one can understand, for example, the drama that rocked 
Hong Kong in 1978 over the alleged misuse of funds at the Golden Jubilee 
School." 
A similar furor could not have arisen over the Protestant schools, which 
were much less authoritarian and much more concentrated on the university 
level. But in the last analysis the price of institutional prominence has to be 
paid by the Protestant schools no less than by the Catholic ones. As a 
group, as a system, they all constitute levers of institutional power; and in 
the very measure in which they are levers of power they can only tend to 
imbed themselves in the strata where power is to be found. For this reason 
the institutional side of Christian education in Asia is not the side on which 
to look first for a significant social protest role. 
The side of the students is another matter. Whatever else may be said of 
the nebulous phenomenon known in the 1970s as the emerging youth cul-
ture, its very existence implied that youth, including students, were no 
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longer deriving their values exclusively from institutions such as school, 
church, and home. 
True, students could never escape completely the built-in consequences of 
their dependent, transient, and middle-class status. True, the majority 
would always be apathetic toward politics unless they were actually pressed 
into politics. Even the activists among students would always include large 
constituencies in favor of major traditional institutions, religious or politi-
cal or cultural. 
Despite all this, the stereotype of the student of the late 1960s and early 
1970s, on both sides of the ideological line in Asia, was politically radical. 
In that period there was hardly a country that did not feel the tremors of 
student activism, sometimes building up into political earthquakes that 
actually left a changed political scene, at least for a time, as in China after 
1966 and in Thailand after 1973. 
Where were the Christians on this student scene? 
The majority of them could be found with the student majority in 
general—on the sidelines. It would in fact be common to say of them, as 
their own activists said of the East Asians among them, "most Christian 
students are more conservative than other students'"2—as indeed one might 
expect from their minority status and from their exposure to the additional 
conservative influence of their local church institutions. 
When we speak of activists we are never speaking of more than minorities 
among minorities. Nevertheless, it is such minorities that have set the pace 
among Christians at least as much as among others. "In Asia," we are re-
minded in the same activist circles, "the strongest and most organized ele-
ments of the extra-governmental sector are the Christian Voluntary Agen-
cies.*"3 
IMCS and WSCF 
At the transnational level, the organized presence of Christians on the 
Asian student scene has been represented by the International Movement of 
Catholic Students (IMCS-Asia) and the World Student Christian Federa-
tion (WSCF-Asia). 
The IMCS is synonymous at the student level with Pax Romana (a name 
it prefers to forget in the measure that it takes its anti-imperialism seriously, 
as it does in Asia perhaps more than elsewhere). The WSCF covers the same 
ground as the Student Christian Movement (SCM). Thus, they are both not 
only transnational, but, like the YCW, transcontinental, and, to that ex-
tent, Asian only by import. However, they can count among distinctively 
Asian achievements the holding of a joint WSCF-IMCS Pan Asian As-
sembly in Hong Kong in 1976—the first such joint assembly for these bodies 
or any similar ones. 
What can we learn from the proceedings of this Assembly? 
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First, the ecumenical sharing goes further here than anywhere else at the 
transnational level. In other instances of sharing, either the group is small, 
unstructured, and of debatable representativeness (as in the case of the 
Third World theologians group), or, if it involves major established struc-
tures, ultimate control usually remains firmly in the hands of one side or 
confessional family. In this case, over eighty participants from fifteen Asian 
political jurisdictions, operating out of two established church-related 
structures, carried through a ten-day meeting as a fully shared enterprise. 
Second, the choice of topic (The Struggle for Self-Reliance in Asia To-
day) put the Christian students not only on the social protest front, but on a 
particularly contentious outpost of that front. Though there is no unanim-
ity even about the slogans, there is a more receptive forum here than else-
where for the language of anticolonialism, anti-imperialism, and anticapi-
talism. The Christian task is seen as one of building people's power and 
self-sufficiency; the student Christian task, as one of joining forces toward 
this end with the majority of people who are peasants and workers; and the 
Asian student Christian task, as one that "critically considers all non-
indigenous inputs,"14 whether of capital or of culture, or, for that matter, 
of Christianity. 
Third, even the question of the concrete socioeconomic alternative does 
not prove too hot for the students to handle. Though the East Asians speak 
of "a dilemma between Christianity and socialism," and only the South 
Asians affirm explicitly "a responsibility . . . of building socialist society," 
it is notable that the only Catholic bishop among the resource persons 
(Bishop Leo Nanayakkara of Sri Lanka) was the Asian Catholic bishop best 
known for commitment to socialism, and that the one keynote speaker 
invited was a Marxist-Leninist ex-M. P. of India, an ideologist contemptu-
ous of reformism, categorical as to the superiority of "the world socialist 
system," committed to work for a "seizure of State power" in the name of 
that system, and not surprisingly banned from leaving India to deliver his 
speech in person.15 
In all three respects, whether rightly or wrongly, the students were grasp-
ing nettles impossible to touch at more "responsible" church levels. The 
most that gets sanction at these latter levels amounts to a kind of pro-
grammed ecumenism that enjoys little credibility among students, a kind of 
anticolonialism that pulls some punches in the ecclesiastical arena, and a 
kind of anticapitalism so carefully matched with anticommunism that they 
tend at best to cancel each other out and to hold the Church indefinitely on 
the fence." 
Our concern here is not to judge between the church leaders and the stu-
dents, but to demonstrate the point that without a plural-role and even a 
multi-polar church community the issues and options can hardly even get 
considered. The monolithic church structure so dear to conservative church 
leaders is truly a guaranteed force for social inertia; and the pious hope 
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cherished by some other church leaders that the Church can be a force for 
change in the world's power structure, while leaving intact the status quo in 
its own, is a wish not rooted in the evidence of experience. 
It is one thing to say that a judgment must eventually be made between 
the church leaders and the students; obviously they cannot all be right in all 
respects. It is another thing to say that the existence of differences between 
them is itself a symptom of disintegration in the Church. When, as com-
monly happens, the latter idea is imperceptibly substituted for the former, it 
is clear that the pilgrimage or procession model of the Church is being re-
jected in favor of the funnel or pyramid model. It should also be clear that 
the pyramid model does not correspond with the way things can actually be 
seen to happen in the life of the churches. 
We must reserve for later consideration some of the ways in which scouts 
like the YCW, the WSCF, and the IMCS have tended to carry the logic of 
Church of the poor and power for the people further than it has tended to 
be carried by the standardbearers in the FABC or even the CCA. In practice 
this divergence throws up some crucial issues, such as those of the internal 
power structure, the transnational and transcontinental center-periphery 
relationship, and the transnational and transcontinental Church-and-
Marxism relationship, of the Christian communities in Asia. 
It must suffice here to draw attention to some immediate consequences of 
the political polarity between the institutional centers of gravity in the 
churches and the edges along which they encounter the world around them. 
For one thing, the relationship of these groups with the church hierarchy 
is an arm's-length one, and seems doomed to remain so. The 1976 assembly 
record speaks of "pressures" from a "nonsupportive" church establish-
ment seen as "resistant to change." The testimony of Asian-level leaders 
several years later shows no significant lowering of the guard on either 
side." 
In this connection, one must learn to expect a higher decibel level in the 
rhetoric of advocacy by students, by other youth spokespersons, and by 
other frontierspeople. Up to a point this must be considered a normal and 
functional part of the role. Occasionally it is even tacitly acknowledged as 
such among the responsables (to use the word in the French sense) in the 
Church and other groups out of power. In Indonesia, for example, the rela-
tive impunity with which students could voice criticisms of the regime in 
power enabled them to serve at times as stalking horses for more inhibited 
critics. In the middle and later seventies the student leaders in Indonesia, 
including the Catholics among them, said things in public that others would 
not dare to say but were not necessarily unhappy to hear said.18 
A second notable effect of the polarization or specialization of the 
frontierspeople is that their activity significantly widens the range of access 
to documentation by all those who wish to understand the issues. In any 
field of inquiry concerning social struggle all words are weapons, and "sub-
versive" documentation is inevitably "fugitive" documentation in more 
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than one sense. Given this situation, objectivity is not a matter of according 
equal weight to all viewpoints competing for attention. To be objective is to 
try to compensate for the factor of sheer power in the production of docu-
mentation. In practice this requires systematic critical resistance to "estab-
lishment" data and corresponding critical openness to sources of data that 
are unfashionable or even literally unmentionable. 
To this task the WSCF-IMCS Assembly made its own contribution. Some 
of the more practical strategies emerging from that Assembly were those 
that concerned "communication links," "a regular vehicle of communica-
tions," and "interregional exchange of information and documents."" 
These strategies found implementation in two notable series of publica-
tions, of independent IMCS origin, called Interflow and Document Reprint 
Service. Such publications may be expected to serve a purpose, not at all 
necessarily as representative records of the struggle for self-reliance in Asia 
today, but as alternative sources of the sort of documentation that more 
"representative" records prefer to leave in the shade. 
There is a third direct effect worth noting here of the out-on-a-limb situa-
tion of Christian militants making common cause in social protest with the 
mass of farmers, fisherfolk, workers, women, youth, and intellectuals. This 
is the tendency of transnational headquarters of movements and transna-
tional centers of documentation to cluster in the few Asian havens of rela-
tive political freedom. 
Not always necessarily for this reason, but in many cases at least partly 
for this reason, the following agencies of Christian activism, to mention 
only some of those with transnational horizons, have found their Asian 
haven in Hong Kong: URM, the WSCF, the IMCS, the Protestant-
sponsored Asia Forum on Human Rights, and the Catholic-sponsored Cen-
ter for the Progress of Peoples. 
Hong Kong, though itself no democracy, has been sufficiently insulated 
from the left-right polarization of the rest of Asia (as a result of a con-
vergence of interest between Beijing and London) to be the only place in the 
continent besides Japan that could afford a relatively free haven to activist 
headquarters throughout the 1970s. (Since Asian headquarters also need to 
be more or less central geographically, at least in terms of air travel around 
the maritime crescent, the other favored locations have been Bangkok and 
Singapore.) 
A particular form of this migration of agencies in search of freedom of 
action is the practice of basing a center in one country for dissemination of 
information about repression in another. Japan has played this role for 
South Korea through the Japan Emergency Christian Conference on Ko-
rean Problems and the Japanese Catholic Commission for Justice and 
Peace. Hong Kong has played it for the Philippines, notably through a 
Resource Center for Philippine Concerns. 
The same role, of course, has been more extensively played outside Asia 
for countries of both left and right within the continent. Historically the 
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role was introduced to Asia in the 1950s by the "China watchers" in Hong 
Kong and elsewhere. Among church people, and in reaction to right-wing 
repression, it is more properly a phenomenon of the 1970s. 
In these ways—through driving activist headquarters and communication 
systems beyond national borders—the authoritarian regimes of left and 
right in Asia made their own unplanned contribution to the transnationali-
zation of Asian Christian social protest. 
Radical Religious Meaning-Makers 
Peasants, workers, youth—we have seen these as the broadest (overlap-
ping) categories into which Asians fall, and at the same time as the broadest 
potential and actual sources of social discontent. Another overlapping cate-
gory, also a potential source of social protest, has been mentioned so far 
only in passing: the category of women. When we speak of peasants, youth, 
and women, we are in each case speaking of a category constituting an ac-
tual majority in most Asian countries, and a majority in one way or another 
excluded from the mainstream of Asian public life. 
It is only with our last category of Asians important to a study of social 
protest—the category of intellectuals in the stricter sense—that we are treat-
ing of a group that is marginal in actual numbers, and numerically marginal 
at the level of membership and leadership alike. 
By defining intellectuals earlier as those who give voice and direction to 
the mass, we have left room here for both speculative specialists and pas-
toral agents in the category of radical religious meaning-makers. By the 
transnational test, we need not expect to find too many of these in Asian 
Christianity, any more than we have found any great multiplicity of leading 
Christian elements in the other categories. 
Christian-inspired movements of farmers or fisherfolk, for instance, are 
scarcely in view in Asia on the transnational horizon, though the Federation 
of Free Farmers in the Philippines has a relatively long history on one na-
tional horizon. As for Christian-inspired movements of workers, we have 
met these in the YCW and in URM; as for Christian-inspired movements of 
students, we have met them in the IMCS and the WSCF. 
But what about Asia-wide embodiments of social protest in the ranks of 
the full-time personnel of the churches themselves? We met them at the 
outset of our survey of transnational Catholicism in Asia in the forms called 
SELA and PISA. There is more to be added; and since the role of religious 
personnel, irrespective of whether it is a ministry of word or of sacrament, 
is in perceptible effect preeminently the role of meaning-makers, we may 
appropriately group under this heading the activities of transnational asso-
ciations of religious along with those of theologians. 
To complete our skeleton survey of the transnational avant-garde, since 
the meaning-making function in religious protest tends to culminate in the 
words, the symbols, and even the persons of individual men and women, 
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who may or may not be priests or religious, we must scan the Asian horizon 
for transnationally salient instances of these individual voices of the voice-
less. 
Frontiers in Ministry, Male and Female 
As noted at the outset of this study, all churches are transnational organi-
zations at least in tendency. The Roman Catholic Church has been trans-
national in tendency and reality as long as there have been nations to tran-
scend; in fact, on the scale of its history, nation states appear as a novelty 
and almost as an interlude. Within that Church, the Catholic hierarchy and 
the diocesan clergy had a transcontinental organization at least a thousand 
years before they had a continental one. 
This transcontinental (and, in modern times, transhemispheric) organiza-
tion was never stronger than it has been in the post-colonial era. It continues 
to play a preponderant role in global Catholicism, one that is not necessarily 
in a decolonizing direction in the intermediate term. This is a point that will 
require further examination. Meanwhile, part of the effect of the begin-
nings of continental organization in the Asian context has been in the direc-
tion of reducing continental dependence in relation to the transhemispheric 
"center." 
The FABC as a bishops' organization is alive and well in the short term, 
as we have seen, with some signs of internal strains in the medium term, as 
we have also seen. The Asian diocesan priesthood has never had a compara-
ble continuing continental organization, though the PISA meeting of 1965 
gave the clergy a temporary sense of Asian identity on the social action 
front. 
But there are also the religious orders and congregations and missionary 
institutes of men and women, who make up a large majority of full-time 
consecrated pastoral agents in Asia. What is the situation of these as regards 
transnational organization? 
Once again history in the form of the Western background and bureauc-
racy in the form of Roman centralism have combined to make the dominant 
pattern one of transcontinental organization, with only incipient networks 
between the transhemispheric center and the national or sub-national 
Asian base. Still, it is these incipient networks that should be watched as 
harbingers of a new kind of Catholic transnationalism. 
Let us take note of two current patterns, one among men religious, the 
other among women religious. 
The Society of Jesus, with membership still numbered in the tens of 
thousands, is the largest clerical religious body in the Catholic Church. Its 
governmental structure provides for transnational assistencies between the 
Generalate in Rome and the provinces in the various countries. In the region 
relevant to our inquiry the most notable example is the East Asian Assis-
tancy. This has been served by an elaborate bureaucracy, already men-
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tioned, called the Bureau of Asian Affairs (BAA). As also mentioned, it 
was preceded or spearheaded into existence by one of its present component 
movements, an East Asian Jesuit association on the social action front, 
Socio-Economie Life in Asia (SELA). 
Both the BAA and SELA were still alive and well in the early 1980s. At 
least, there was no sign that their activity would fade away in the then fore-
seeable future. Indeed, they were already such relative old-timers on the 
Asian Catholic scene, and so strongly structured for long-term service, that 
they were beginning to be seen as overtaken by the Weberian process of 
routinization. Such at least was the feeling among some activists, including 
some Jesuit activists; this might be fair or unfair, but it was inevitable. For 
change is a battlefield on which no artillery, all the more if it is weighty and 
effective, can retain for long the image of being always where the action is.20 
Men religious in Asia, in any case, have not been in the forefront of ef-
forts at Asia-wide cooperation among religious institutes. For that matter, 
in the judgment of many of both sexes, men religious in Asia have not been 
in the forefront of renewal and innovation on any major front, by compari-
son with their sisters in religion.2' It was left to the women religious to de-
velop in the 1970s, from a beginning modestly called Asian Service Center 
for Religious Women, the only transnational and transinstitutional associa-
tion of religious on the Asian horizon. 
This is now known as the Asian Meeting of Religious Women (AMOR). 
By 1980 it had met for the fifth time, bringing major superiors of women 
religious of twelve countries together in Sri Lanka. 
Its statement there urged its members in Asia and Australia to ' 'reeval-
uate and reorient apostolates to meet the challenges of today." That was 
standard rhetoric in any post-conciliar gathering of religious of either sex; 
but the delegates of AMOR V went further. In reference to their traditional 
apostolates of "education, health, and social welfare," they accused them-
selves of having "unconsciously strengthened the hands of the oppressors" 
and "actually helped to generate and perpetuate an elitist class of people." 
They now called for shifting "from serving the elite groups to living with 
the poor," for abandoning "hothouse formation methods" in favor of 
"the new method of learning while living with people," and for "the Sisters 
who opt for the poor" to be "ready to be broken and given as sustenance in 
the struggle of the people."22 
What this could mean in practice was spelled out only a month later in 
another continent, in the shallow graves of the murdered women mission-
aries of El Salvador. But in any case the women behind the AMOR state-
ment were themselves no strangers to real experience of victim women and 
shallow graves. 
Behind AMOR V stood a novel convergence of emerging forces: those of 
women, those of youth, those of post-conciliar religious renewal, and those 
of social protest in the global sense. 
At the turn of the decade, the important social training center, the Asian 
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Social Institute in Manila, was headed by a woman, the Filipina Mina 
Ramirez; the Asia-Pacific Secretariate of the YCW was led by a woman, the 
Filipina Norma Binas; the CCA program for women workers in Asia was 
under the charge of a woman religious, the Filipina Teresa Dagdag; and the 
head of AMOR, after the Filipina Christine Tan, was the Indian Gladys 
D'Souza. 
None of these women was elderly; most were young; and as for being 
socially radical, even to the point of arousing controversy, the religious 
were if anything more in the forefront than the lay women. If one were look-
ing for signs of the distance travelled by Asian Christianity between 1965 
and 1982, one could hardly find more telling ones than the differences be-
tween the Asian women religious of the 1950s and those of the 1980s, at 
least on those frontiers of activity occupied by contestatory superiors, po-
litical detainee task forces, and rural missionaries of various kinds. 
The prominence of Filipinas and of Philippine areas of activism in this 
picture calls for comment. It is not that Filipino women religious had a 
proportion of the Asian total of nuns as large as Filipino layfolk had of the 
Asian total of Catholics. On the contrary, there is a disconcerting :ontrast 
between the contours of the Church of the people in Asia, as measured by 
the Catholic population, and the contours of the institutional Church in 
Asia, as measured by the numbers of pastoral agents (bishops, priests, other 
men religious, women religious—the women religious being always a major-
ity of the total). 
This is illustrated in Appendixes 5 and 6. There are about four times as 
many pastoral agents in India as in the Philippines, which has about five 
times as many Catholics; by a per capita index of institutionalization on 
this basis, the Catholic Church is more institutionalized in other countries 
than in the Philippines by a factor of sixty in Japan, of fifteen in India and 
Vietnam, of ten in South Korea, of eight in Sri Lanka, and of four in 
Indonesia. 
How are we to interpret these figures? We must leave until later an at-
tempt to put all the elements in the balance, and confine ourselves here to 
noting once more, as we have noted in connection with the FABC, the 
CCA, the NCCI, the YCW, the BAA, and SELA, the ambivalence of insti-
tutionalized agencies, even institutionalized agencies of change. It is clear 
that change does not start either from top-heavy structures, which can only 
fall by their own weight, or from bottom-heavy bodies, which are inert by 
definition. Somewhere between the extremes there is an always fluctuating 
optimum area of leverage for change. 
The evidence suggests that change must begin from circles outside but not 
too far outside the centers of power. 
In the context of the world order, it must begin from nonruling groups 
within striking or destabilizing distance of rule, such as some parties and 
some churches. 
In the context of churches, it must begin from nonhierarchical groups in 
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orbit between the hierarchical centers and the marginal masses, such as 
religious orders and some mass-based lay movements. 
In the context of religious orders and congregations, it must begin simi-
larly from groups not too near either the gravitational force of the center or 
the tangential force of the fringes, such as groups of women religious in not 
too heavily institutionalized religious institutes and national churches. 
In the context of women religious institutes, it must begin in conditions 
where some provocation for change and some prospects for change are 
proffered by the forces at play in the larger society. In the 1970s these condi-
tions were realized more fully in the Philippines than in any other country 
with a Christian population of a million or more. 
Frontiers in Dialogue and Theology 
At the International Mission Congress of 1979 in Manila, already men-
tioned in connection with those of Melbourne and Pattaya in 1980, the 
focus was on relating the three emerging themes in Asian Catholicism: jus-
tice for the poor, dialogue with religions and ideologies, and inculturation 
into the Asian context. Agencies to deal with the first two concerns existed 
in various stages of readiness in both the FABC and the CCA. As for in-
culturation, there was a wide gap between the degree of self-reliance as-
sumed as a birthright by the churches of the CCA on the one hand, and, on 
the other, the narrow course steered by the FABC between the various 
Asian cultural contexts and the steady pull of centralization from Rome. 
Judged by their degree of social impact, the activities of the CCA Asia 
Ecumenical Center (AEC) and of the FABC Bishops' Institute for Religious 
Affairs (BIRA) are not particularly relevant to our inquiry. Neither is the 
World Conference on Religion and Peace (WCRP), which under the presi-
dency of the Catholic Archbishop of Delhi blazed some trails in meetings of 
the 1970s—in Kyoto, Louvain, Singapore, and Princeton. More directly 
relevant is the idea embodied, though on a much humbler scale, in the or-
ganization known originally as the Asian Cultural (and Religious) Forum 
on Development (now ACFOD). 
ACFOD is another transnational and transconfessional creation of the 
1970s. Launched in 1973 under the ecumenical sponsorship of SODEPAX, 
brought to grips with development problems in 1975 in an interreligious 
conference with the cosponsorship of the UN Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation (FAO), based in Bangkok with a Catholic priest and later a Thai 
Buddhist as chief coordinator, it set itself the task of "action, dialogue, and 
mutual support" linking religious and cultural groups "in a common en-
deavor for social justice and development."2' 
If ever there was a David taking on a Goliath, it was ACFOD undertaking 
to break down the barriers built by millennia of cultural conditioning 
among the religious, ideological, and cultural blocs of Asia. It is impossible 
to report anything yet from ACFD by way of significant impact on its 
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chosen field of endeavor. Only the fact that a systematic beginning has been 
made makes ACFOD a possible milestone in the history of Asian efforts at 
social change. 
Action is of the essence of movements like ACFOD. What of cooperative 
initiatives that concentrate exclusively on reflection? So far the Asian pat-
tern has been for theological associations to emerge transnationally within 
the CCA family and in the course of time to gain Catholic participation. In 
these, as reflected in journals like the South East Asia Journal of Theology, 
attention to social issues has been an effect rather than a cause of social 
awareness in the wider world. An effort to put theology more in the main-
stream of the struggle for self-reliance is represented by the CCA Commis-
sion on Theological Concerns, with its ready welcome for indigenous theo-
logical thinking. 
But to touch a nerve and provoke a reaction, socially radical theological 
thinking in Asia had to become still more broadly transnational and trans-
confessional. Theologians as a group became a visible factor in Asian Chris-
tian social protest only with the Wennappuwa meeting of the Ecumenical 
Association of Third World Theologians (EATWOT). 
Third World theologians had to become a separate association in order to 
get a hearing in the theological—hitherto practically synonymous with the 
Western theological—world. Otherwise they could never have been much 
more than an echo of that world's trumpet tone, or at best a very muted 
variation on its themes. When EATWOT held its first Asian meeting in Sri 
Lanka in 1979, it had already met twice in Africa (1976 and 1977). Its first 
Latin American meeting was held in 1980. But by 1979 its most influential 
input came from liberation theology, and the most influential source of this 
was Latin America. 
By 1979, liberation theology was proving itself not merely influential but 
distinctly threatening to the received wisdom in theology. Its voices now 
came from several continents; it wore the faces of several races and of both 
sexes; it spoke with the accents of Marx, Ché Guevara, Gandhi, King, and 
(as was the case in the Philippines) Mao. It had its opponents in the Third 
World, and it did not easily prevail at Wennappuwa; but prevail it did in the 
end, as is seen in the statement cited at the beginning of this study. 
Wennappuwa undertook its task with not insignificant credentials. There 
was a cardinal (Darmojuwono of Indonesia) and six bishops from four 
other countries among the eighty participants from ten Asian and several 
other countries. Sri Lanka itself was disproportionately represented, but 
none of the nonsocialist Asian countries of major Christian strength, with 
the forced exception of South Korea, was without representation. What the 
group had to say, therefore, could not be immediately brushed aside as the 
sloganeering of an immature or unrepresentative minority. 
Where the WSCF-IMCS meeting of 1976 had spoken of the struggle for 
self-reliance in Asia, the EATWOT meeting spoke of Asia's Struggle for 
Full Humanity and saw that as "the Asian context" of the search for "a 
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relevant theology." Its analysis of the issues in Asia accepted some basic 
Marxist criteria; passed a harder judgment on the role of capitalism there 
than on the role of socialism; spoke of "revolutionary violence" there as 
being "most often unavoidable"; reacted against theology's past "elitist" 
and "domesticating" role; and called for a theology for which, as Marx 
himself would have put it, the point was not to interpret the world but to 
change it.24 
If getting attention may be considered a first step for a theology commit-
ted to change, the Wennappuwa statement at least met that first test. Within 
little more than a year Vatican displeasure had been manifested, first in a 
direct criticism of the Wennappuwa findings, then in an attempt to isolate 
the following EATWOT meeting in Säo Paulo. The criticism accused the 
Wennappuwa findings of being a warmed-over version of an already dis-
credited trend, not worthy of the name of theology.25 
The immediate effect of this criticism was to provoke the reaffirmation 
and reinforcement of the views expressed by the conference. Less imme-
diately and more positively, the criticism may have influenced the framing 
of the Säo Paulo statement, which took more care than the Wennappuwa 
one to sound like theology rather than like politics.26 In the longer term, 
even apart from any ultimate rights or wrongs in the case, it posed in its 
context a particular burning question about transnational relations. 
The burning question is this: on the whole, do transnational relations 
make for a freer, more fraternal, more participatory, less unbalanced, more 
peaceful world than nation state relations do? 
In the intermediate term, it is not at all certain. There is generally admit-
ted to be a certain ambivalence in the way such relations work out in in-
ternational politics in the more conventional sense. There appears to be a 
similar ambivalence in the way they work out in the politics of transnational 
relations in the churches. When we return to this, we must return prepared 
to look for some clarifying distinctions. 
Individual Symbols of Social Protest 
The meaning-making function in religious protest tends to culminate in 
the words, the symbols, and even the persons of individual men and wo-
men. The global record is full of religious rebels who are the hinges, as it 
were, on which history has turned: Gautama, Jesus, Mahomet, Luther, 
Gandhi, to mention only some giants. The case appears to be no different 
with movements that claim to have outgrown religion and outgrown indi-
vidualism. Who would say that individual charisma has loomed less large in 
the world of Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Ho, Tito, Castro, and Kim II Sung? 
How this is explained is of course a subject of perennial dispute among 
social scientists. There will probably never be an end to efforts to explain 
one of their fields in terms of another, if only because there will never be an 
end to tendencies to exaggerate the role of one or the other and thus pro-
voke a swing of the pendulum. 
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Marx and Engels arrived on the historical scene at a moment when the 
pendulum, in terms of exaltation of the role of what would come to be 
called superstructure, had swung to a Hegelian extreme. Similarly, Hitler, 
Stalin, Gandhi, Mao, not to mention more recent arrivals like Deng Xiao-
ping, John Paul II, and Khomeini, may yet be seen in historical retrospect 
as having shown in practice the inevitability of a return swing. 
One might hazard the hypothesis that each age in history is liable to be 
dominated by that particular one of the irreducible sources of historical 
dynamism that has been most denied its due credit in the preceding age— 
whether that be the forces and relations of production and power, or the 
structures and dynamisms of the cultural complex, or the role of the indi-
vidual human personality. 
As for the personal contribution in the present age, the frontier of con-
temporary Christian social protest has already produced its crop of individ-
uals who have articulated and embodied its force and direction—Martin 
Luther King, Camilo Torres, Helder Cámara, Ernesto Cardenal, Oscar 
Romero. Can we find comparable transnationally salient figures on the 
Asian horizon? The seeds of such may have been sprouting, but within the 
1970s they had not yet yielded a harvest. 
As a galvanizing signal, the martyrdom of a high church leader might 
cross frontiers fastest. This did not happen in Asia within the 1970s, though 
a Korean Catholic bishop, Daniel Tji of Wonju, came close to becoming a 
martyr-figure in General Park's prisons, and though the general secretary 
of the main Protestant church in Taiwan, the Presbyterian C. M. Kao, was 
serving a heavy jail sentence for association with Taiwanese dissidence by 
the beginning of the 1980s. 
The barriers are greater where the message needs to be articulated, since 
this requires crossing boundaries of language and culture. Neither English 
nor French can reach as many Asians as there are Latin Americans reached 
by Spanish or Portuguese; and the mass languages of Asia, led by Chinese, 
Hindi, Indonesian, and Japanese, are even more culture-bound. 
When the articulation in question is at a technical theological level, the 
difficulties are compounded. M. M. Thomas of India, Cardinal Kim of 
Korea, Bishops Labayen and Claver of the Philippines were among the few 
Asians of high ecclesiastical standing whose articulation of a Christian ra-
tionale for social protest was beginning to have an international and inter-
confessional audience within the period under study. 
Literary figures command a wider following than theologians. In a coun-
try like Japan, where the institutional writ of the churches runs no higher 
than 1 percent to 2 percent of the population, one arrives at a very different 
measure of the influence of the Christian leaven when one considers those 
Christian writers, such as Endo Shusaku, who have been among the most 
widely read throughout the population. In Indonesia, comparable national 
eminence has been enjoyed by W. S. Rendra, whose Christian connections 
are tenuous but who has been directly associated with social protest. 
In the end, however, one must look to the Philippines and South Korea, 
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the two foremost Asian countries of Christian social protest, for living sym-
bols of protest who have some visibility beyond their own national hori-
zons. 
The Filipino example most in view in the 1970s was Edicio de la Torre, a 
young priest of the Society of the Divine Word. His path to radicalization 
came through the experience of his chaplaincy to the Federation of Free 
Farmers, which in the 1960s was a pioneering organization on the rural 
frontier. He had been preaching the need for social revolution in more or 
less Marxist terms before the imposition of martial law in 1972. He put off 
arrest for two years by going underground, then spent over five years in 
political detention before being released without trial in 1980. By then he 
had become something of a celebrity abroad as well as at home. 
The conditions of his imprisonment were not the harshest or most restric-
tive suffered by Philippine detainees. This no doubt contributed to a nota-
ble serenity in the development of his thinking. As described by himself in 
the last months of his first detention (he was re-arrested in 1982), that think-
ing had not only gone beyond the stage where a committed Christian radical 
gives priority to cultural revolution within the Church, but had also gone 
beyond the stage where he or she ceases to be concerned for cultural revolu-
tion within the Church. 
History, he felt, had already shown that, just as the Church alone is inca-
pable of bringing social revolution to the state, so the state alone is incapa-
ble of bringing social revolution to the Church. To leave the institutional 
Church to its fate is not consistent either with concern for the success of the 
social revolution (the revolution may swallow the Church, but an unrecon-
ciled Church will stick in its throat) or with concern for the success of re-
newal in the Church (a Church of the people does not leave its institutional 
framework behind it like a used cocoon).27 
In his pre-jail days de la Torre had promoted a group called the Theologi-
cal Writing Collective of the Christians for National Liberation, a specimen 
of documented cross-fertilization of theology and Maoism outside China. 
Among products of his prison days is a collection of poems and letters by 
himself and others called Pintig—a primary source among the mass of doc-
umentation on the jails of Marcos, and a Philippine product of the sort of 
conditions that produced the prison writings of Bonhoeffer under Hitler, of 
Gramsci under Mussolini, and of Berrigan in the Vietnam-era United 
States. Out of prison and out of the Philippines from 1980 until 1982, de la 
Torre joined the transnational dialogue on human liberation on the terms 
hammered out of his experience. These terms amounted to a dialogue on all 
fronts—with the Church, as a priest who has opted to remain a priest, and 
with all other forces, including Marxist and Muslim ones, which purport to 
offer a way to liberation by whatever means the task requires.2* 
As an international symbol of social protest in the 1970s, the South Ko-
rean counterpart of de la Torre was Kim Chi Ha. 
Like de la Torre, Kim was widely read in radical theology and social 
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thinking. Like de la Torre, he suffered political imprisonment, which in his 
case meant repeated jailings, extremely harsh jail conditions, and a confes-
sion of communist sympathies which he later repudiated as having been 
extracted by torture. Like de la Torre, he had poetic and artistic gifts; in 
fact it was as a poet and playwright that he came to be identified nationally 
and internationally. As in the case of de la Torre, his passion was for the 
people, and most particularly for the rural people, whose poverty and 
hunger had been part of his own life. 
Unlike de la Torre, Kim was not a priest or even a cradle Christian. His 
conversion to Catholicism dated from 1971 ; but his life from then on was 
entwined with that of his local bishop in Wonju, the one bishop in non-
socialist Asia who could compare notes with him on what it was like to be 
behind prison bars in a national security state. 
Kim Chi Ha's last imprisonment in the 1970s covered almost the same 
years as the first period of detention of de la Torre—with the difference that 
in Kim's case there had been a trial, a conviction, and a sentence commuted 
from death to life imprisonment and later to twenty years before being 
lifted altogether in 1981 under the presidency of General Chun. His post-
prison course falls outside the scope of this study. It must suffice to say that 
it began with a reaffirmation of the themes of his previous writing, and a 
declaration that this was "only the beginning."2' 
What were those themes? They concern us here because in them there 
could be taking shape, with all the crudeness and fragmentation but also 
with all the passion and intensity of the crucible from which they came, 
something that might yet be seen as an authentic Asian theology, capable of 
catching imaginations transnationally and of providing social protest with a 
vision at once credibly Asian, credibly Christian, and credible as a motive 
force for social change. 
As for the Asian roots, we have touched on them earlier in connection 
with URM in Korea. These roots sink beneath the Confucian topsoil into 
the peasant culture that bred a century of popular upheavals against alien 
rule: the 1894 Tonghak rebellion against Chinese tutelage; the 1919 March 1 
Movement against Japan; and the upheaval of the students, workers, and 
farmers who rose against the South Korean military elites of the period after 
World War II. 
Providentially, some might say, Kim had no recourse other than this 
"Eastern learning" before his encounter with Christianity. By the time of 
that encounter, he was already imbued with an outlook at once populist, 
religious in both an intense personal and a broad social sense, and non-
violent (in a sense that will need further qualification30). For him the 
Tonghak principle—treat people as though they were God—needed only to 
be given a theological rationale in the doctrine of the incarnation, and a 
social application by way of social theory or political strategy. On the side 
of social theory, however, it was still inchoate at best at the time of his death 
sentence. 
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We have mentioned how minjung theology, which is the theology appro-
priated by Kim Chi Ha and developed by some Protestant theologians such 
as Kim Yong-bock, defined itself over against (which is not to say in any 
rigid opposition to) Western liberalism, Latin American liberation 
theology, and Marxism-Leninism, especially as embodied in the North Ko-
rean regime. Three pressures doubtlessly played a part in crystallizing this 
thinking: the cultural need to affirm an indigenous identity, the hostility of 
the prevailing political and religious climate to anything savoring of Marx-
ism, and the consciousness of the problems that had remained unsolved and 
in some ways exacerbated after twelve decades of attempts to act on the 
Communist Manifesto. 
One of these problems was the catastrophic impasse, illustrated nowhere 
better than on the embattled Korean peninsula, in the worldwide struggle 
between economic liberalism and Marxism. Another problem was the seem-
ing inevitability of the betrayal of every revolution, and above all the seem-
ing inevitability of the betrayal of every Leninist revolution, by the newly 
established power elite. The question posed by the latter problem is: Is there 
any way to keep the needed revolution faithful to the interests of the people; 
and, if not, is there any strategy for coping with the inevitable betrayal? 
This question could not but be a constant preoccupation of Asian Christian 
leaders at the transnational level; and so it is not surprising to find minjung 
thinking being hopefully scrutinized in bodies such as the CCA's Commis-
sion on Theological Concerns.31 
Kim Chi Ha has sometimes been described as Asia's Solzhenitsyn. The 
comparison, though suggestive, can hardly be taken too seriously. On the 
one hand, by 1981 Kim had yet to show that he could produce a literary 
work on the scale or with the universality of appeal of a major Russian 
novel. On the other hand, his sociopolitical thinking also had yet to show 
signs of the sclerosis and stridency of that of the celebrated Russian exile. 
Kim, at 41 (in 1982), had already become a transnational voice of the 
Asian voiceless, and a symbol of Christian solidarity with more than Chris-
tian victims of oppression. Still, his ultimate stature could not be confi-
dently predicted. As he himself said, it was only the beginning, a beginning 
that might or might not have an important sequel—both for his role in the 
history of Asian Christian social protest and for the role of Christian pro-
test in the history of Asian social change. 
6 
THE UNDERLYING 
LOCAL CONTEXTS 
In any attempt to scan the Asian horizon in search of transnationally 
salient features of Christian social protest, two things most immediately 
demand to be noticed. 
On the one hand, the multiplicity of the data, overwhelming when one 
recalls that it spreads over nearly two-thirds of the human race, becomes 
relatively manageable when attention is confined strictly to those transna-
tionally salient features—just as it is easier to take in a map of Asia if the 
continent can be imagined as covered with water to a height of, say, 1,000 
or 5,000 meters. At 5,000 meters, the waters would make Asia look like a 
cluster of islands in the vicinity of what we now call Tibet. At 1,000 meters, 
we would see an Asian backbone running from Iran to Mongolia, with ribs 
and limbs scattered as far as Turkey, Yemen, Sri Lanka, Java, New Guinea, 
Japan, and the shores of the Arctic Ocean. Similarly, if considered exclu-
sively at its transnational altitudes, Asian Christian social protest takes on a 
certain shape—a skeletal shape, which is not entirely misleading for all that. 
On the other hand, in any living body the skeleton is not separated from 
the flesh, and in fact gives only a very approximate idea of what the whole 
body looks like. In excluding from a map of Asia all land below 1,000 me-
ters, one would in fact be excluding the Asia in which the immense majority 
of Asians live and have lived from time immemorial. Similarly, in excluding 
from the study of Asian Christian social protest the purely national or sub-
national processes that could be considered part of it, we risk conveying 
some major misrepresentations of the totality of the phenomenon. 
To learn all that can be learned about the transnational level of Asian 
Christian social protest, while at the same time compensating for any major 
distortions or deficiencies liable to result from focusing on that particular 
level of that phenomenon, we need to put things more precisely in context in 
relation to a series of overlapping other contexts. One context can cover 
some of the same ground as another in any one of three ways: by falling 
wholly within the same ground, by falling partly within it and partly outside 
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it, and by covering all of it and more. We must look for significant instances 
of all three kinds of contexts in relation to the ground we have already sur-
veyed. 
Let us take a closer look, then, at those national or subnational processes 
that belong to the underlying local contexts of Asian Christian social pro-
test. 
In the measure that global society becomes more transnational, it be-
comes more difficult to draw that contour line, on the map of humankind, 
which distinguishes phenomena that are transnationally salient from those 
that are not. 
The distinction is at its most elusive when applied to communication. It is 
when one contemplates a world of mass media, satellite media, and interna-
tional travel that the myth of the global village looks closest to becoming a 
reality. It begins to seem almost as if Teilhard de Chardin's noosphere has 
really become a medium spread uniformly around the globe—at least now 
that the various iron curtains and bamboo curtains of the first postwar 
generation are no longer as tightly closed as they used to be. 
It is premature to think that the global village has arrived, even in respect 
to communications; but it is true that a certain common fund of global 
awareness exists today in a way that was unthinkable in earlier times. There 
is really something new under the sun when people on both sides of the 
globe can simultaneously follow space flights or sports events or the reper-
cussions of major political developments, and be aware of being united in 
the activity; when the starvation of children on one side can be witnessed in 
living rooms on the other; and when tyrants on any side must live with the 
possibility of being detected in their tyrannizing by observers on any other. 
Thus, in Asia, regimes that have had something to hide (and what regime 
has not something to hide?) have had to live with the fact that at least some-
thing of what they are up to will come to light through outside monitors of 
their behavior. There is ample evidence (for example, in the files of Am-
nesty International) that a certain amount of international political leverage 
has been made possible through this porosity of even the most tightly sealed 
interstate borders. 
The fact remains that even in respect to communications there is still a 
long way to go before everyone in the world feels like everyone else's 
neighbor. A glance at the local press on any continent, including those 
where press freedom is least restricted, suffices to show just how insular, 
how positively parochial, the readers of the press are presumed to be by 
those whose vested interest lies in giving the people what they want. A con-
versation with a peasant in northern China will show in a similar way that 
his or her mental world map is not the same as that of a worker in southern 
India, or for that matter as that of a peasant in southern China. Even what 
is seen as the social protest experience differs drastically from country to 
country and from province to province. 
In what respects, specifically, does the transnational picture of Asian 
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Christian social protest already outlined need to be corrected or put in per-
spective in the light of the country-by-country record? 
To suggest an answer to this question, let us first examine the main events 
or event-clusters that have loomed large in the record of Asian Christian 
social protest. Let us look at these without particular regard for the ques-
tion of what country they occurred in or whether their repercussions have 
been felt beyond that country's borders. This examination alone will not 
suffice to bring to light the full geographical pattern, since the underlying 
processes are like icebergs that do not always show tips above water in the 
temporally definable sense of "events." But it will show that the events and 
processes involved do have a certain geographical concentration; and this 
realization will oblige us to compensate for one major inadequacy in our 
transnational picture by supplementing it with one outstanding national 
case history—that of the Philippines. 
Events, Event-clusters, and Their Geographical Distribution 
Appendix 3 itemizes the relevant events and event-clusters over an 
eighteen-year period. As a guide to the unfolding of the phenomenon under 
study, it is only indicative, first because it shows only the tips of the icebergs 
and second because it is only a selection among these. As far as possible the 
selection is confined to events whose relevance is more or less self-evident. 
In addition, the selection is biased toward events that point beyond them-
selves, indicating (though this is not in every case verifiable) that a whole 
series of events or processes lies behind or beneath each one. 
Granted its limitations, what generalizations can be made on the basis of 
such a list? 
About one in six of the events occurred outside Asia, either involving 
Asians (as in the worldwide Catholic or Protestant meetings) or at least 
affecting Asian Christian social protest (as in the continent-wide Latin 
American meetings). Their field of concern extends beyond the borders of 
Asian nations and of Asia itself. About one-fourth are events whose field of 
concern is transnational, though not transcontinental. 
These two groups of events would by themselves suffice to show what is 
meant by saying that a new transnational trend, spearheaded by a new in-
tensity of transnational social concern, has become part of the pattern of 
global Christianity in the past generation, and more especially in the past 
half generation. Such a list of events could scarcely have been predicted by 
anyone trying to peer into the future half a century or even a quarter of a 
century earlier. 
Our list also shows that a clear majority of the relevant events were of less 
than transnational scope. For the people who precipitated them, the precipi-
tating factor was regularly a local provocation. 
Accordingly, one looks for major provocations where there have been 
major reactions. These major provocations are in fact not far to seek in 
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South Korea, in the Philippines, and in the Republic of Vietnam, the three 
countries that together account for about two-thirds of the local cases on 
the list. However, they have also not been far to seek in other Asian coun-
tries less strongly represented, such as Indonesia, India, Taiwan, and the 
People's Republic of Vietnam, or in other Asian countries not represented 
at all, such as North Korea, China, or Thailand. So we need to take a closer 
look at these local cases. 
There is no simple correlation between the strength of a local provocation 
and the strength of the local Christian reaction. The most obvious reason 
for this is that social protest, like human eyesight, can operate only along a 
limited segment of the spectrum of theoretical possibility. To put the point 
in Toynbeean terms, eliciting a creative response requires a challenge that is 
neither too crushingly strong nor too enervatingly weak. We can now at-
tempt to define more precisely what constitutes in Asia a challenge capable 
of eliciting a creative response in terms of Christian social protest. 
First Exclusions: Homelands of Half of All Asians (North and West) 
We have had occasion already, when considering Christianity in the 
Asian Crisis (p. 29), to determine that Christian social protest has been 
excluded as a practical option and made a fairly total irrelevance over more 
than four-fifths of Asia's territory and for more than half of Asia's people, 
though these include only about one-seventh of Asia's Christians. 
The first decisive factor in these areas is extreme minority status, Chris-
tians being a minority of at best 2 percent in communist-dominated 
northern Asia taken as a whole, and in Muslim-dominated southwestern 
Asia, together with Pakistan and Bangladesh, taken as a whole. The second 
decisive factor in both areas is the hostility of the dominant ideology to any 
Christian voice or influence in public affairs. 
The combination of both factors makes the relations of force too unequal 
to permit any real confrontation between Church and State on issues of 
public policy. Where minority status is not extreme, as is the case in Syria, 
which is almost one-tenth Christian, the entrenchment of Islam in and 
around the country is sufficient to rule out any flexing of Christian political 
muscle. Where Christians are not in a minority at all, as has been the case 
within the very local limits of Lebanon, they are certainly involved in con-
frontation, as also noted earlier, but not at all in the role of social radicals. 
Obviously it is not difficult in Asia to find clear-cut cases where the pres-
sures inhibiting corporate Christian social protest are insuperably strong. 
Even in such contexts it will always be possible to find individuals heroic 
enough to protest in the name of justice for others; but in such contexts it is 
not humanly realistic to expect significant postures of protest on the part of 
representative groups, except in the face of threats to the groups' own sur-
vival. 
"Of course," one could hear in 1980 from the newly mandated spokes-
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person of Chinese Protestantism, "our patriotism is not without a pro-
phetic or critical character.'" But the mere mention of this idea is an ex-
traordinary novelty in that situation. It is not a statement of the way things 
have recently been in the People's Republic; rather, it reflects a new relax-
ation inside China and a new openness to currents of thought and talk out-
side it. It is a novel Chinese testimony to the legitimacy of that particular 
current in global Christianity.2 
Further Exclusions: Homelands of Three-Quarters 
of All Other Asians (South and East) 
It is not only in northern or western Asia that one can define the relations 
of force between Church and State as insuperably unequal. Even in the 
absence of a hostile dominant ideology, it does not appear that a Christian 
minority of less than, say, 5 percent, can realistically be expected to put 
itself on a collision course with state power, except where its own survival is 
at stake. That seems to be the lesson of experience in the remaining parts of 
Asia; and that criterion would excuse us from the trouble of looking for a 
prophetic or critical Church in any country of continental Southeast Asia 
except Vietnam, and in any country of East Asia except South Korea. 
Or is this generalization too sweeping? It is partly a question of defini-
tion, a question as to which postures of protest are representative enough to 
be significant. 
On a small scale these postures can be found in embryo almost every-
where—even in Bangladesh, where Christians are only half of one percent 
of the population. On a national scale they can be found in pure form 
nowhere, and certainly not in the Philippines, the only majority-Christian 
country, where the line between conservatism and radicalism runs through 
the Church itself. 
Between the extremes, we must be content to diagnose postures of protest 
as representative and significant when the groups involved are somewhat 
broadly based and have a degree of linkage to the institutional Church, 
sufficient to modify the overall distribution of Christian weight in the bal-
ance of power in state and society. This is shown most clearly in united 
stands on public issues by nationally representative church bodies that are 
distinctly and riskily critical of the policies of those in power. These united 
official stands usually represent a diluted response to militant pressures 
from lower levels of representativeness. 
Let us see in the concrete if we have excluded too much of Asia. 
Japan, officially less than 2 percent Christian, might look like a refuta-
tion of the thesis, given its relatively vocal national organs of social concern 
among both Protestants and Catholics. It might look like it, that is, until we 
measure the element of risk. There is undoubtedly an evolution in boldness 
there, especially among Catholics; but the last time it was really risky for 
Christians to be critical in Japan was before and during World War II. Jap-
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anese Christianity failed the test then, and it has not been confronted with 
any comparable test since, though it has made increasing use of its relative 
freedom in the meantime.3 
Japan, along with Hong Kong, is about the only territory in Asia of 
which it could be said that the Church there in the postwar generation was 
being killed with kindness, in contrast with the pattern of crucifixion and 
resurrection in the Philippines and South Korea. There would still be some 
truth in this generalization, although, if it were entirely true, much (see pp. 
83f.) would be missing from the present transnational picture of Asian 
Christian social protest. 
Burma, no more than 4 percent Christian, might also seem to challenge 
our hypothesis. What are we to make of a situation where large minorities 
are in perennial armed revolt, and where government suspicion, in the 
words of a Burmese bishop, falls on "Buddhists, Baptists, and Muslims, in 
that order"?4 We must be explicit here about a distinction that we shall have 
to consider later in the case of Taiwan: tribal or nationalist protest is not 
necessarily social protest, and in itself is much less securely linked with the 
Christian ethos, even where it speaks with Christian accents. In the judg-
ment of the Secretary General of the Burma Council of Churches in 1980, 
Karen and Kachin insurgency has been largely Protestant, but its motiva-
tion has been more racial than religious.' 
There remains the most massive national exclusion if we test the sugges-
tion that a Christian minority of less than 5 percent is incapacitated from 
being a force for social protest. What about the Christians of India—27 
million of them by some reckonings, and the largest national Christian 
community in Asia after the Philippines? They are a minority of less than 4 
percent. 
We have seen enough of the Indian case to know that the winds of change 
have blown there too, and that formidable reserves of energy can be mobi-
lized in the face of a threat to the Christian community's survival (as in the 
case of the Freedom of Religion bill in 1979). But the Christian community 
as a whole and in its leadership, when faced with a national polarization 
between the powerful and the powerless (as in the Emergency of 1975-77), 
is not yet secure enough to dare to throw its weight on the side of the latter. 
Local Sources of Militancy: The Search Narrowed Down 
Once we have eliminated from consideration all Asian countries with a 
Christian population of 5 percent or less, we find we are left with some ten 
Asian territories of the 1970s that could claim a Christian population ap-
proaching or exceeding 10 percent. Eliminating further, for reasons already 
seen, the cases of Soviet Asia, Lebanon, and Syria, we are left with three 
Christian footholds in continental Asia (South Korea, Vietnam, and the 
British colony of Hong Kong) and four in insular Asia (the Philippines, 
Indonesia, Singapore, and Sri Lanka). We could count an eighth case if we 
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counted Papua New Guinea with Asia rather than with Australasia. How-
ever, though it would provide us with a second case of a majority-Christian 
country in East Asia, it would not add to our case histories of social protest. 
Seven Christian Footholds on Asia's Fringes 
Seven territories in all—that is what seems to result from our inquiry into 
the places of origin of Asian Christian social protest. True, in these territo-
ries are concentrated some 84 million Christians, making up well over half 
of all Christians in Asia, and representing about a fifth of the territories' 
total population. The fact remains that the total population of these territo-
ries is only about a tenth of the total Asian population. 
Actually the implications go further than this. The timidity or intimida-
tion of Christianity among nine-tenths of all Asians must also have an effect 
on Christians among the other tenth. The timid cannot fail to give pause to 
the bold, even while being partly emboldened by them. The warning rum-
bles from the leaders of the Christians of India, which we have heard rever-
berating in the FABC and the CCA, are only the clearest of many illustra-
tions of the limits of the possibilities of representative transnational Asian 
Christian militancy. 
All such transnational stances in fact are necessarily compromises. In 
terms of prophetic militancy, as long as its minority Christian complex 
holds it back, South Asian Christianity can never be expected to go more 
than part of the way to meet the Christianity of other Asian regions in 
which the Christian community feels less insecure. By the same token, as 
long as it remains an overall minority of less than 5 percent, Asian Chris-
tianity as a whole can never be expected to go more than part of the way to 
meet the Christianity of the non-Asian world, a world in which every second 
person is at least nominally Christian. 
This is necessarily the case, if not as regards pronouncements made, at 
least as regards positions effectively maintained, and at fully representative 
ecclesiastical levels. The same constraints will be felt much less consistently 
at the level of the frontierspeople of the transnational avant-garde. 
We have seen enough to show that there are areas in Asia where the pres-
sures discouraging Christian militancy of any kind could be described as too 
crushingly strong. Let us not fail to inquire whether there are any areas 
where the pressures could be described as too enervatingly weak. There is 
only one possible case: the Philippines, an island nation where the only 
internal threat to Christianity as such comes from a (southern) Muslim 
minority that is about as small in the country as a whole as the Christian 
minority is in Asia as a whole.' 
And in fact, with one important qualification, the case fits the descrip-
tion. It took the martial law regime of the 1970s to subject Philippine Chris-
tianity to its first real test in four centuries of whether there were any bones 
at all within its soft and pliant body. The test proved, as expected, that 
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much of it had neither bone nor sinew—though it also proved what no one 
could have confidently said before: that a significant fraction of it was not 
second in fortitude to the Christianity of any other country. 
We have already found, in the cases of Japan and Hong Kong, territories 
of which it could be said that in the postwar generation the Church was 
being killed by kindness. The same could have been said of the Church in 
the Philippines, before martial law cut through it like a knife through but-
ter. It could still be said of that major part of Philippine Christianity that 
remains on easy terms with the wielders of power in the nation's New So-
ciety. As we have yet to see in further detail, the country that contributes 
most to radicalism in Asian Christianity is also the country that contributes 
most to its conservatism or inertia. 
We are left with the conclusion that the overwhelming problem of Chris-
tianity everywhere in Asia has been to muster enough strength within itself 
to overcome a feeling of demoralization before the magnitude of the overall 
forces in Asia ranged against the realization of the vision of justice it is 
committed to promote. This being so, and the geographical distribution of 
Asian Christianity being so skewed towards the warm-water fringes, it 
should not be too difficult to get accustomed to the idea that there are only, 
at bottom, seven territories in Asia in which the Church has the minimum 
absolute and relative numerical strength it would need in order to be able to 
take a nonconformist stand and make it heard. 
So much by way of a list of the possible places of origin of Asian Chris-
tian social protest. It will now be instructive to match it with our other list 
of actual locations of protest among some thirty relevant local events or 
event-clusters. 
Six Key Locations of Christian Social Protest 
There is in fact a correlation between the possible and the actual places of 
origin of social protest. About half the actual cases come from the two 
countries with about 40 percent of Asia's Christians: the Philippines and 
South Korea. These also happen to be the countries that lead the continent 
everywhere east of Lebanon in percentage of Christians (the percentages 
being in the range of 90 percent and 30 percent respectively). About 
another quarter of the cases come from four territories with about another 
15 percent of Asia's Christians: Vietnam, Indonesia, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore. These also happen to be the territories next highest in Asia in 
percentage of Christians (of the order of 10 percent in each case). 
This is about as much as we need to know in order to establish a certain 
fundamental correlation of territories of relative Christian strength with 
locations of relative Christian militancy. To put the point more precisely in 
our original terms, local cases of corporate protest are normally to be ex-
pected, and will normally be discovered, where the relations of force are not 
overwhelmingly unequal one way or the other, but remain balanced in a 
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certain productive tension between the strength of a challenge and the 
strength of the Christian capacity to respond. 
In this equation, relative Christian strength is one crucial factor. It 
creates the potential for social militancy in at least the seven territories we 
have singled out. At the same time, it is not the only factor. To turn poten-
tial into actual militancy, what seems to be required is a major but not over-
whelming local provocation. 
This condition has not been quite fulfilled in Hong Kong, in Singapore, 
or in Sri Lanka, with the result that protest there has involved, for the most 
part, only the avant-garde, as also in India and Thailand.7 It was not being 
fulfilled in the other four territories either, prior to the provocations of 
emergency rule there. Finally, it has not been fulfilled in Vietnam when 
newly unequal force relations have supervened; when the same have pre-
vailed in Indonesia (during the earlier years of Suharto's New Order); and 
when they have held temporary sway at various stages of the military 
regimes in South Korea. 
It is in the interstices between all these inhibiting factors that the voice of 
corporate Christian militancy is heard. Among our seven territories, the 
cases that are most instructive are those of the Philippines, South Korea, 
Vietnam, and Indonesia. Outside the seven territories, there is much to be 
learned from the case of India (as we have seen, and as we might have ex-
pected from the sheer numbers and variety of Christians there). For reasons 
yet to be explored, there is also something to be learned from the case of 
Taiwan. 
What has been said already must suffice as to the cases of India and Ko-
rea. What remains to be said must be confined to some notes in the cases of 
Indonesia, Vietnam, and Taiwan. 
The essential ingredients for protest in Indonesia were provided in the 
1970s: a Christian minority (mainly Protestant) possibly reaching, after 
rapid growth, 10 percent of the total population, and a military regime that 
had physically liquidated some hundreds of thousands of alleged Com-
munists in 1965 and had kept in political detention some hundreds of 
thousands more. 
The special inhibiting factor here was the dominance of Islam. If Islam 
had had anything like the dominance it claimed (95 percent according to its 
fundamentalists), Christian protest would have been as unthinkable here as 
in Bangladesh or Pakistan. But in fact Islam had a firm hold on no more 
than half the population, and was determinedly excluded from direct power 
by the Javan generals of the New Order. This gave minorities an interest in 
not carrying criticism to the point of overturning that order altogether; but 
at the same time it made room for some relatively daring contestation of its 
more corrupt and repressive features. The contestation was spearheaded by 
students; it occasionally involved the clergy; and on one occasion (the Sa-
wito affair of 1976) it obscurely implicated the most representative figures 
of all the main religions of Indonesia.8 
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In the case of Vietnam, the essential ingredients for protest were pres-
ent only in the early 1970s: a well-entrenched Christian minority (over-
whelmingly Catholic) of at least 10 percent in the Republic of Vietnam; and 
a military regime comparable to its Indonesian counterpart in reputation 
for corruption and repressiveness. 
The special inhibiting factor in this case was the imminent threat of com-
munism, already dominant in North Vietnam, which was engaged in a bitter 
war with the South. A critical Catholic movement grew in South Vietnam 
from 1970 on, a time when it had no counterpart elsewhere in Asia except in 
South Korea. It was spearheaded by Young Christian Workers and their 
chaplains, and it did not shrink from including in its criticism official 
church privilege and complicity in abuses of power. It had become suffi-
ciently broadly based by 1975 to bridge the traumatic transition for the 
Church from being a bastion of anticommunism to being a Church under 
communism. Two archbishops, because of it, were not treading a total 
vacuum when they called for a new beginning under the new regime. One of 
them, Archbishop Binh of Saigon, as we have seen, persevered in his new 
direction at least long enough to plead its case before the Synod of Bishops 
in Romein 1977. 
Obviously this experience would take on historic importance if it proved 
to be a breakthrough in Christian-communist relations. However, the signs 
on this were mixed at best by the end of the decade.' 
The pattern of response to the challenge in Indonesia and South Vietnam 
was within the bounds of what might have been expected. It would have 
been less easy to anticipate the contribution of Taiwan. Its overall percent-
age of Christians is less than 8 percent; and the third of that minority repre-
sented by the Catholic Church is ranged massively and officially, with none 
of the qualms of conscience of its counterparts elsewhere, on the side of the 
powers that be. Indeed, the case of this largest denomination in Taiwan 
goes uniquely far to one extreme: we have here the most unreserved and 
longstanding official alignment anywhere in the world of a national Catho-
lic community with a martial law regime. 
That has been the situation as regards official alignment. At the grass-
roots level the attitudes could never have been so uniform; and at any rate 
the case of the second largest denomination goes uniquely far to the oppo-
site extreme. With 1 percent of the population in the 1970s, the Presbyterian 
Church in Taiwan set itself against official national policy to a point that 
cost its national executive leader a seven-year jail sentence at the beginning 
of the 1980s.10 
If the Presbyterian protest could be properly defined as social protest, it 
would invalidate our generalization that social protest is not to be expected 
from small minorities. 
And in fact the case is at first sight persuasive. It is not as if the leaders 
had no mandate from their constituency; on the contrary, perhaps no 
leaders and no policies in the Republic of China on Taiwan were ever so 
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democratically mandated. Nor is it as if a Christian case could not be made 
for the Presbyterian position; on the contrary, the Presbyterian leaders 
could claim that they spoke for a disfranchised majority (the non-
mainlanders) as large as the non-white majority in South Africa (more than 
80 percent in both cases)." By any definition the Presbyterian stand for 
Taiwanese self-determination and human rights has been an example of a 
church risking its own life for the sake of the people. It may seem like quib-
bling to point out that the solidarity here is ethnic rather than social. 
The case may serve to clarify some concepts. Why, we may ask, should a 
church be drawn more easily into nationalist than into social solidarity? 
The first reason is of general application: because it requires less altruistic 
motivation to struggle for an interest which, though broader than one's 
own, encompasses one's own. For what is the decisive difference, in this 
regard, between the Presbyterian and the Catholic Church in Taiwan? It is 
not as if one were sociologically a church of the poor to a decisively greater 
extent than the other. As far as that goes, while both have a substantial 
aboriginal community, both have their main roots, like most churches in 
Asia, in the urban middle class. What really distinguishes Presbyterians and 
Catholics in Taiwan is their ethnic background: the Presbyterians are over-
whelmingly Taiwanese in membership and leadership, while half the Catho-
lics and almost all the Catholic leaders are of mainlander extraction. Thus, 
on both sides the partisanship is only too understandable. 
Another reason why the threshold of tolerance is higher for Christian 
social protest than for Christian nationalist protest particularly applies in a 
post-Marx world, a post-Lenin Asia, and a post-1949 Taiwan. It is all very 
well to call for opting out of the system of capitalist imperialism, as radical 
Christians might like to do in both Korea and Taiwan. But one has to think 
of the concrete alternative; and what if the available alternative has con-
trived to become equally unpopular, and moreover, as in the case of 
Taiwan, all too menacingly close at hand? 
For the Catholic Church in Taiwan, the thought of that alternative has 
been enough to throw it without reservation into the linked arms of capital-
ism and its local client, the Kuomintang Party, which monopolizes power at 
the "national" or "Chinese" level in Taiwan. For the Presbyterian Church, 
the two options being equally repugnant, the only choice left is a generalized 
defense of human rights, set or not set in the framework of some sort of 
ideological third way. 
At this point the problem in Taiwan becomes the same as that facing 
critical Christianity in South Korea. In both cases an element of nationalism 
becomes part of the third way, since both communities can see themselves 
as objects of military imperialism on one side and economic imperialism on 
the other. In the Taiwan (Presbyterian) case, the situation lends itself to 
more straightforward political nationalism, since the line of division there 
can be represented as running between the people (of Taiwan) and a foreign 
invader. And in fact, for Taiwan church history in the Presbyterian perspec-
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live, the period after 1949 is taken in stride as "the sixth colonial period on 
the Island.*"2 
Nationalism and Christianity, however, though often in history found 
hand in hand, have never been comfortable for long in each other's com-
pany. A faith that can so easily serve the turn of conflicting tribalisms, as 
appears to have been the case in so many places and periods, cannot but feel 
embarrassed in its claim to stand for universal love. It knows that by play-
ing the chameleon it feeds the suspicion that there is nothing constant, other 
than survival instinct, beneath its too frequently changing colors. 
Because religion is used ideologically in many different ways, of course, it 
does not follow that all the uses are equally rationalizations of self-interest. 
A bias on the side of the underdog remains a perennial touchstone of the 
Judaeo-Christian ethos. If there is any credibility in the position of the 
Taiwan Catholic spokespersons, it can come only from their underdog sta-
tus vis-à-vis the mainland colossus. If there is something more like Christian 
credibility in the homeland theology of some Taiwan Presbyterians, and in 
the minjung theology of some Korean Christians, it can be so only to the 
extent that in their case there is evidence of an identification with the under-
dog that is more immediate, more immediately costly, and more innocent of 
immediate consequences by way of making underdogs of others. A solidar-
ity that lands people in jail carries more conviction than one that leaves 
them walking the corridors of power. 
It has been necessary to review briefly these key locations of Christian 
militancy, even in this survey of the transnational dimension of the phe-
nomenon, because of their repercussions there. All local experiences make 
their contribution to the transnational compromise, even at the level of the 
transnational avant-garde, but most especially at the level of the FABC and 
the CCA. One can imagine the constraints on an episcopal federation that 
has to take account of the views of the Taiwan bishops, and that actually 
held its first assembly as their guest. 
By the same token one must suppose that a country embracing over a 
third of Asia's Christians and over two-thirds of Asia's Catholics must 
weigh particularly heavy in the balances of the FABC and the CCA. That is 
the case of the Philippines, and that is why we must single out the Philip-
pines for some closer inspection. 
Local Sources of Militancy: The Philippine Case 
The place of the Philippines in the pattern of Asian poverty has been 
touched on under the heading Asia among the Continents; its place in the 
world market economy, under Asia in the Global Crisis of Change; its place 
in the history of Christianity in Asia, under Christianity among Asian Reli-
gions; its place in the confrontation of ideologies in Asia, under Christianity 
in the Asian National Security States; its place as regards the social role of 
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religion in Asia, under The Critical Dimension in Catholicism; and its place 
in the pattern of post-colonial Asian Christian social protest, under the 
various heads covering the role of the transnational Christian organisms 
(most relevant here would be the PISA, the FABC, the OHD, the YCW, the 
IMCS, SELA, the ASC-AMOR, and EATWOT). 
In all this the inevitable effect of concentrating on common features has 
been to obscure the singularity of the Philippine case. 
In some ways, of course, the singularity has been impossible to obscure. 
We have already sufficiently reminded ourselves that the Philippines is the 
single Asian case where a country as a whole was won to Christianity during 
its expansion in the sixteenth century; and that the Spanish made Christian-
ity in the Philippines take the form of Catholicism, thus making Christian-
ity in Asia as a whole about one-third Filipino and about half Catholic. We 
have touched also on the singular extreme of paternalism that followed the 
Spanish flag, and on the passive and nominal character of the Catholicism 
that remained as its legacy until the martial law of President Marcos. 
What happened then was bound to be portentous for Asian Christianity 
as a whole. The Church in the Philippines could not but be, for better or 
worse, the major influence on the Church in the rest of the continent, even 
if it had nothing new to offer it. 
In fact, it proved to be the conduit between Latin America and Asia over 
which the social ferment in the Christianity of the New World found its way 
to the Christian fringes of the Old. At the same time, it proved to be a meet-
ing place, and indeed about the only one of any consequence in the world, 
where there was some cross-fertilization between the Latin American form 
of liberation theology and the Maoist variety of Marxism-Leninism. No one 
could say how explosive the mixture might prove to be; but no one con-
cerned with the future of Christianity and revolution in Asia could afford 
not to keep it under observation. "We are all watching to see how things go 
in the Philippines," said the chief theologian of the CCA in 1980." 
As an outline of how things were going, the local Philippine events listed 
in Appendix 3 are inadequate. Though there are twice as many local Korean 
events in the list, one should not conclude that Korean Christian social fer-
ment was on a larger scale than its Philippine counterpart. One might rather 
say that Korea was a case of a smaller pot with a tighter lid, and that it blew 
off its lid in more spectacular eruptions in the 1970s—bolder trials of 
strength put on by workers and students; stronger support from the top 
Protestant and Catholic leadership; a bishop jailed; a famous poet bru-
talized in jail; alleged subversives executed; a president assassinated; 
another president violently dislodged from power; a popular insurrection 
bloodily suppressed; show trials dramatizing a ferocious purge of politics, 
education, media, and business. 
Some of these convulsions did find parallels in the Philippines in the same 
decade: the Muslim war, for one thing, was immeasurably more devastai-
108 THE UNDERLYING LOCAL CONTEXTS 
ing. But it could be speculated, nonetheless, that by the end of the 1970s the 
real trial of strength had not yet come for the Philippines. 
One could also speculate as to why this was so—or at least why the Chris-
tian ferment in the Philippines was not observably, or not immediately, on 
the scale of the Christian population. The passive and nominal legacy of its 
Spanish colonial past is one part of the answer. Closely related to it, but 
ambivalent in its bearing on the question, is the low level of institutionaliza-
tion of Philippine Catholicism. 
A Case of Strength in Numbers? 
A fundamental correction of perspective is needed here. It arises from the 
fact that the institutional Catholic Church in the Philippines is not on the 
same scale as the membership of the Church. This fact cuts the size of the 
Philippines down dramatically in the transnational institutional framework, 
where the institutional side of the churches is decisive. 
On a per capita index of institutionalization based on the ratio of Catho-
lics per pastoral agent, the Philippines is the last in the Asian league. Even 
in terms of total numbers of pastoral agents, the Philippines ranks far be-
hind India and is not all that far ahead of Vietnam or Japan. If the non-
Catholic contribution is counted in, the combined church personnel of 
India would rank as equal to three or four churches of the size of the aggre-
gate in the Philippines, and the Philippines aggregate itself would barely 
exceed that of Indonesia. In terms of Christian periodicals, the 
Philippines ranks fifth after India, Japan, Indonesia, and Hong Kong. 
What is the bearing of this low level of organization on the potential and 
actual contribution of Philippine Christianity to impetus for social change? 
We have already noticed the ambivalence of its implications. In trying to 
put the Philippine contribution in continental perspective, we cannot disre-
gard either the Philippine strength in numbers or the Philippine weakness in 
institutionalization. The fact is that both indices are ambiguous in their 
significance for the course of developments. 
On the one hand, take the equivocal notion of strength in numbers. On 
examination it proves to be partly strength and partly weakness. 
The mere fact that most people in a country are Christian, as in the Phil-
ippines or Poland, does ensure that government policies cannot for long fly 
in the face of Christian sensibilities. However, the mere fact that most peo-
ple in a country are Christian also ensures that these sensibilities will not 
deviate very notably from a certain sociological norm for similar condi-
tions. 
In other words, the more Christianity becomes common, the less it can be 
distinctively Christian. This fact makes it ultimately impossible to maintain 
that optimum church growth is the same thing as maximum church growth, 
even from the point of view of the Church's own objectives. The leaven role 
of the Church seems to require, ideally, not majority status or weak minor-
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ity status, but something in the range of a healthy minority status. 
On the other hand, take the equivocal notion of weakness in institutiona-
lization. It too, in its own way, proves to be partly weakness and partly 
(potential) strength. 
A Case of Weakness in Institutionalization? 
The weakness is all too evident in that vast area of world Christianity 
where the Church has been traditionally understaffed—the area of the for-
mer Spanish and Portuguese empires, which includes Latin America and the 
Philippines. 
True, we may discount indices of weakness that presuppose the desirabil-
ity of maximum institutionalization: priest-people ratio, church-controlled 
schooling, church attendance. We may also discount the clerical disregard 
of popular religion. All that being duly allowed for, the word "weakness" 
still applies. "A tremendous force for social inertia'"4 was, we may recall, 
MyrdaPs verdict on religion-in-practice in South Asia, where religion was 
lacking in any healthy corps of activists and energizers. Myrdal could have 
said the same of religion in Latin America. 
Where, then, is the potential strength in this institutional weakness? 
Who, indeed, would have found signs of strength at the time when Myr-
dal wrote, whether in South Asia or in Latin America? In the latter region, 
there was still no sign then of the militant gospel of Medellin and Puebla, or 
of their vanguard, the theology of liberation. But few are now unaware that 
it is precisely from this understaffed, underinstitutionalized backwater of 
Christendom that there has come, for better or worse, the most revolution-
ary Christian historical force of our time. 
It may be pointed out, of course, that the upsurge of revolutionary reli-
gion in Latin America is the product of a peculiar constellation of circum-
stances. Due credit must be given to North American economic rapacity for 
providing a peculiar degree of provocation. Due credit must also be given to 
nonreligious Marxism, inspired by the once-Christian Fidel Castro, for 
spearheading the peculiar Latin American reaction. It must be recognized 
that the pattern of Latin America as a protest-provoking periphery was a 
secular reality before it became a religious one. 
It remains true nonetheless that the subsequent shift in Christian weight 
in the Latin American power balance remains in itself a momentous politi-
cal development. On this point Castro can be dur best witness, because 
presumably our most reluctant one. "Times change," he said in 1980 in a 
nationwide speech in Cuba, upon returning from the first anniversary cele-
bration of the Nicaraguan revolution, "and imperialism, the oligarchy, and 
reaction are finding it more and more difficult to use the Church against the 
revolution."15 
Times change: such is the lesson of the 1970s in Latin America. More 
specifically, we have learned from Latin America that times can change in 
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regard to the social role of religion in ways that are least expected. And now 
we observe the same kind of change in the Philippines, in the same sort of 
constellation of circumstances—essentially the same confrontation of 
transnational capitalism and social revolution in the setting of the same 
underinstitutionalized Catholicism. 
Why did the change take a more significant form in that setting than in, 
say, the setting of India? Why has it become possible to find a change-
oriented Church in the Philippines, not only among "the transconfessional 
groups of the tolerated and not excommunicated ministries"" (among 
whom it can be found also in India and indeed practically everywhere), and 
not only among the cadres of the national and international ecclesial avant-
garde (URM, SELA, PISA, OHD, YCW, IMCS, WSCF, AMOR, 
EATWOT), but also at representative national levels, such as the national 
leadership of women and men religious, the national body responsible for 
official Catholic social concern, and even a significant segment of the 
Catholic episcopate itself? 
We have dealt at length with one basic reason: the minority complex, the 
fact that only half a dozen territories in Asia contain Christian communities 
that are not too insecure for the sociological possibility of corporate social 
militancy. We could add several factors more specific to the India/ 
Philippines comparison that also play major roles; for example, the inward-
looking legacy of India and the fragmented character of Indian Christian-
ity, geographically, linguistically, culturally, and denominationally. We 
could look for clues in the Marxist thesis about the "mode of production," 
which today would see different degrees of ripeness or unripeness for revo-
lution in the varying conditions of "dependent capitalism," which are 
otherwise essentially common to India and the Philippines.17 
However, insofar as one concentrates on the contrast in degree of institu-
tionalization between Indian and Philippine Catholicism, and correlates it 
with the contrast in degree of social radicalization, one is forced to conclude 
that their inverse relationship is not entirely coincidental. In other words, 
just as optimum church growth is not to be defined as the highest possible 
growth, by the test of the Church's own objectives, so optimum church 
institutionalization is not to be defined as the highest (any more than as the 
lowest) degree of organizational development. 
Once it is recognized that a prophetic or critical role in society is part of 
what the Church is for, and that for this purpose there can be such a thing 
as too extreme a degree of institutional entrenchment as well as too extreme 
a weakness in numbers, it can be speculated that the relative failure in India, 
in contrast to the relative success in the Philippines, is not unrelated to both 
factors. 
The argument advanced long ago by Ivan Illich, that the problem of the 
institutional Church has not been understaffing but overstaffing, has come 
to look more plausible since it has come to be known that it is those so-
called understaffed backwaters of the world Church, such as Latin America 
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and the Philippines, that have shown the most striking signs of new vitality 
in the form of basic Christian communities, innovative ministries, and a 
prophetic role in regard to society. 
A Pattern of Protest f rom the Periphery 
Let us look more closely at what we have just called the relative success in 
the Philippines. The pattern of protest from the periphery does not apply 
only to the Philippines as a whole within global Catholicism, or only to the 
Philippines in a special way as compared with other former outposts of 
empire, such as India. It applies in these ways, but it applies in a further way 
also. The pattern of protest from the periphery is repeated within the Philip-
pines itself. 
First a word as to the reality of the radicalization in the Philippines. It is 
beyond our scope to spell this out in much more detail than has already been 
suggested. We can, however, speak in terms of several major indices: the 
relative radicalization of a fifth to a third of the Catholic Bishops' Con-
ference (CBCP); the relatively greater radicalization of its National Secreta-
riat of Social Action (NASSA) and its regional Mindanao-Sulu Pastoral 
Secretariat (MSPS); the spectacular radicalization of the Association of 
Major Religious Superiors (AMRS), to the point of incurring the ire of both 
the episcopal majority and the Roman Curia; and the rise of a massively 
participatory and politically radical Church of the people in certain 
dioceses, mostly remote rural ones. 
To describe all this, an enormously complex story would need to be told, 
on the basis of a vast proliferation of necessarily fugitive documentation.18 
But it is necessary to call attention to this story for a couple of reasons. 
First, it represents a reservoir of experiences unmatched in scale and social 
significance in any of the other churches of Asia. Second, it reflects a pat-
tern of interaction of church influences in the Philippines that can be seen as 
paralleling the transnational pattern. 
In this connection, we have the benefit of Robert Youngblood's research: 
a detailed and copiously documented study attempting to quantify the data 
in terms of Johan Galtung's center-periphery model of the international 
system. The conclusion of Youngblood's study deserves to be cited at some 
length. 
In conclusion, it appears that powerful forces in Rome and in Manila 
converge to maintain a harmony of interest between the center of the 
Center (cC) and the center of the Periphery (cP) within the church and 
between church and state in the Philippines, regardless of the nature of 
the regime. Yet the situation is by no means static, nor is it a foregone 
conclusion that the harmonies between Rome and Manila and between 
the CBCP leadership and [the President in] Malacañang will prevail in 
112 THE UNDERLYING LOCAL CONTEXTS 
the long run, for since Vatican II has thrust to the forefront the need to 
witness for greater social justice in the world, it is unlikely that the dis-
harmony of interest between center and periphery represented by the 
progressive bishops will be overcome until the basic structures of Philip-
pine society are changed.. . . The glacial shift of the Roman Church is 
clearly visible on the side of eradicating social injustice in the contem-
porary world, and even though many setbacks can be expected in the 
coming decades, the movement of the church in behalf of those on the 
economic and political margins of society will be inexorable. The crucial 
question for the Philippines is whether structural changes imperative in 
this shift can be brought about through peaceful or violent revolution." 
Unfortunately, there is no way to test the prediction about "the move-
ment of the church" being "inexorable" except by living through the fu-
ture. In the meantime all such predictions are likely to have an element of 
wishfulness in them. 
As for the other assertions in this passage, they are all supported by some 
substantial evidence already available. In connection with them, the issue of 
violence is only one of several that deserve brief consideration here, because 
one and all have implications that go beyond the local or national context. 
We cannot speak of the issue of violence without bringing up the issue of 
communism; and we cannot speak of the local phenomenon of center-
periphery relations without raising once again the issue of the relationship 
between the trend to transnationalism and the prospects for peace and jus-
tice in the world. 
The Issue of Violence 
The issue of violence in the Philippines was a particularly agonizing one 
by the end of the 1970s. President Marcos had ceased to have a normal 
constitutional mandate by the end of 1972. His continuation in power rested 
outwardly on an increasingly flimsy patchwork of constitutional pretexts. 
Meanwhile the effective basis of his rule was the iron hand of martial rule, 
partly hidden in a velvet glove, worn through at several points, and borne 
up on an arm of American economic and military reinforcement. This rein-
forcement had shown some disarray, especially when similar arrangements 
proved counterproductive in Iran, Nicaragua, and South Korea. 
The issue was not whether violence could be prevented, but whether 
violent resistance to the manifold violence already endemic under martial 
rule would make things better or worse. 
That question had become academic in some parts of the country. Even 
before the proclamation of the New Society, violent resistance to the politi-
cal status quo had been a chosen option among one ethnic minority, the 
southern Muslims. The subsequent intensification of the hostilities on both 
sides created casualties by the tens of thousands and refugees by the hun-
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dreds of thousands. Earlier still, violent resistance to the social status quo 
had been the chosen option of a guerrilla group, the New People's Army 
(NPA), a Peking-oriented insurgency, which in 1969 seized the initiative 
from the older, Moscow-oriented, Hukbalahap. The martial law regime 
provided the provocation that turned this insurgency from a local irritant to 
a serious long-range contender for national power. 
How serious a contender? Certainly more serious by the early 1980s than 
could have been anticipated in 1970. That is the measure of the contribution 
of the Marcos regime to the destruction of conventional politics and of the 
political middle ground in the Philippines. For nearly three decades the 
country had seen nothing like the "socialist upsurge in the countryside" 
that held sway behind the back of the Philippine Army in a string of prov-
inces scattered the whole length of the archipelago from the Cagayan Valley 
in the north to Davao in the south.20 
However, those who would agree that the Communist Party of the Phil-
ippines (CPP) had come a long way in a decade would also agree that it had 
a long way still to go. To have any important share in the picking up of the 
pieces after the inevitable demise of "the conjugal dictatorship," it would 
clearly have to come to terms in some way with that other power in the land, 
the Catholic Church. And before that church could even consider what kind 
of company it would want to keep in a violent struggle for justice, it would 
have to resolve the moral issue of violence itself. 
That was one reason why Christian eyes elsewhere in Asia turned anx-
iously toward the Philippines as frustration built up there to the point 
where, by 1979, some small sparks of urban terrorism were struck even on 
the conservative wing of the opposition. The Cardinal Archbishop of 
Manila, never the first to confess discouragement about "critical collabora-
tion" with the martial law regime, began to notice talk of revolution every-
where, and signed an "Exhortation against Violence" in the name of the 
Philippine hierarchy. The operative part of that pastoral letter read: 
In our country today, there is growing evidence that the call to violence is 
being sounded by the leaders of clearly identifiable ideological groups 
and by others who are collaborating with them. We must condemn as 
criminally irresponsible the inciting of the suffering poor to that revolu-
tionary violence which promotes hatred, leads to useless bloodshed and 
the tragic loss of many lives, and seldom, if at all, achieves any good. 
Those whose first victims will be the poor masses must be answerable for 
what violence brings upon our people.21 
Was this position as agreed upon and as representative as it professed to 
be? All that can safely be said is that its priorities would have been the 
priorities of the great majority of the bishops. 
Skeptics noted that its only actual signatory was the Cardinal; that the 
pastoral itself recognized that "an absolute interdict on the use of violence 
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is not part of the moral tradition of the Church" (and not part even of the 
1967 encyclical, Populorum Progressio); and that the pastoral could be 
interpreted either simply and angrily as the Cardinal condemning the 
violence of the oppressed, or, at best, as an oblique way of urging on the 
oppressors the need, as the pastoral letter itself put it, " to prevent violations 
(or toleration of violations) of human rights which provoke counter-
violence in turn." 
And such skeptics were only the ones that troubled to read the document. 
There were others, including some in relatively responsible church posi-
tions, who no longer looked to such quarters for guidance on these matters. 
As elsewhere in the world after Vatican II, this independent attitude to-
ward magisterial utterances sometimes reflected loss of all faith and some-
times reflected simply a change of theology. In the Philippine case there was 
ample inducement for such a change. Any theology that relied heavily on 
the bishops to steer the Church through the shocks and shoals of the martial 
law period was bound to be found wanting. 
As a body the bishops were quite unequipped for that experience. And as 
a body they proved incapable of learning from it, at least as far as can be 
judged from the record of the first seven years of the New Society. An anal-
ysis of more than a hundred documents emanating in that period from the 
hierarchy as a whole, from groups of bishops, or from individual bishops 
(there were over eighty of them by the end of the decade) shows that divi-
sion emerged quickly, changed little, and fairly sharply separated a critical 
minority, who at the outset numbered seventeen, from a generally com-
pliant or manipulable majority.22 On crucial issues, such as violence, the net 
result was bound to be that such restraint as could be applied by the hierar-
chy as a whole would work more effectively on the powerless than on the 
powerful. 
But was not that the tendency of history as a whole since the churches had 
first become pillars of their respective societies? From medieval crusades to 
twentieth-century wars, had they not lent themselves all too readily to the 
violence of the powerful, and blessed the revolutions only after they had 
triumphed? It would be simplistic to hold one cardinal responsible for a 
posture practically ensured by the ecclesiastical mind-set, and reproduced 
around him not only by most bishops but also by the local nuncio, the curial 
heads of bishops and religious, and the very latest popes. John Paul II had 
no different advice on this point when he visited the Philippines in 1981. 
On the question of whether there was a right to violent resistance in the 
Philippine New Society situation, the minority of Christian consciences that 
would support it had grown by 1980 beyond the reach of magisterial re-
straint. On the issue of its general workability, the experience of Nicaragua 
in 1979 (but was not that victory much more dearly bought?) gave a lift to 
their hopes. 
On the issue of timing, however, the pope and the cardinal would have 
had one authority on their side that was a professional in the matter. The 
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CPP-led National Democratic Front (NDF) was consistent in dissociating 
itself from the urban bombs and fires of the right-wing opposition, recog-
nizing that it needed much more time to build up its base in the countryside. 
But that, of course, only shifted the Christian dilemma to new ground. 
The Issue of Christian-Communist Collaboration 
As already hinted in the passage from "Exhortation against Violence" 
quoted above, the problem of violent resistance was complicated for the 
Christians by the company they would have to keep to resort to it. Yet if 
there was no peaceful way to restore power to the people (a conclusion that 
had spread from left to right across the opposition by the end of the dec-
ade), still less was there any prospect of success for any violent revolution 
that was not a united front. 
The most effective fighters already in the field were the NPA and the 
Bangsa Moro Army (BMA) of the Muslims. There were some uneasy links 
between them; and their political fronts, the NDF and the MNLF (Moro 
National Liberation Front), even managed to appear together before an 
international, self-proclaimed Permanent Peoples' Tribunal (PPT) in 
Antwerp in 1980. This panel claimed for them the status of legitimate bellig-
erents against "the Marcos-U.S. neocolonial system," which it judged as 
amounting to "a continuing criminal enterprise" under "emerging interna-
tional law."23 
For the Antwerp participants, pronouncing this verdict was guaranteed to 
be much easier than making it stick. For one thing, it implied turning one 
country into two—an implication that PPT, NDF, and MNLF alike chose 
not to examine too closely. For another, it counted for less in international 
affairs than the two none-too-convergent movements to which it had to 
look for effective backing—those of the communist and of the Muslim 
worlds. For a third, its fate depended perhaps most concretely of all on the 
extent to which the Catholic Church in the Philippines could be neutralized, 
infiltrated, or honestly converted to its cause. 
The prospects for any clear-cut outcome have looked more unlikely for 
the Philippines of the 1980s than they ever looked for the Nicaragua of the 
1970s. Marcos was not Somoza; in particular, he would have to lose his gift 
for deflecting or defusing or confusing discontent before he could effec-
tively unite the whole country against him. The southern Philippines corre-
sponds to nothing in Nicaragua; and while that region of the Philippines 
boasted the most progressive church constituency in the country, it was far 
from ready to accept the Moro claim there to majority status and a mandate 
to secede and rule. As for the rest of the country, where were the ingredients 
for a Sandinista-style coalition? 
On the Marxist side, there was a question as to the real strength of the 
NPA. All would agree that its support had grown rapidly in the late 1970s; 
but not all were certain that it had already shown itself to be the wave of the 
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future. Those who were certain of that, given the security problem, were in 
no position to show why." 
On the Christian side, where were the priests or other leaders in the 
Church who could be the Filipino counterparts of the priest-ministers in the 
government of revolutionary Nicaragua? There were several who had been 
in jail or in the underground; there was Edicio de la Torre (see p. 92), who 
appeared to have grown with the movement; and by the end of the decade 
those who spoke for the NDF were less few, less circumspect, and less 
marginal in the Church." But all that added up to something less than a 
conversion experience for the whole Church; quite the contrary in some 
quarters, as alarms periodically sounded, not always unjustifiably, about 
communist double-dealing, infiltration, and manipulation of the Church. 
By 1982 these had produced a dissociation between the bishops and the 
Secretariat of the Mindanao-Sulu Pastoral Conference.2* Neither Church 
nor Party had come to this encounter with its heart on its sleeve. 
Failing a clear-cut outcome, what prospect was likely? For a Church that 
was practically coextensive with the people, the only realistic prospect was 
for a splintering process in the Church corresponding to the splintering of 
Philippine society. More realistically, it could be said that the contribution 
of the Márcoses was to lay bare what was already there—in biblical terms, 
the secret thoughts of many hearts; in Marxist terms, the class struggle in 
society and in the Church. 
For the New Society was nothing if not a sundering sword. We have spo-
ken earlier of criteria of Philippine Christianity that cut it down to size. The 
sword of the New Society undoubtedly cut it down further. 
The options of some church leaders there, whatever might be their subjec-
tive state of good or bad faith, put them firmly in the role assigned to 
church leaders by Marx and Lenin: the role of lackeys of the prevailing 
power. No clear-sighted analysis can leave any doubt that a struggle for a 
less unequal order in the Philippines must involve either the conversion of 
certain well-entrenched elements in the Church or a struggle against them. 
In the case of a much larger segment of the Church, one can hardly speak 
meaningfully of any conscious option, in regard to the imbalance in public 
power, other than perhaps an option for inaction and inertia, which in prac-
tice also maintains the imbalance. If an option for the poor is a Christian 
duty, these are the elements that sin by omission. By failing to become part 
of the solution, they are part of the problem. Here again the analysis of 
Marx (and of Myrdal for a comparable situation) seems fairly applicable. 
As for the remnant who have faced the issue and determined to opt for 
the poor in reality and not only in rhetoric, their troubles are only begin-
ning. In the first place, they represent a church minority hardly greater in 
size and surely more marginal in the institution than the minority actively 
opposing them. In the second place, choosing sides does not settle the ques-
tion of choosing allies. They have judged that national salvation is not to be 
expected from the New Society. Does it follow that it is to be expected from 
THE UNDERLYING LOCAL CONTEXTS 117 
the Communist Party? For most of them that does not necessarily follow. 
Are people-oriented church leaders to be blamed for holding back from 
this final plunge? On the contrary, it would be strange, in view of what they 
know or believe they know, if they did not think twice about it. Merely by 
being what they are, they have already broken the mold of the classic Marx-
ist argument about the role of religion in relation to revolution. As Castro 
conceded, times change. Why then should times not change further? Why 
should there not be some special concern to ensure that this revolution will 
be a revolution with a difference? 
Clearly, if there is ever to be a people's revolution that actually keeps 
faith with the people, it will have to be notably different from all the major 
specimens so far available for inspection. And Christians would scarcely be 
Christians if they were not convinced that they had something to contribute 
to the difference. Even granted an option for opposition to the New So-
ciety, even with acceptance of a need for violent resistance to its violence, 
even with openness to a need for some kind of rallying of opposition forces 
and hence of Marxists and Muslims among others, it never follows for 
Christians that any particular struggle must be victorious at all costs. It 
never follows for all of them, or even for most of them, or even for most of 
those thoroughly committed to the cause of the people. 
Here is a political reality with which all calculations about church and 
revolution must reckon, whether they are calculations of Christians or of 
Marxists or of observers with no direct involvement. Radical Filipino Chris-
tians could see that times change for revolutions too. They could argue that 
China after 1949 had not been exactly like Russia after 1917, and that Ni-
caragua after 1979 had not been exactly like Cuba after 1959. They could 
contend that the Philippines in the 1980s, in turn, need not and must not 
merely repeat any set pattern of the past, including the pattern in which 
Christians learn nothing from Marxists and Marxists learn nothing from 
Christians and both get defeated because of their inability to come to terms 
with each other. 
Delusion, of course, was sure to stalk such calculations; some delusion 
was inevitable for Christians in the New Society Philippines who had re-
solved to follow the option for the poor and powerless wherever it might 
lead them. But the option confronted them none the less. Thrown together 
by history on the same field of struggle with Marxists, they were faced with 
the opportunity and responsibility before their people, and before the 
Christians and people of Asia, to make their inevitable contribution to the 
record a constructively different one in terms of matching Christian deeds 
to Christian words in the domain of social concern. 
The Issue of Organization and Dependency 
A further major issue illustrated in the Philippine case is the issue of the 
relationship between organization and dependency. This cannot be ignored 
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because of its relevance to arguments about center-periphery relations put 
forward by writers like Galtung and Prebisch. 
We have cited a source which demonstrates in some detail that the 
transnational organization of the Roman Catholic Church lent itself to a 
reinforcement of the "center of the Periphery" by the "center of the Cen-
ter" against the "periphery of the Periphery" in the context of the Church 
and of the state in the Philippines (pp. 111-12). 
This argument by Youngblood, adapting the "harmony of interest" 
criteria of Galtung, purports to establish (1) a general harmony of interest 
between the Vatican and the CBCP (in favor of martial law or at least in 
disapproval of substantive church resistance to it); (2) a general disharmony 
of interest between the CBCP "center of the Periphery" and the CBCP 
"periphery of the Periphery" (reflected in their open conflict over martial 
law and the role of the Church in society); and (3) a correlation, explained 
as a circular cause-and-effect relation, between degree of marginality and 
degree of disharmony (in that the bishops most critical of the authoritarian 
regime regularly hold the least powerful positions in the hierarchy, control 
fewer of the Church's resources, and are located frequently in the most 
geographically peripheral areas of the country)." 
As key examples of how the harmonies and disharmonies have worked 
out, Youngblood cites, besides the original disagreement among the bishops 
over the declaration of martial law, the further discord among them over 
the use of the ballot in the New Society, the inaction of the hierarchy re-
garding deportations of militant foreign clergy, and the interventions of the 
Vatican against the militancy of the AMRS. 
There is no question that the Vatican and the AMRS were on opposite 
sides of this argument, nor that some of the measures resorted to by the 
episcopal conservatives, the nuncio, and the Roman Curia savored more of 
Macchiavellian power politics than of evangelical dialogue. But the entire 
experience showed the fragility of the gentler conventions on both sides, 
once the substantive power issues had been forced out in the open.28 
The argument of Galtung is that the term "structural imperialism" is 
fairly applicable to a world in which harmonies and disharmonies operate in 
the manner indicated. The argument of Youngblood is that the case of the 
CBCP fulfills the essential conditions of structural imperialism both within 
the Philippines and in Vatican-Philippine church relations. 
Both arguments appear to hold good within the limits of the definition. 
In other words, that is the way things are; and, as further reflection sug-
gests, that is the way things inherently tend to be. As structuralists like 
Claude Lévi-Strauss have argued, a certain degree of correspondence is 
simply inevitable between the systems of a society, as long as that society is 
functioning. When the society itself is unequal and divided, institutional 
religion, for the sake of peaceful coexistence with the political system, can 
only tend to reinforce the inequality and the divisions. It must do so all the 
more in the measure that it is highly institutionalized; and this tendency is 
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not overcome merely by resolutions to overcome it, since it is not in itself a 
matter of good or bad will. 
These considerations recall us to a recurring theme in these pages—that 
of the ambivalence of institutionalized agencies, even institutionalized agen-
cies of change. In this unequal world it is not at all to be assumed that com-
munication and contact on an ever larger scale lead of themselves to a 
strengthening of the church periphery, unless they are in some way coupled 
with a weakening of the gravitational force of the center, which tends to 
make the periphery serve the interests of the center and to make the reli-
gious center in turn serve the interests of some center of gravity in world 
society as a whole. In global politics, as in planetary physics, the existence 
of centripetal forces creates the counter-necessity of centrifugal ones if the 
system as a whole is to remain in being and in equilibrium. 
That is perhaps the most constructive lesson of the Philippine experience. 
The Philippine experience does not settle the question of the rightfulness 
or usefulness of Christian participation in violent resistance to state 
violence, except to the extent of showing the credibility problem involved in 
attempts to settle it by high ecclesiastical fiat. 
Neither does it settle the question of the rightfulness or wisdom of 
Christian-Communist collaboration in extra-legal resistance to state repres-
sion, except to the extent of suggesting that such collaboration need not and 
indeed must not occur according to any fixed formula from the past. 
The Philippine experience does, however, have something categorical to 
say about the relationship between transnational interactions and center-
periphery asymmetries. On the one hand, it shows existing interactions 
actually exacerbating the asymmetries both nationally and transnationally. 
On the other hand, in practice a certain amount of such unintentionally 
creative "imperialism" is perhaps part of the price that must be paid on the 
periphery for the emergence of a Church of the people and for the people 
there. 
As with the experience of Latin America, the Philippine experience sug-
gests that there would have been no Christian ferment on the fringes had 
there been no heat applied by national security ideology from one direction 
and by Roman curial centralism or Protestant mission-board possessiveness 
from another. 
7 
AN OVERALL 
TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
Today the principal fact that we must all recognize is that the social ques-
tion has become worldwide [Populorum Progressio]. 
All the major issues—political, economic, social, racial, or sexual—are 
global in character and interrelated. They demand global solutions [Re-
port to Fifth Assembly, World Council of Churches]. 
Beyond the transnational perspective proclaimed in these words, what is 
significant for our inquiry is their sources. The first statement was made by 
Pope Paul VI in 1967 in his major social encyclical, Populorum Progressio; 
the second by Philip Potter in 1975 in his report as General Secretary to the 
Fifth Assembly of the World Council of Churches in Nairobi. The two 
quotations represent a central insight of the churches in the third quarter of 
the twentieth century.' 
Even if this insight were not valid, or not entirely valid, it would still suf-
fice to show why we need to relocate our Asian findings in a larger perspec-
tive. That larger perspective is necessary simply in virtue of the fact that the 
churches have come to see it so. 
We would be still far from a complete appreciation of Asian Christian 
social protest if we confined our attention either to Asia alone or to Chris-
tian protest alone. Just as it has not been possible to learn all that can be 
learned about Christian protest at its transnational Asian level without 
considering the underlying local contexts and the very particular distribu-
tion of the local sources of militancy, so it would not be possible to learn all 
that can be learned about it without reference to other international con-
texts that are perceived as intersecting or overarching it. 
Some of these other contexts have forced themselves on our attention 
repeatedly. We could not consider these matters at any length without ob-
serving a transformation of international consciousness promoted in very 
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different ways by the capitalisms, the socialisms, the humanisms, and a 
multitude of other forces of our day. 
We have not needed to enlarge on the influence of the humanisms, dif-
fuse as it is and not given to appearing as a distinguishable actor on the 
contemporary international political stage. But these pages would be remote 
indeed from reality if they failed to suggest that the part of Christian protest 
on that stage is a part in a drama largely dominated today by the transna-
tional actors called capitalism and socialism. 
Nor is it inadvisedly that we have referred to these actors in the plural. 
A monolithic capitalist bloc, facing a monolithic socialist one, would 
present one kind of context for Christian social concern. There was a time 
when the confrontation was perceived largely in these terms, when the situa-
tion was seen as one of East confronting West. In Stalinist or Maoist terms, 
it was seen as revolution confronting imperialism; in terms of the Western 
alliance, as one of godless communism confronting the free world. 
This rhetoric survives, and so does some of the conviction behind it and 
some of the basis for it. No analysis can dismiss these black-and-white or 
rather red-and-white perceptions as long as their influence is reflected in the 
course of events. For the same reason, however, no analysis can neglect to 
look at the drastically changing realities underlying the stereotypes. 
To try to do justice both to the realities and to the perceptions, we must 
once more broaden our focus beyond the Asian horizon we have been ex-
ploring throughout the five central parts of this study. Returning to the 
place we began, taking our distance from contemporary Asia in space and 
in time, but now taking account of what we have been able to observe of it 
at closer range, we must try to set it in the context of (1) an overall perspec-
tive on modern history, (2) an overall perspective on contemporary options, 
and (3) an overall perspective on the options involved specifically in Asian 
Christian social protest. 
A Perspective on Modern History 
Any overall perspective on any historical period must take account of the 
dominating realities and issues of the period and take a position among the 
actual and possible ways of interpreting them. 
Any overall perspective on the historical period called modern during the 
second half of the second Christian millennium must take account of the 
reality and the issue of the haves and the have-nots. That concern is never 
far from the consciousness of any organized society. However, it was thrust 
to the fore by Marx and others with unprecedented vigor in Europe in the 
middle of the nineteenth century; it was forced onto the agenda of non-
Marxists as well as Marxists around the world by the revolutions of the early 
and middle twentieth century; and it dominated and determined the East-
West and North-South divisions of the world in the later decades of the 
same century. 
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Any overall perspective on modern history, all the more if it takes parti-
cular account of divisive and explosive issues of that history, must search 
for a certain bedrock of acknowledged fact that is common ground to the 
diverging interpretations, and seek to base on that bedrock its own choice 
among the interpretations. 
We take it as being part of this bedrock of acknowledged fact that mod-
ern history, by comparison with medieval, has been revolutionary in its 
impact on the distribution of haves and have-nots in society; that in its revo-
lutionary development the broadest and most basic distinction is to be 
found between an older stream called capitalist and a later stream called 
communist, or, more broadly, socialist; that in the period when capitalism 
had the field to itself its revolution was by far the most successful the world 
had yet seen; and that since the time when the world has been divided be-
tween capitalism and communism there has been no consensus about their 
competing claims. 
It is well to be clear at the outset about the fact that the quarrel between 
capitalism and communism does not involve any basic disagreement as to 
the scale of the original success of the capitalist revolution. We do not need 
to leave it to capitalism alone to sing the praises of its revolution of produc-
tivity, of the horn of plenty it produced out of the midst of the indigence 
and indolence of feudalism. The fact is that its praises have never been sung 
more magisterially, precisely for this achievement, than in the Communist 
Manifesto. The backhanded compliments of this document show the extent 
as well as the limits of agreement on the question of the success of capital-
ism. 
The bourgeoisie, historically, has played a most revolutionary part. . . . 
It has been the first to show what man's activity can bring about. . . . 
The bourgeoisie . . . has created more massive and more colossal pro-
ductive forces than have all preceding generations together.2 
Needless to say, the bourgeoisie has never had any quarrel with any part 
of this argument, except possibly with the actual term bourgeoisie. In the 
measure that this term has been appropriated for unfriendly use, the people 
it is applied to naturally dislike and disown it. That is their privilege; and 
inasmuch as our interest is not in generating heat but in shedding light, we 
can make do with a term in which they more willingly recognize themselves: 
we can call their revolution the middle-class revolution. This term, apart 
from being less emotionally loaded, has the advantage of implying rather 
clearly not only how far this revolution has gone but also how far it has yet 
to go. 
How far, then, has it gone? In feudal terms, one would have to say that it 
has let more of the people into the manor, that it has broadened the scope of 
the demesne to enable multitudes to enjoy an abundance and a freedom 
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formerly beyond the dreams even of the feudal aristocracy. It has certainly 
changed the shape that society had in the days of the seigneur, his suzerain, 
and his serfs. It has drastically altered the proportions of the haves and the 
have-nots. 
To be able to say that much is no mean claim, especially when, as we have 
seen, the soundness of the claim is conceded by friend and foe alike. But we 
must not leave it at that, since we need to explain why there are still foes. 
How far, more precisely, has the revolution gone? Has it replaced a tiny 
minority of haves, a feudal minority, simply with a less tiny minority, or 
with a large minority, or with an actual majority? 
The Communist Manifesto had a judgment on that too: it was here that it 
parted company with the champions of capitalism. "All previous historical 
movements," it said (meaning movements previous to communism), "were 
movements of minorities, or in the interest of minorities."3 
This was no doubt a defensible assertion in 1848, even in the context of 
the homelands of capitalism. During the following century and a third, 
contrary to the predictions of the Manifesto, it ceased to be defensible 
within the limits of those homelands. In the industrialized countries the 
beneficiaries of the middle-class revolution actually became a majority, 
even a large majority. 
The revolution could certainly be faulted with failing to extend its bene-
fits to everyone. It could even be plausibly accused of being actually inca-
pable of reaching everyone, despite all its later inventiveness, given the 
persistence of intractable deprivation for a sizable minority of the home 
populations. But obviously that alone would not justify Marx and Engels 
in denying it the merit of being the first social revolution in history to 
benefit a majority. 
There is a more serious reason why the middle-class revolution can still be 
accused of being the movement of a minority, in the interests of a minority. 
It can be so accused because the middle class not only remains a numerical 
minority in the world as a whole, but does so in a situation where, much 
more manifestly than in Marx's day, the world's majority is integrated into 
the system by which the middle class benefits. 
Have we now strayed beyond the bedrock of acknowledged fact that is 
common ground on to more contentious ground? Cannot one find in-
formed commentaries, more than a century after the Manifesto, dismissing 
its claims on this very point as sweepingly as it had made them? The histo-
rian A.J.P. Taylor, introducing thcManifesto in 1967, could speak confi-
dently not only of "the failure of the law of increasing misery" (a law pro-
pounded explicitly in the first chapter of the Manifesto), but also of the 
failure of the revised version of that law later formulated in terms of "impe-
rialist super-profit."4 
Well, the law may have been prematurely formulated and reformulated, 
but so was this particular postmortem on it. Even in 1967 it was still too 
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soon to be sure the bourgeoisie was not producing, as Marx asserted, 
"above all, its own grave-diggers," not indeed in the short term and on the 
home front, but in the longer term and on a more distant front. At any rate, 
what gave a new lease on life to the Marxist thesis was the growing aware­
ness (nowhere adverted to in the sophisticated 1967 liberal commentary) 
that the majority of people affected by the middle-class revolution were 
outside the Western world altogether—enduring in the 1960s the Asian 
drama of which Myrdal wrote, and causing in the 1970s even the president 
of the World Bank to question whether a global society that had "such an 
enormous mass of misery piling up around its base" could survive.' 
As to the more precise facts of the situation, let us make do with one of 
the more authoritative of the current formulations of the rich-poor division 
of the world of the 1970s. The UN "Declaration on the Establishment of a 
New International Economic Order," which WEIS approved without a vote 
by the General Assembly in 1974, puts it in these terms: 
The developing countries, which constitute 70% of the world popula­
tion, account for only 30% of the world's income. . . . The gap . . . 
continues to widen in a system which . . . perpetuates inequality.' 
If this version of things could command a grudging consensus in the mid-
1970s, it had no need to fear being shaken by the main events of the remain­
der of that decade: the energy crisis, the continued deterioration of the 
North-South imbalance, and the continued spread of the reach of transna­
tional capital into the socialist economies, notably with its post-Мао break­
through into China. 
The notion of global interdependence had by then become a truism ac­
cepted, though equivocally, both by the rich nations of the Club of Ten and 
by the poor nations of the Group of 77, which had not taken long to become 
a group of more than a hundred. Global interdependence had become a 
postulate uniting the more disinterested from North and South and West 
and East, such as those eventually represented in the Brandt Report of 1980, 
itself the inspiration of the Cancún Summit of 1981.7 
What we have to do with, then, is a theme that has maintained a certain 
constancy for a century and a third despite disconcerting transpositions of 
context and definition. In the Communist Manifesto it was a rallying cry to 
"working men of all countries." After Lenin and Stalin the battle lines 
seemed to be drawn between East and West. After Nehru, Nasser, the Cu-
ban Revolution, and the Chinese-Soviet split, it bore signs of developing 
into a confrontation between North and South. To situate the theme in the 
closing decades of the twentieth century, we must keep in mind both how 
much has changed and how much has remained constant through thirteen 
decades of verbal battle and bloodshed without precedent in this conflict 
which continues to be, in the words of the Brandt Report, "the great social 
challenge of our time."8 
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A Perspective on Contemporary Options 
The last wave of middle-class revolutions, or of high points in the overall 
social revolution, after it had been secured politically by the English, the 
French, and the American revolutions, came in the decade after 1860. 
One thinks of the American Civil War, categorized by one historian as 
"the last capitalist revolution."9 It liquidated the slave-and-feudal society 
of the American South and set Yankee America on the road to becoming 
the world's leading superpower in the following century. 
One thinks of the Meiji Restoration in Japan, which liquidated the feudal 
Tokugawa society and set Japan on the road (a more authoritarian road in 
its earlier stages) to becoming another of the world's economic superpo-
wers. 
One might think of the Risorgimento in Italy, not only because of the way 
it transformed Italy into one nation under middle-class hegemony, but also 
because of the way it incidentally liquidated an internationally important 
symbol of the feudal past, the Papal States. The digestion of this defeat by 
the papacy marked an essential change in its social outlook between the 
First and the Second Vatican Councils. Though once again it took a century 
to make the transition definitive, by the end of Vatican II the Catholic 
Church had pronounced itself reconciled to the world the middle-class revo-
lution had made. 
By that time, however, that world was not the only world, nor was that 
revolution the only revolution, or even the one with the freshest claim to 
being the wave of the future. While producing its capitalist revolution by its 
willed activity, the middle class had also been unwittingly producing by 
reaction the makings of a whole new series of revolutions in the name of 
that other class, the proletariat, which capitalism could not help setting 
apart, thus causing it to become conscious of itself. 
"A specter is haunting Europe," proclaimed the Manifesto; and indeed 
the specter went on to haunt the world. For the working-class revolution 
spelled doom for the hegemony of the middle class as surely as the middle-
class revolution had spelled doom for the absolutism of the monarchs and 
the nobles. What was merely a threatening blueprint in the hands of Marx 
and Engels was translated eventually—too late, however, for the designers 
to pronounce on the faithfulness of the translation—into still more 
threatening realities in the hands of Lenin, Stalin, Tito, Mao, Ho, Castro, 
and Kim II Sung. 
The more general effect of this, and the one that here concerns us most 
directly, was to make a battlefield of those areas of contemporary society 
formerly considered most sheltered from the dust of the arena—the fields of 
research and reflection, especially of all that is known as ideological super-
structure to Marxists and as the cultural sphere to others, and most particu-
larly of social sciences such as history and politics. If Marxism is right in its 
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inverted Hegelianism, then ideas, far from being above the conflict, are at 
once its echoes and its instruments. The pretension of scholarship to stand 
on the sidelines, playing the impartial scorekeeper, can only be a bourgeois 
delusion. 
"He who is not with me is against me." Such is the absolutism that Marx-
ism in its purest tendency shares with all the absolutisms it claims to de-
throne and discredit. When one takes a position—and one takes a position, 
whether one knows it or wants it, the moment one forms an opinion about 
human affairs—one takes it in the face of this all-or-nothing Marxist ten-
dency. 
What, then, are the options of the contemporary researcher on social 
issues, landed as he or she is in the middle of this contemporary battlefield 
of ideas? In the most general sense there appear at first sight to be only two 
options; but for reasons to be indicated later we shall venture to distinguish 
a third and a fourth. 
First, there is the option of thoroughgoing rejection of the claims of 
Marxism to be a serious contribution to social thought. 
In this perspective, "scientific" and "scholarly" analysis of contem-
porary problems means analysis in the light of "orthodox" (that is, non-
Marxist) economics, sociology, and politics. A "universal" approach 
means an approach on the basis of economic liberalism—an approach de-
finable broadly enough to encompass a multiplicity of revisionist theses, but 
not broadly enough to admit the possibility that the free market could end 
up by being self-defeating. On this premise, Marxism is deluded as a theory 
and disastrous as a practice. An important part of any sound strategy for 
coping with the world's ills must be to ensure the frustration of the designs 
of the movements operating under its banner. 
This kind of thinking is still alive and strong. It was strengthened in the 
West in the measure that the West was polarized against the East in the Cold 
War. It was enjoying a revival in America and Britain in the early 1980s. It 
has been nowhere stronger than in the churches, and has remained the in-
stinctive reaction in Western pews and pulpits in the measure that more 
nuanced approaches at the top have been slow to filter down. It remains the 
dominant mentality among the rank and file of Asian Christians. 
This way of looking at things, left open at the beginning of this inquiry, is 
closed now at the end. The essential reason for setting it aside is the greater 
plausibility of the alternatives considered below. In itself, a merely negative 
appraisal of Marx and Marxism requires a resolute myopia in considering 
modern history, in the world as a whole and in Asia in particular. 
Even apart from the question of its truth or falsity, it would be as unsci-
entific today to disregard Marxism as to disregard Christianity, since both 
have become and remain part of at least the mental makeup of so much of 
our world. But there is also the fact that, as noted by a major contemporary 
non-Marxist economist, "had Marx been mostly wrong, his influence 
would quickly have evaporated."10 And there is the corresponding fact that, 
had simple economic liberalism been entirely right, and had its preventive or 
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cure for Marxism been effective, the results might be expected to be less 
catastrophic and apocalyptic than the situation of the world in the early 
1980s. 
Let a non-Marxist say it for us, though in fact he says a bit more here 
than we could confidently vouch for. Having established his non-Marxist 
credentials in the first part of his essay, A.J.P. Taylor writes: "Anti-
Communism causes more trouble in the world than ever Communism does 
or did."" 
A second option, at the opposite pole from thè first, is that of thorough-
going rejection of Marxism's rival or rivals as a framework of interpretation 
for the problems of our time. 
In this perspective Marx is a point of departure, a first principle, whether 
in the state ideology as in Marxist-Leninist states, or in the discourse of the 
group or individual engaged in social theorizing. This perspective exists in 
any discourse in which it is presumed to be beyond question that Marxism is 
the right and necessary point of departure. Its strength is to cover the theo-
retical possibility that all other points of departure have been definitively 
superseded. It enables research and reflection to be carried very far along 
one line. 
This second option, like the first, can never be fairly tested except by 
those who are open to the possibility that it is the correct one. For this in-
quiry, however, the parallel with the first option does not end there. In the 
final analysis the second too has to be set aside as an inadequate approach 
to the problems considered in this study. It requires a myopia that would be 
the mirror image of the liberalist myopia. The world this study has encoun-
tered, inside and outside Asia, is simply too complex—and that means, 
among other things, too rich in mutations and cross-fertilizations of liberal-
ism and Marxism—to be capable of being fitted on to one or the other Pro-
crustean bed. 
But let us allow a Marxist to pronounce on the inadequacy of doctrinaire 
Marxism, as we have allowed a non-Marxist to pronounce on doctrinaire 
anticommunism. 
But has the value of his general model of society and of history been 
destroyed by the run of historical events that have overturned specific 
theories and expectations? My answer to this question is substantively, 
yes. The model as Marx left it is inadequate. One can use it only with 
great intellectual clumsiness and wasted sophistication, and often only 
with doubletalk. For us today, the work of Marx is a beginning point, 
not a finished view of the social worlds we are trying to understand. So 
far as our own orienting philosophy and our own social theories are con-
cerned, we may not know just where we stand, but there is little doubt 
that we are somewhere "beyond Marx."'2 
Once, then, we have eliminated the pure positions at both extremes, what 
options are left to us? While reopening all the questions, we have not greatly 
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simplified the choice of answers. But within the remaining range of possible 
approaches, it may be useful to draw a further distinction on the basis of 
attitude toward the excluded options, in such a way as to distinguish a third 
and a fourth overall orientation. 
The third option is the attitude "a plague on both your houses" toward 
the other two options. This option takes cognizance of the catastrophic 
impasse to which the clash of two irreconcilable dogmatisms has brought 
the world. It concludes, with Solzhenitsyn, that it is precisely ideology that 
has been the great mass murderer of the twentieth century. It looks, with 
Peter Berger, on capitalism and communism, and their "myths of growth 
and revolution," as "pyramids of sacrifice," like those of Aztec Mexico, on 
which countless human beings have been sacrificed to abstractions. And in 
its revulsion it may incline, with Emerson, to "leave theory, as Joseph left 
his coat in the hand of the harlot, and flee."" 
This option too must be weighed before it is set aside. Any attitude that 
would dismiss its moral indignation as irrelevant would be itself a moral 
obscenity. It is the merest sanity to recognize that something has gone griev-
ously wrong with the whole revolution of modernization, and that any at-
tempt to grasp it as a whole without recognizing something pathological 
about it as a whole can only make it more pathological. To explain a world 
that is spending over half a trillion dollars a year on arms, while over three-
quarters of a billion people live in the condition defined by the World Bank 
as absolute poverty, requires something more radically wrong than any 
mere wrongness in one or other of the rival systems. The least one can say is 
that both must have a share in the blame. 
That is the least, then; but it is not enough by itself. To acknowledge that 
multitudes have been seduced from sanity by theory is an argument against 
seduction, not an argument against theory. To find the enemy of humanity 
in the exclusiveness of the rival claims, in their refusal to see anything good 
beyond their borders, is an argument for less exclusivism, not an argument 
for more. A new approach to the world's problems that would be primarily 
negative in relation to other approaches, or that would appear as such, 
would only compound the tendency to mutual extirpation that is at the 
heart of the trouble. A theoretical approach to social questions that is to be 
consistent in rejecting only the spirit of rejection—the liberal rejection of 
any Marxist contribution, the Marxist rejection of any bourgeois 
contribution—must a fortiori reject the temptation to base itself on rejec-
tion of both. 
And so, by elimination, we are led to a fourth option. 
In our task of making some overall sense of the contemporary phenome-
non of Asian social protest, we have tried at the fact-finding stage to make 
do with as little as possible by way of choice among explicative theories. 
Even at the fact-finding stage, however, we find it difficult to resolve ques-
tions of fact without first coming to terms with some larger questions of 
theory and value. Now that we face the task of putting our Asian findings in 
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a global perspective, this coming to terms with larger questions of theory 
has to be made more explicit. 
Confronted with a spectrum of ready-made interpretive frameworks that 
are mutually exclusive at their extremes, and failing to be persuaded by the 
attitudes "either-or" and "neither-nor," we are left with some sort of 
"both-and" attitude. 
This is the time to recapitulate some generalizations made tentatively in 
the course of this study, and to give them as much more definiteness as the 
evidence accumulated may warrant. 
1. Historical reality will always be more complex than the abstractions 
captured in our dichotomies between "material" and "spiritual" factors 
and between causes and effects. The essential idea here is scarcely disputed 
by anyone; but insofar as it involves a choice of approaches, it is Weberian 
rather than Marxian.'4 
2. The world this study has encountered, inside and outside Asia, is too 
complex to admit of adequate interpretation in terms of any approach that 
could be accurately labelled classically liberal or classically Marxist. We are 
beyond Adam Smith, beyond Karl Marx, and for that matter beyond Max 
Weber, if only in virtue of the principle of "historic specificity," insisted on 
by Marx himself,15 which limits the applicability of historical generalizations 
to specific historical spans. 
3. Fundamental to the complexity of today's world are the mutations and 
cross-fertilizations of Marxian and liberalist thinking since the time of 
Marx. These have made it increasingly unreal to speak of either socialism or 
capitalism in the singular, or even to imply that the boundary between them 
is still distinguishable to an extent that would be beyond dispute. 
Marx himself insisted that he was not a Marxist. The contemporary so-
ciologist who affirms that we are "beyond Marx" proclaims himself "a 
plain Marxist" (after defining what he means) elsewhere in the same work.16 
Within the socialist world, no student of contemporary China can fail to be 
struck by the range of ideological positions, from "Maoist" and "Linist" 
to "Liuist" and "Dengist," that have claimed to represent authentic Marx-
ism and socialism in the name of hundreds of millions of people. Mean-
while, back in the capitalist world, the contemporary economist who wrote 
the landmark work The Affluent Society, in what he called "the central 
tradition in economics" (that is, capitalism), was not being entirely face-
tious in saying that his work might be categorized as "semi-socialist."'7 
In short, on the one hand there is no such thing anywhere as the Marxism 
(and apparently there never was such a thing), and on the other hand there 
also is no such thing anywhere as serious social thinking without an ac-
knowledged or unacknowledged debt to Marx. 
The least we can conclude from this ideological miscegenation is that we 
now have a sizable overlap in territory claimed by some for Marxism and by 
others for liberalism. At this point it becomes of secondary importance to 
judge between preferences in nomenclature. What is more important is not 
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to be deterred or detoured or seduced by labels in the task of applying to 
today's realities the insights available today. 
4. Also basic to the complexity of today's world are the mutations and 
cross-fertilizations underlying not only the theories but also the realities 
confronting us today. We cannot do justice to the complexity without tak-
ing account of the master-ideas that had so much to do with the making of 
it. We cannot do justice to it without also taking account of the hybrid his-
torical forms that have resulted from the entry of these master-ideas into the 
historical process. We cannot do justice to it without taking account, still 
further, of those novelties on the historical horizon to which the original 
master-ideas have nothing to say. 
The world we now confront has too much in common with the world 
analyzed by the classic liberalist and Marxian traditions to permit us the 
luxury of supposing that we have nothing more to learn from them. At the 
same time, their original world has grown and changed too much—in evolu-
tionary and revolutionary ways, in ways beyond anything programmed or 
predicted by them, in ways resulting from interaction between them or reac-
tion against one or other or both of them, and in ways that have been quite 
unforeseen—to permit us the luxury of supposing that their help can be 
more than partial and transitional. The resources of the past need to be used 
with a freedom that permits them to be progressively let go as they inevi-
tably become less a help and more a hindrance to the grasping of the present 
and the making of the future. 
To settle for this way of looking at things is to be open to all perspectives 
and prisoner of none. Clearly that is more easily said than done. By capital-
ist criteria it risks playing the communist game. By communist criteria it 
risks playing the capitalist game. By any criterion it is liable to land some-
where on the middle ground of social democracy or democratic socialism, 
or of some humanist form of neo-Marxism, which may or may not be the 
best point of departure in the search for a future that will fulfill and tran-
scend the legitimate goals of liberalism and Marxism. 
All things considered, this choice among the perspectives discussed above 
has to be the preferred one. Despite assiduous search, this study has not 
encountered the kind of data that would seem to justify a more categorical 
choice. To the task of situating Asian Christian social protest in relation to 
the intersecting transnationalisms of capitalism and communism it brings 
the following conscious premises: 
• what we call capitalism today is the contemporary heir of a middle-
class revolution that has been the most fruitful in human benefits of 
any revolution that has yet come to the full light of history, though 
at an enormous human cost still being added to; 
• what we call communism today is the contemporary heir of a 
working-class revolution, also enormous in its human cost, which 
has been successful in exposing inherent and still unresolved short-
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comings at the heart of the revolution of the middle class; 
• both revolutions, through their encounter with each other and with 
the refractoriness of their historical material, have changed in the 
course of time, not beyond recognition, but beyond the possibility 
of useful application of their classical stereotypes; 
• neither in isolation, even with all its mutations and adaptations, 
looks sufficiently like the wave of the future today to have serious 
hope of breaking the present deadlock decisively in its own favor 
within this century; and 
• if anything can be confidently predicted, it is that the historical pat-
tern of the twenty-first century will not fit, except remotely, any 
blueprints drawn in the nineteenth or the twentieth. 
Asian Christian Options in Contemporary Transnational Perspective 
Where is Asian Christian social protest going? Where, when the terrain 
around it has been taken into consideration, does it have to go? Does it have 
anywhere to go? 
We have had ample occasion to get the impression that, humanly speak-
ing, Asian Christian social protest would have nowhere to go if Asia had to 
be considered in isolation from the rest of the world. If it were, there would 
never be a better example of a David taking on a Goliath. 
But there can be no question of considering Asia in isolation from the rest 
of the world. This fact transforms the whole problem. In a global perspec-
tive, the Goliath of entrenched social inequity looms larger than ever, but 
the David of a Christian disposition to join the battle against it no longer 
looks so helpless. A 33 percent minority in the world as a whole need not 
feel as overwhelmed as a 5 percent minority in Asia; and a historic new 
direction deliberately given to both minorities by its most representative 
leaders, under powerful pressures from within and from without, will not 
be so easily repudiated or neutralized. 
If we take Christian social protest in the broadest sense we have been 
assigning to the term, then the least that can be expected during the remain-
der of the present millennium is that, in the scales of history, Christianity as 
a whole will weigh significantly more heavily than before on the side of 
social change, and significantly less heavily than before on the side of the 
social status quo. 
That is not to say that Christianity, either in the world as a whole or in 
Asia in particular, can now be regarded as more a force for social change 
than a force for inertia or stability. On such a large question opinions could 
honestly differ, not only in regard to influences too close to us for full 
assessment, but also in regard to eras that have already receded into histori-
cal perspective. 
Categorical conclusions on this point, therefore, are not to be expected 
here. What may be more realistically attempted, by way of a summing up of 
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the findings of this inquiry, is to locate the phenomenon of Asian Christian 
social protest more precisely and systematically in relation to some of the 
historical coordinates that have been drawn at the beginning of this study. 
These coordinates may be reduced to three. In connection with Asian 
Christian social protest, we have posed the problems of nationalism and 
transnationalism in general, of capitalist and communist transnationalisms 
in particular, and of the possibility of a post-Constantinian era in terms of 
the corporate relations of Christianity with the powers that be in state and 
society. We ask, then, where Asian Christian social protest is going, in 
terms of its transnational trend in general, in terms of its apparent dilem-
ma between capitalism and communism in particular, and in terms of its 
still more ancient dilemma between the powers that be and the cry of the 
people. 
Between Nationalism and Transnationalism 
The word transnational has reechoed throughout this inquiry. If we turn 
to recent academic writing on international relations (as is done more in 
detail in Appendix 7), we observe that the phenomenon of Asian Christian 
social protest needs to be related to the alleged rise of a transnational so-
ciety, involving on the one hand a diminution of the tendency to reify na-
tions in favor of various forms of transnational consciousness, and on the 
other hand an increase in humankind's capacity for organization in a way 
that is outrunning the nation-state system. 
We find ourselves in the presence of masses of information from a parti-
cular sector of human activity that lend credence to these academic asser-
tions. They also give us pause before we endorse them completely. There 
certainly is a transnational trend, and it is a powerful trend, but there are 
also powerful currents in the opposite direction. 
The evidence is persuasive in regard to the growth of transnational con-
sciousness; but we are still far from McLuhan's "global village" or 
Teilhard's "noosphere." 
There is also evidence suggesting an increasing incapacity of the nation 
state to exercise fully its accustomed sovereignty. But we have seen the 
nation-state system and the nationalist spirit actually showing new 
strength—not only in capitalist countries where a Marxist would expect it 
(the state being "the committee of the ruling class") and not only in com-
munist countries where the socialist transition should be bringing about 
"the withering away of the state"; but also, and most significantly for our 
purpose, in nonaligned Third World countries in reaction at least partly to 
some aspects of the transnational trend that are unacceptable there. 
Theories devised to explain and predict the development of a world in 
which either capitalism or communism will have won out have definite 
drawbacks. They fail to do much about explaining and predicting what 
happens in a world characterized by prolonged antagonistic coexistence of 
the two. 
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Making too clear-cut a distinction between national, interstate, and 
transnational political influences has its drawbacks too. As Keohane and 
Nye have noted,18 there is such a thing as "the 'domesticization' of interna-
tional politics," which from another angle can be seen as "the 'internation-
alization' of domestic politics." They could also have said that there is more 
than one kind of trend that can be called a transnational trend. 
Some of these trends are one in their ambition to create a global transna-
tional society, and differ only in their vision of what that society should be 
like. Such is the case of the transnational trends called capitalism and com-
munism. Other trends may be at cross-purposes with each other because 
their transnationalisms are not equally far-reaching. Thus it is that one can 
speak of international solidarities such as those of the Association of South-
east Asian Nations, or of Asia as a whole, or of the Third World as a 
whole—solidarities that take their shape as much from their resistance to 
more enveloping transnationalisms as from their efforts to transcend merely 
national horizons. 
Let us give full weight to the purely national component of Asian Chris-
tian social protest. Let us say frankly that, if we consider where the bulk of 
it comes from, it is not so much Asian as it is Philippine and Korean. If 
these two national experiences did not exist, Asian Christian social protest 
would be transformed (and shrunken) almost beyond recognition. Or rather 
we should say that the muted condition of social protest in Asia would show 
just how impotent minorities of 5 percent or less are doomed to be in the 
hands of state autocracies solidified by confrontation across a continent-
wide ideological divide. 
In its local sources we have found Asian Christian social protest practi-
cally confined to half a dozen political jurisdictions holding about a tenth 
of Asia's people on the warm-water fringes of Asia, where three-fifths 
of Asia's Christians constitute about a fifth of the overall local popula-
tion. 
Geographically considered, Christian social protest is almost entirely a 
phenomenon of maritime Asia; and indeed, apart from Korea, it is now 
overwhelmingly a phenomenon of insular Asia. Politically it has been al-
most entirely a phenomenon of the national security regimes produced by 
reaction to "the communist threat" in Taiwan, in South Korea, in South 
Vietnam, in Indonesia, in the Philippines, and, less directly and lastingly, in 
India. 
It has been, in short, a reaction to a reaction; and the articulation be-
tween the reactions has been so close that without the national security 
trend the Christian social protest trend might never have materialized. It is 
as if both trends are triggered by extreme swings of one pendulum. 
Closer examination of these local particularities brings us back to our 
point about the difficulty of disentangling the strands of national, inter-
state, and transnational political influences. 
In both Latin America and Asia, several conditions have been required 
for the emergence of corporate Christian social protest: first, on the part of 
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the churches, minimal local numerical strength combined with institutional 
flexibility; then, on the part of individual national political regimes, provo-
cation typically taking the form of exacerbation of class war in the name of 
mobilization against communism; and third, the reinvestment of this expe-
rience in the international arena through old and new channels of transna-
tional Christian linkage. It is a good example of a phenomenon that from 
some angles can be seen as a domesticization of international politics and 
from other angles as an internationalization of domestic politics. 
We cannot say absolutely which comes first. The chain of reactions is in 
fact a circle, perhaps better a spiral: communism was a reaction to capital-
ism before the reaction to embattled communism took the form of embat-
tled capitalism. What seems clear is that the spiral had to touch the extreme 
of what we now call the national security regimes before it could touch off 
the reaction we now call Christian social protest. 
There is a bias in historic Christianity, arising partly out of its pacific 
ethos and partly out of its institutional entrenchment, which gives the bene-
fit of any doubt to the social status quo, preferring the devil it knows to the 
devil it doesn't know. That is why there is an element of truth in the Marxist 
stigmatization of Christianity as "the opiate of the people"; and that is why 
the first effective stirrings of moral revulsion from modern social exploita-
tion had to take the form of a revulsion from religion. 
One could put this sociotheologically by saying that, while religion may 
be God's right arm in the world, the world needs and gets periodic re-
minders that it is not God's only arm; that there is something in the nature 
of God or of religion, or more exactly perhaps in the difference between the 
two, which ensures that history shall not be moved forward by religion 
exclusively. There are historical circumstances, such as those involved in the 
first century or so of the development of the contemporary social con-
science, where a believer can only conclude that God's right hand has left 
much of the initiative to his left. 
Be that as it may, what concerns us directly is that a new development of 
social conscience is now a transnational and (in some degree) transideologi-
cal fait accompli. Just as the churches finally reconciled themselves to the 
ideal of bourgeois liberation rudely thrust upon them by the middle-class 
revolution, so they have been reconciling themselves to the ideal of proletar-
ian and peasant liberation even more rudely thrust upon them by the 
working-class revolution. 
A century after the French Revolution, Pope Leo XIII could tell workers 
that democracy was now acceptable, provided it went with a religious resig-
nation to the necessity of class distinctions. Eight decades after Leo's ency-
clical on the working class, the preoccupation of that encyclical with keep-
ing workers' welfare within the limits of the existing (capitalist) system was 
conspicuous by its absence in Paul VI's updating of Leo XIII's teaching." 
That is one measure of the fait accompli referred to. It was brought about, 
not by mere magisterial reflection on gospel principles (otherwise it should 
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have happened earlier), but only after a situation of extremity had devel-
oped and been certified to by forces outside the Church as well as by forces 
on the Latin American fringes of Christendom. 
As a phenomenon with official ecclesiastical sanction, Christian social 
protest clearly has a very mixed parentage. It could not have developed in 
the first place without authentic roots in the Judaeo-Christian tradition; it 
could not have developed into what it is today without drawing some of its 
insights from the liberal humanist and the radical Marxist traditions of 
recent times. It could not have gained a broad base in the Third World 
churches without sanction at the level of the Church Universal; and it could 
not have been galvanized into becoming preeminently a Third World phe-
nomenon without some extra measure of provocation in the Third World. 
Neither the provocation nor the reaction could have been what it has been 
without the very specific national experiences associated with names like 
Pinochet, Somoza, Marcos, and Park. Neither would it have been what it 
has been without the transnational reach of the influences and ideologies of 
multinational capitalism, national security ideology, Marxism-Leninism, 
and other models of socialism. 
Let us pause for a moment on the paradox involved in Christian social 
protest becoming preeminently a Third World phenomenon under the spur 
of that extra measure of provocation in the Third World. There is a paradox 
here both from the standpoint of classical Marxism and from the standpoint 
of a "classical' ' version of transnational theory. 
For Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, what we now call the Third World 
was a backwater, a residue not yet "rescued" by the industrial revolution 
from "the idiocy of rural life." Precisely because their theory required the 
feudal world first to produce the bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie then to 
produce the proletariat and the proletariat to be "the main force" of the 
socialist revolution, the only role they could envisage for the "toiling 
masses" of Asia, Africa, and Latin America was that of anti-imperialist 
auxiliaries harassing the flanks of capitalism while the industrial workers of 
the West bore the brunt of the attack upon it. 
This scenario became questionable with the arrival of the Soviet revolu-
tion and was explicitly discarded in the course of the Chinese one. For Mao 
and his lieutenants of the 1960s, the rear in the global battlefield had be-
come the front, the global countryside was encircling the cities, and the 
preindustrial continents were now the storm centers of world revolution. 
This rhetoric abated after Mao's death and downgrading, but the fact re-
mained that the proletariat had won no revolution in classic Marxist condi-
tions, while peasant armies had marched to lasting victories in China, Cuba, 
and Vietnam.20 
Mao Tse-tung Thought thus provided one controversial adaptation of 
Marxist theory to Third World reality. It had no particular explanation to 
offer for distinctive forms of resistance to communism in Third World 
conditions; nor could it do much more than repeat some clichés about the 
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role to be expected from Christian churches in such circumstances. For both 
these questions, more particular interest has attached to the reflections 
produced in the jails of Mussolini by the Italian Communist leader of the 
1920s, Antonio Gramsci. 
Gramsci's context was closer to the contemporary Third World context 
than Marx's was in several respects. Italy in Gramsci's time, in its relative 
poverty, its dual economy, its frontier status in the capitalist world, and its 
nominal Catholicism, was not too unlike a typical Latin American outpost 
of dependent capitalism today. The process of modernization was creating a 
minority of beneficiaries who were not yet secure in their hegemony over the 
rest of the population. The most threatened among them found a champion 
of their interests in a Fascist dictator, who proceeded to link their destinies 
with an international axis of military-industrial regimes. 
Gramsci could not foresee the full complexity of the next half-century's 
global experience of capitalism and communism. Still, he appears today as a 
bridge between Marx and Medellin with his application of "the philosophy 
of praxis" (Marxism as he understood it) to "superstructure" in general 
and to the role of the Church in particular, in unstable conditions on the 
expanding front of capitalism, where a new elite riding the wave of the 
world market needed and found Caesars and their international allies to 
hold down the marginalized masses.21 
A true political scientist, Gramsci drew a profile that could fit many a 
reactionary Caesar of our time. A true atheist, he failed to anticipate the 
emergence of a Church that would resist them. There is irony in the fact 
that his line of analysis is most vigorously and prolifically carried on, espe-
cially in the Asian context, by a Catholic canon from a pontifical univer-
sity.22 
So much for the paradox involved for classical Marxist theory in Third 
World provocation and protest. Let us observe also the paradox involved 
for any "straightforward" version of transnational theory. 
A "straightforward" vision of transnationalism assumes that the 
transnational trend, by helping the overcoming of nationalism and paro-
chialism, marks a step in the direction of a unified, peaceful, and fraternal 
world. Unfortunately, this vision overlooks the unequal terms on which the 
process is based. 
Just as the parade of "sovereign" nations in the United Nations disguises 
the fact that some are very much more sovereign than others, so also, in the 
multiplication of transnational contacts, the haves are once more strength-
ened at the expense of the have-nots. In a world in which nine-tenths of the 
headquarters of all international organizations have been concentrated in 
the developed Western world, and in which 98.5 percent of the managers of 
U.S.-based multinational corporations have been U.S. nationals, it need 
not surprise us if what the rich rejoice in under the name of transnational-
ism comes to be seen by the poor as no more than imperialism in a more 
insidious form." The trouble with the " free' ' domain of transnational inter-
actions, as with the "free" market and the "free world," is that "free" 
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holds meaning only for the masterful few who have preempted the freedom 
of all the others. 
The most conspicuous instance of this ambivalence in the effective role of 
transnational interactions is the multinational corporation. There could 
hardly be a greater contrast between the way this phenomenon is perceived 
from the vantage point of the Manhattan boardroom and the way it is per-
ceived by the mass of the populations affected by its Third World subsidi-
aries.24 In the 1970s the association of the word transnational v/ith transna-
tional corporations was a key factor in giving them, even in ecclesiastical 
circles, the status of a Third World dirty word. If a true transnationalism is 
to arise, contributing to true world development through true transnational 
capital interactions, it will first have to live down the image of the multina-
tionals as they have been experienced in the developing nations. 
Since this image may be too easily explained away as a case of Marxist 
mud thrown at the corporations just managing to stick, it may be well to see 
the main point reformulated in the terms of a liberal exposition of transna-
tional theory: 
If transnationalism has become the ideology of some of the rich, na-
tionalism remains the ideology of many of the poor. . . . The trouble lies 
in the gap between elites and masses in less developed countries. The 
increased mutual sensitivity of societies that is created by transnational 
relations touches only a tiny proportion of the population. As elites are 
absorbed into a transnational network, the gap between elites and masses 
is increased and intolerable political tensions may be created. . . . The 
creation of a single global economy is rational, perhaps, to achieve opti-
mal allocation of global resources, but it is also a severe limitation on 
national autonomy. The transnationally mobile are rewarded at the ex-
pense of the nationally immobile.2' 
This passage focuses on the polarity between nationalism and transna-
tionalism. With a few adjustments it could also serve to call attention to 
intermediate solidarities that are nationalistic in relation to the super-
transnationalisms, but transnational in relation to perspectives and loyalties 
confined within state boundaries. 
The Third World itself is a concept, and a more or less nebulous reality, 
in this category. Slogans like "Asia for the Asians" reflect a common con-
sciousness forged in reaction to extra-Asian pressures too strong for iso-
lated nationalisms to resist. The drive for indigenization in the churches 
gains much of its force—and, at least in the case of Roman Catholicism, 
most of its hopes of balancing the domination of the Center—from this 
source. In the Ecumenical Association of Third World Theologians we met 
a new movement in the world of theology that illustrates the same trend. 
The transnational trend in Asian Christianity as a whole also turns out to 
be a Janus-faced phenomenon. 
Within its own context it is unequivocally transnational, not only in the 
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literal sense of crossing state boundaries, but also in its aspiration toward 
mutual enrichment and reinforcement, expressed in its very origins in the 
classic transnational rationale that "national boundaries could no longer be 
the only basis for effective work in Asia."26 
Meanwhile the face it turns toward the wider world is distinctly more 
ambivalent. Only the social protest part of it can look to its extra-Asian 
counterpart (Christian social protest movements elsewhere) with assurance 
of being reinforced in resistance to the status quo in church and society; for 
such resistance is the raison d'être of both. In all other respects it can greet 
extra-Asian Christianity (or rather, the First World part of it) at best with 
an arm's-length embrace, like the embrace of a younger and weaker sister 
more accustomed to domination by than partnership with her powerful 
sibling. 
This sense of a need to assert Asian identity over against Western Chris-
tian identity is open and aggressive, as we have had occasion to see re-
peatedly, in the Christian Conference of Asia. It is more muted in the 
Federation of Asian Bishops' Conferences. A centralizing agency like the 
Vatican can only look on structures like the FABC and the CELAM with 
much the same uneasiness that the Soviet Communist Party shows in look-
ing at the growth of horizontal structures in a Warsaw Pact country such as 
Poland. It would be justified in suspecting that the imperial-curial concept 
of Catholic transnationalism (the parental Center, the filial peripheries) has 
no future if a genuine regional Catholic transnationalism succeeds in estab-
lishing itself. 
Paradoxically, the Center might bring this regional transnationalism to 
earlier maturity more quickly by mistrusting and repressing it than by grace-
fully abandoning the more provocative aspects of its "imperialism" while 
saving the substance. What we have found in the Philippine case (pp. 1 Π­
Ι 9) appears in retrospect to be the most pragmatic lesson of the entire 
transnational trend in Third World Christianity. 
Between Capitalism and Communism 
Christian social protest, this child of our time, is not the child of any 
virgin womb. One parent was misery, the other the not-so-common idea 
that misery does not have to be endured. This idea came into the making of 
Christian social protest, as we have seen, not through historical Christianity 
alone, and not through any extra-Christian influence alone, but through 
another not-so-common marriage of influences, a cross-fertilization of the 
ancient Judaeo-Christian tradition with recent liberalist and Marxian hu­
manisms. The final phase of the gestation took over a century. The midwife 
was the national-security states of the Cold War in the Third World, not 
without positive and negative stimulation from the institutional churches of 
' 'the center of the Center' ' and the ' 'center of the Periphery. ' ' 
In the 1960s and 1970s it was common to dismiss the phenomenon of 
AN OVERALL TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 139 
Christian social protest with much the same contempt expressed by Marx 
for the Christian socialism of his day. Indeed, its enemies have always been 
as plentiful inside the fold as outside it. A historical perspective on Church 
and State and social issues from a conservative Christian standpoint could 
maintain as recently as 1980 that the theology of liberation represented 
essentially a surrender of Christian to Marxist thinking in which "theologi-
cal rationalizations have followed the absorption of political ideologies."27 
Contempt was never the only attitude. In Britain, for example, there has 
always been a school of thought maintaining that whatever was gained for 
socialism there was gained more by Christian than by Marxian socialists. In 
Anglo-America, insofar as any socialism has surfaced at all, it has tended to 
acknowledge Christian more readily than Marxian inspiration. 
As for contempt for Christian socialism in the context of Latin America, 
it might have seemed realistic before the 1970s. By that time, after the mile-
stones associated with the Puebla CELAM Assembly, the Nicaraguan revo-
lution, and the sanctuary slaying of Archbishop Romero of San Salvador, it 
was beginning to be plausibly claimed that church-based social activism had 
shown itself to be a more broadly based and effective force than the activ-
ism based on communism and its Cuban sponsors.28 History would have to 
be the judge of that; but there was no denying that in Latin America Chris-
tian social protest had become a political force to reckon with in the 1980s. 
Could the same be said of its Asian counterpart? Before answering, one 
should take account of all the qualifications we have formulated in the 
course of this inquiry. 
As a local manifestation of a global phenomenon, Asian Christian social 
protest carried with it all the weight of the most conspicuously transnational 
religion in the world. As an extremely local and indeed marginal phenome-
non in Asia—marginal within the churches, which themselves were 
marginal within the continent—it faded into local irrelevance over all but 
half a dozen political jurisdictions on the warm-water fringes of Asia. 
Even there, in the one country that belonged more to the Latin American 
than to any Asian pattern, Christian social protest fell short of the average 
Latin American degree of vigor. At the same time, even in that country (the 
Philippines), insofar as "church" and "communist" protest could be 
weighed against each other there, it is premature to think that the balance of 
influence would ultimately go to the communists as compared with that 
fraction of the nominally Christian mass base that was partly or thoroughly 
energized by the rise of the Church of the people.29 
In general the problem of the Church in respect to social protest was no 
longer a problem as far as mere words were concerned. At a certain level of 
generality, the positions taken in the name of all the mainstream churches 
were more or less equally forthright by the end of the 1970s, in the First 
World as well as the Third, and in Asia as well as Latin America. These 
churches committed their constituencies to a struggle for justice and peace, 
involving in practice a preferential option for the poor, as the Catholics 
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tended to put it. Or, what came to the same thing, they took a stand, in the 
favored World Council of Churches formulation, for "a just, participa-
tory, and sustainable global society." 
It was when it came to matching deeds to words that this solid front gen-
erally ceased to exist. 
At "the center of the Center," the weight of the Holy See was regularly 
thrown into holding back the avant-garde contestants of the capitalist 
regimes, while the weight of the Russian Orthodox in the WCC was regu-
larly thrown into preventing any criticism of the Warsaw Pact regimes. 
At various "centers of the Periphery" a similar political fault line opened 
up within the churches. The official CELAM spokespersons after Puebla 
took on the same braking role as the Vatican. Indian church leaders of all 
stripes during the Emergency protested mainly against the protests. The 
official church spokespersons of China and Taiwan (Taiwan Presbyterians 
excepted) sternly repudiated all calling in question of their respective politi-
cal authorities. The episcopal majority in the Philippines prevented or dilu-
ted all but the mildest remonstrances against the direction of their New 
Society. Conflicts in Singapore in 1976 over sterilization, and in Hong Kong 
in 1978 over the Golden Jubilee School affair, found the Catholic Church 
authorities taking the side of power rather than the side of protest.30 
What are the implications of the opening up of this political fault line in 
the churches? We have yet to make a final assessment of them in relation to 
the question of the possibility of a post-Constantinian Church. We have 
first to assess them in relation to that other political fault line in global so-
ciety as a whole—the line between capitalism and communism. 
As we have repeatedly had occasion to note, there is clearly a connection 
between the two fault lines. The way lofty generalities have been translated 
or not translated into concrete options has obviously depended on the con-
crete options that have been available. 
Capitalism or communism? If the choice for Christians depended on the 
formula of each for relations among human beings in society, it ought to be 
easy. As Tawney pointed out, the idolatry of wealth is as irreconcilable with 
the gospel as is emperor worship. As Headlam remarked, people who go to 
Holy Communion should be holy communists.31 
Capitalism as Christians had grown accustomed to it, or communism as 
Christians were learning to fear it? For better or worse, that was the way the 
question was posed in its modern form; and once again, as long as it was 
posed in these stark terms, there could be no contest. 
Christianity in its day had indeed done battle with capitalism, first when 
capitalism was encountered in the guise of usury, then when it was perceived 
as a middle-class revolt against feudal Christendom. Christianity had lost 
the battle by the nineteenth century, and had made its peace with the winner 
by the twentieth. 
Marxism, for its part, caught the churches on the anti-Marxist side of the 
argument about property versus people. It left them little choice but to stay 
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there when it identified its own side with atheism. The rise of the Marxist-
Leninist bloc effectively locked the churches into the Western liberal-
capitalist bloc. At the same time it effectively convinced them, for a while, 
of the truth of its own contention that they had nowhere else to go. 
Had capitalism proved quickly to be the decisive failure, and had social-
ism proved quickly to be the resounding success, that had been envisaged 
from the time of the Communist Manifesto, Christians might have been 
presented earlier with a second serious chance to take a fresh look at both, 
with no greater prejudice against one than against the other. 
History, however, failed to unfold in any such straightforward fashion. 
By the 1980s both blocs had registered enormous successes and enormous 
failures, in ways that corresponded to their original strengths and 
weaknesses, and in ways related to the fact that they had been interacting— 
paralyzing or galvanizing, contaminating or fecundating each other. Al-
ready in the 1970s the choice for the churches was not so much between 
capitalism and socialism as between several capitalisms and several social-
isms, with more than a little overlap between the two. 
Meanwhile a contribution of decisive importance was being made by the 
continent of Latin America. That continent belonged to the Third World, 
the underdeveloped world, which was by then the battlefield par excellence 
of social change. By a crucial coincidence, it was at the same time the one 
Third World continent that was overwhelmingly a Christian continent, and 
the one continent where the threat of imperialist domination was over-
whelmingly experienced not from the Soviet Union but from the United 
States. 
For the churches of Latin America, from Medellin through Puebla, the 
rejection of capitalism became not just a generalized gospel rejection of 
Mammon, and not just a generalized papal rejection of unbridled economic 
liberalism. It became a visceral rejection of a concrete capitalist system, 
typified above all by the leader of the "free world," the United States. 
Thus it was that Latin America became the pivot on which Christian 
social thinking began to make a decisive historical turn. It was Latin 
America that supplied the Christian world for the first time with an expe-
rience of the unacceptable face of capitalism on a scale sufficient to balance 
its Eurasian experience of the unacceptable face of socialism. Through 
Latin America the perception became part of the Christian awareness that 
capitalism in the raw could be as heartless, as oppressive, as ruthless, as 
unscrupulous, as demonic, as communism in the raw was perceived to be. 
Through Latin America the Christian world discovered that capitalism had 
not after all left the days of Dickens and Marx behind it: instead, while its 
victims at home might now be a minority, they were more than made up for 
by a majority of victims abroad. At the receiving end of this treatment, the 
hope that the benefits would eventually trickle down to the masses appeared 
increasingly derisory. 
This turn in Christian social thinking was of course not a simple 180-
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degree turn, or even a simple 90-degree one. It did not replace an implicit 
trust in capitalism-in-the-concrete with any comparable trust in socialism-
in-the-concrete. It did not even amount to anything like a wholesale break 
in the links that bound the churches to the power centers of capitalism. Its 
effect was no more than to shatter the easy conscience with which Christian­
ity had hitherto cohabited with capitalism. 
Insofar as it really was a decisive historical turn, that was what was deci­
sive and historic about it. For the foreseeable future, the pull of some ele­
ments in the churches back toward capitalist versions of socioeconomic 
orthodoxy would be balanced by the pull of others toward socialist ones. In 
other words, there was no longer any version of socioeconomic orthodoxy 
that could impose itself on the churches implicitly or explicitly with the 
authority of Christian faith. 
Such, roughly, are the latest terms of the contribution of Christian social 
thinking outside Asia to Christian social thinking inside it. Such are the 
terms into which the options of Asian Christian social protest translate 
themselves, when considered in global perspective along the axis of capital­
ism versus communism. These options could not be expected to be any wi­
der in Asia. In the Asian context the room for maneuver could only be 
much more limited. 
In particular, the dice would be heavily loaded in Asia against any pure 
form of the socialist option. This can be said on at least three grounds: be­
cause of Christian marginality and insecurity, because of communist power 
and proximity, and because the Marxist-Leninist front itself was split in 
Asia, after 1978,between a Chinese version and a Soviet-and-Vietnamese 
version, each of which would regard any rapprochement with the other as 
the most hostile possible act toward itself. 
In this connection the only extreme scenario that had any remote plausi­
bility was the notion of a radicalized Philippine Catholic Church constitut­
ing a Trojan horse for communism in the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations. 
This speculation had some facts in its favor. The Philippines was the only 
country in the region where communist insurgency had actually gained 
ground in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. It was also the only country 
where significant links existed between the Communist Party and the left in 
the institutional church. The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) 
had been China-oriented since 1969; and Christians for National Libera­
tion, its partner in the National Democratic Front (NDF), was the only 
activist Christian group known to have dabbled much in Maoism. 
In the post-Мао era the Chinese connection in the CPP had been wound 
down or played down. The CPP appeared to be outgrowing its Maoism as it 
had outgrown its Stalinism; it appeared to be putting its nationalist foot 
forward rather than its communist one. Meanwhile the NDF was reaping 
the fruits of polarization and demoralization in the country. The Marcos 
regime had more or less completed the destruction of the political middle 
AN OVERALL TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 143 
ground; in the midst of political and economic malaise, Marcos continued 
to entrench himself in power; a vice-president of the United States had said 
to him in public: "We love your adherence to democratic principles and 
democratic processes."32 
In short, the moderate opposition now had nowhere to turn but to the 
radicals; and the slide to the left accordingly seemed set to continue in the 
early 1980s. A map of guerrilla activity in late 1981 covered most of the 
territory of most major islands in the archipelago." 
The Trojan horse scenario nevertheless still seemed a remote one even in 
1982. No one believed the New People's Army was ready for a direct trial of 
strength with the Philippine Armed Forces—least of all the NPA itself. 
Even with one hand busy holding the southern Muslim insurgency at bay, 
the military establishment could still pretend to wave away the NPA threat 
with the other. 
Outside observers of the Philippines continued throughout the 1970s to 
discount the potential of popular unrest there. There was always a possibil-
ity, of course, that they would be proved as wrong about the Philippines as 
others had been about Iran or Nicaragua; but the signs of that eventuality 
would have to become much clearer than they were in 1982. The repression 
would have to get much worse, and the situation generally would have to 
deteriorate much further, before the NDF would begin to look like the San-
dinistas, or Cardinal Sin like the Ayatollah Khomeini. And even if the Mar-
cos regime should eventually meet its end at the hands of a Marxist revolu-
tion, realpolitik would surely dictate that the victor stand aloof from 
alignment with either China or the Soviet-Vietnam axis—at least as aloof 
as, say, North Korea. 
Such, in brief, are the reasons why we conclude that for Asian Christian 
social protest, by the turn of the 1980s, the dice were loaded, not only 
against any Trojan horse scenario, but against any "pure" form of the 
socialist option. For as long as such an option was not a plausible prospect 
for church bodies in the Philippines, there were surely no church bodies 
elsewhere in Asia for which it was a plausible prospect. 
We must now go further and say that some of the same reasons also mili-
tate in Asia against any "pure" form of the capitalist option. If by 1980, 
after the downgrading of Mao in China and after the intersocialist wars in 
Indochina, it had become harder to sell Marxism to Christians in Asia, then 
by 1982, especially after the Christian militants had digested the American 
role in post-Park Korea and in the "normalized" New Society Philippines, 
it had also become harder to sell capitalism to Asian Christians." 
With or without a Marxist revolution, in the Philippines or elsewhere in 
Asia, the options pragmatically open for the churches fell clearly short of 
any corporate endorsement of any of the conflicting blocs or systems. Like 
their Latin American counterparts, the representative Asian church leaders 
had learned a measure of anticapitalism without unlearning anticom-
munism. 
144 AN OVERALL TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
Perhaps more to the point, they had been at least partly inoculated 
against the ecclesiastical tendency to assume some divine sanction for exist-
ing political powers and superpowers. They were at a juncture in history 
and geography from which they could see all the major actors along the 
great ideological divide in dismal and disillusioning parallel. Their view was 
a view from the underside of history; and at this juncture it looked particu-
larly like the underside of marching jackboots. They were finding that the 
underside of jackboots look and feel alike whether the brand they bear is 
linked with the Soviet Union or with the United States. 
What, then, can be expected, nationally and transnationally, from Asian 
churches that unite in affirming a new solidarity with the Asian masses 
while refusing to choose between either the slogans or the blocs that claim to 
represent the alternatives? Must they be seen as neutralized somewhere in 
the middle, or as immobilized by their own internal divisions, or as offering 
a third way out of an impasse, or as still searching for a role? 
These possible answers are perhaps best seen as ranging in an ascending 
scale of plausibility. 
It is least plausible to say the churches are neutralized in the middle. What 
middle? A midpoint between two false alternatives is all that could be in 
question, once one has ceased to regard either old-fashioned capitalism or 
old-fashioned communism as the wave of the future. 
It would seem closer to the truth to represent the churches as immobilized 
by internal divisions. We have repeatedly been faced with the fact that ele-
ments in them pull in different directions—the standardbearers and the 
scouts, the center and the periphery, and the complex range of orientations 
of nationalism and transnationalism. Yet to say "immobilized" is to say 
more than the evidence warrants. The social scene in the Asian churches is 
nothing if not a scene of creative ferment. 
At the same time, it is certainly saying too much to suggest that a hundred 
million Asian Christians have a sociopolitical way of their own to show to 
the other two billion of their fellow Asians. Undoubtedly, like Asia as a 
whole, they are still searching, though not without having found at least a 
new orientation for their search. 
A minority like the Asian Christian one, newly conscious of its solidarity 
with its two gigantic reference groups (more than a billion non-Asian Chris-
tians, more than two billion non-Christian Asians), has a bridging role to 
play that should tend to focus its attention on points of proximity between 
Christian and Asian problems and solutions. 
As an Asian group, it cannot but tend more and more to see its future in 
terms of the South, the Third World, the nonaligned nations, the struggle 
against neocolonialism and neoimperialism, the New (or at any rate some 
new) International Economic Order. 
As a Christian group, and given its own weakness, marginality, and 
heterogeneity in Asia, it cannot but prove more receptive and cooperative 
toward proposals that are representative, inclusive, pragmatic, pacific, and 
conciliatory, even at the price of seeming tame, gradualistic, and middle-of-
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the-road. It will talk more of human rights than of systems claiming to 
guarantee individual or social rights, even if that makes it seem an inve-
terate fence-straddler, as if it could not differentiate between a human-
rights approach and a liberal-capitalist one." It will no longer preach peace 
without regard to justice, but its new thrust towards justice will continue to 
be balanced, if not blunted, by its bias towards peace. 
And who is to say that, on the whole, if Asian Christianity were to suc-
ceed in its search for this precarious balance, it would not thereby be prov-
ing faithful, for better or worse, to the deepest imperatives of the gospel it 
professes to live by? 
We have noted already that the institutional churches have too long a 
record of acquiescence in the violence of the powerful to be altogether credi-
ble in the reprobation of the violence of the oppressed. But not all those 
church leaders who have shrunk from the idea of armed revolution have 
done so because of weakness or double standards. There is an authentically 
Christian (as well as authentically Hindu and Buddhist) tradition of pure 
pacifism that is as much a factor in the political role of the religions as revo-
lutionary violence or complicity in repression. It appears as regularly as 
these other phenomena wherever in the Asian crucible Christianity is put to 
the test. 
If we may take the following 1981 testimony at face value, such pure 
pacifism can represent the united stand of a whole diocese, small and rural 
and peripheral indeed, and not even representative within the southern 
Philippine ecclesiastical ferment, but outstanding in its claim to be one of 
the rare examples of an Asian church of the people on the scale of a diocese: 
Consensus . . . arose from our last general Prelature meeting in February 
of priests and religious, lay leaders and church workers. At that meeting 
we faced up to the problem of armed power in Bukidnon and its conse-
quences for ourselves and our people. The consensus was an option for, 
to put it in a formula, total vulnerability. In effect, it was a rejection of 
violence as a way of righting wrongs and an affirmation of the Prela-
ture's thrust for justice. We said no to the "salvaging" of the military, to 
the ' 'liquidation' ' of the NPA; yes to the continued striving for justice 
and the peace that comes through justice. 
From a sheerly human—intellectual, political, ideological—point of 
view, we know the option made no sense. We saw clearly that by our 
open disavowal of the violence of both the military and the NPA and all 
other armed powers, we were putting ourselves completely at their 
mercy; worse, we were inviting, even provoking, the very violence we 
were rejecting by our insistence on the forceful doing of justice; and 
possibly, worst of all, we arrived at the option in the clear-eyed convic-
tion that we would never be able to bring about full justice in society, but 
for all that we would have to keep striving mightily for it—even unto 
death. 
It does not make sense. Except in the context of a faith . . ." 
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Between "the Powers That Be" and "the Cry of the People" 
It is worth recalling that both of the above phrases are of biblical origin. 
They come from the two biblical passages most representative of the two 
political poles of attraction in any community in the Judaeo-Christian 
tradition—the pole of submission to authority (Romans 13:1 f f.) and the 
pole of liberation from oppression (Exodus 3:7). Thus, the roots of the 
dilemma these phrases express go back to the sources of the Christian faith 
itself. 
We must dispense ourselves here from discussing the respective biblical 
contexts of the two emphases, except to note that neither was left long 
without being balanced by a contrary emphasis. In the New Testament case 
this can be found especially in the rage of the Apocalypse against Caesar; in 
the Old Testament case it runs through the long drawn out struggle of the 
monarchical and the priestly principles against the prophetic one. 
We must dispense ourselves also from repeating what we have said (pp. 
9-16) about the contexts of the two emphases in Christian history—except 
to pose once more, and more specifically, the questions they put to Chris-
tians on the social front today about the desirability and the possibility of a 
post-Constantinian Church. 
We must dispense ourselves further from repeating the general consider-
ations that have suggested themselves in connection with particular aspects 
of our inquiry—except, once again, to recall that insofar as they are valid at 
all they are relevant to any general understanding. 
Thus, it is still relevant to recall, from our discussion of the transnational 
avant-garde in Asia (pp. 69-70), that for empirical study it is simply not 
useful to think of the Church as a fixed point in the firmament, but that 
what we have under observation is more like a rather scattered moving pil-
grimage in the midst of a larger mass of people also on the move. When we 
speak empirically of the Church or the churches, we are generalizing about 
an entity that undoubtedly has a certain unity, or at the worst a certain as-
piration toward unity, but only within the limits of a permanently precari-
ous distance between the head and the tail of the procession, and between 
the standardbearers and the scouts. 
As long as we bear this aspect of things in mind, and as long as we recog-
nize its inevitability and normality, we need never make the mistake of ex-
pecting the overall reality of "the Church" to be reflected either exclusively 
in the pronouncements of the standardbearers or exclusively in the manifes-
tos of the scouts. It will be more realistic, where social questions are con-
cerned, to take the former as likely to be more indicative of where the tail of 
the procession is, and the latter as likely to be more indicative of where its 
head is. 
Any talk of an overall position or orientation of the Church will then be, 
at its crudest, little more than the result of adding the extremes together and 
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dividing by two. And any proposition to the effect that the Church is now 
more a force for change than a force for inertia will imply, not that the 
rearguard is no longer dragging its feet, but that it is no longer doing so 
sufficiently to nullify entirely the forward thrust of the advance guard, or to 
dissociate itself entirely from it. 
Similarly, it is relevant to recall from our discussion of frontiers in minis-
try (pp. 85-88) the ambivalence of institutionalized agencies, even institu-
tionalized agencies of change, with the corollary that even in these latter we 
must look somewhere between the extremes of top-heavy structures and 
bottom-heavy bodies for an always fluctuating area of leverage for change. 
If change must begin, when it does begin, from circles outside but not too 
far outside the centers of power; if it must begin from nonruling groups 
within striking or destabilizing distance of rule, from nonhierarchical 
groups in orbit between the hierarchical centers and the marginalized 
masses, from groups not too near either the gravitational force of the center 
or the tangential force of the fringes; then it is not in itself a sign that change 
is effectively blocked when ruling groups, hierarchical centers, and even 
institutionalized change agencies seem to relapse, as we have seen repeatedly 
in Asia, into postures of intransigence and resistance to change. 
Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose. "The more things change the 
more they stay the same." That is true of society whether it is a question of 
Marxist class domination or Weberian routinization or the structural corre-
spondence proper to social systems according to Lévi-Strauss or the 
structural-functional pattern perceived by Talcott Parsons. These are ex-
planations of the forces that keep society the way it is. 
E pur si muove! "But it does move."* Change also is a reality! Change 
eventually overtakes all human creations, including all theories that have no 
place for change. 
Nonruling groups sometimes do prove themselves to be within striking or 
destabilizing distance of rule—even in strategic bastions of one or the other 
superpower bloc. Iran and Poland are among the most recent illustrations 
ofthat. 
Nonhierarchical groups, especially in the Third World, sometimes do 
capture the initiative in the life of the Catholic Church as a whole— 
provoking the Vatican and the hierarchies into strenuous efforts to recover 
control. Such has been the case with movements of Third World theology, 
of women and men religious, and of basic Christian communities. 
Groups as far from the gravitational force of the center as are the radica-
lized margins of the churches in Asia sometimes do exercise crucial leverage 
on policies at the center. So it has been with URM in the CCA, with the 
CCA in the WCC, with the AMRS and the NASSA in the CBCP, with the 
OHD and the BISAs in the FABC, and with the FABC itself, as with 
•Remark attributed to Galileo after he was forced to recant his views on the motion of the 
earth before the Inquisition in 1633. 
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CELAM, by its mere survival as a transnational novelty and potential locus 
of power in the global organization of Catholicism. 
A third consideration that is relevant to recall from our discussion of 
local sources of militancy in Asia is the notion of unintentionally creative 
consequences of political and ecclesiastical "imperialism" (pp. 117-19), 
within the limits of a certain productive tension between the strength of a 
challenge and the strength of the Christian capacity to respond (p. 103). 
We have said enough about how narrow these limits are in Asia, and how 
it is not surprising to find that only in half a dozen local situations have the 
relations of force not been too unequal to permit the tension to be produc-
tive. 
We have also sufficiently highlighted the paradoxical reality of creative 
repression within these limits, and the vital contribution such repression is 
capable of making, unwittingly, to the emergence of a people-oriented 
Church. For at a certain stage, when such a Church is emerging, even when 
the process seems entirely and inescapably in continuity with the original 
trajectory of the Christian ideal, this continuity is not enough to give the 
forces in favor of a people-oriented Church the power to prevail. At such a 
stage, a certain provocation, by way of ill-judged obstructiveness, can serve 
to rally the decisive degree of further support. It is thus that attempts to 
dam the undammable have often proved in the end to be the most far-
reaching forces of change. 
All these considerations still do not suffice to permit a categorical answer 
to our question as to the possibility of a post-Constantinian Church. They 
merely permit us to define more narrowly what is in question, and thereby 
to distinguish some possibilities that may be plausibly entertained from 
others that may not. 
On the one hand, it seems clear that, short of a social miracle, there will 
never be anything like complete emancipation of large ecclesiastical bodies 
from the pull of the social status quo. In this sense, what the Asian bishops 
said in 1970 must be considered as promising more than mere bishops can 
deliver: "We will not tie our hands by compromising entanglements with 
the rich and powerful in our respective countries." The truth is that their 
hands are already tied, and that their entanglements must remain in varying 
degrees compromising. All that can be done—but this badly needs doing— 
is to distinguish more clearly between the degree of entanglement that is 
sociologically inevitable and the degree that is a proper subject for moral 
suasion or censure. 
We have put ourselves this question at the outset of our inquiry: Is there 
any exception to the rule by which large institutions, such as churches, tend 
to privilege the status quo in society precisely in the measure that they are 
rooted there? 
For reasons first hinted at then, and made more fully apparent in various 
connections (the Christian experience in the world and in Asia, in colonial 
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times and today, in positions of internal or external strength or weakness), 
we are led to affirm that no true exception can be found in that experience. 
Similarly, for reasons outlined in our discussion of standardbearers and 
scouts within church institutions, we are led to affirm that a change in this 
pattern would be not merely historically improbable but sociologically im-
possible, insofar as it would involve a systematic rupture between a large 
social body and the social power center on which its survival depends. 
We say, insofar as. The root of the impossibility is found in the extreme 
case, where rupture would be suicide. Self-preservation, that first law of 
nature, admits exceptions at the level of individual human beings, and even 
at the level of organizations small enough to be wholly subject to one or a 
few human wills. It ceases to admit exceptions at the level of true social 
institutions, which are characterized by the fact that human volition is only 
one of the forces at work in them. 
Among these forces at work in human institutions, sociology insists that 
some at least are irreducible to the forces of human volition. One view, 
which seems most easily reconcilable with the facts of experience, is that 
there are three fundamental forces, or sources of social and historical 
dynamism, which are irreducible to one another: the force of human voli-
tion (the human actor), the force of the cultural complex (language, for 
instance, though originally a mental product, cannot be bent entirely to the 
actor's will), and the force of social structures and systems." 
Even if human volition could be decisive in social institutions, the human 
wills involved are too numerous and too exposed to varieties of condition-
ing to be capable of uniting in favor of such an extreme option as liquida-
tion of the institution itself or of something perceived as a vital part of it-
self. But in any case those wills are faced with the other irreducibly separate 
factor, the social factor, whose tendency, whether interpreted according to 
Marx or Durkheim or Weber or Parsons or Lévi-Strauss, is to make the 
social institution cast its lot in with the lot of the prevailing social forma-
tion. 
This may seem a hard saying from the standpoint of Christian idealism. 
Other institutions may be self-interested, but is not the Church the institu-
tion whose essence is to be cfcinterested? Does it not claim to believe (Matt. 
10:39) that only through dying to self is true life to be found? Does it not 
take its cue from a Master who represents for it the very model of kenosis, 
of self-effacement (Phil. 2:7-8)? Does it not profess to continue the work of 
a Shepherd who lays down his life for his sheep? Does it not acknowledge, 
and have we not heard it acknowledge in Asia in BISA V (p. 59), its gospel 
duty to risk everything for the growth of God's Kingdom? 
The easiest part of the answer is that it is nothing new for churches to fail 
to live up to their ideals, and that a certain gap between promise and per-
formance is a permanent part of the human condition. But that is only to 
single out the element of moral failure in the churches' predicament. That 
element is indeed important, but it cannot be fairly assessed except in con-
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junction with those other elements that are not directly attributable to 
failure of will. 
The easiest of these other elements to acknowledge is the element of sec-
ond nature. It is a fact that the habits of centuries are not changed over-
night. Even if we were to suppose that the hands of the church leaders can 
be untied from compromising entanglements, and that the resolution to do 
so is genuine and unqualified, who is to say how much time would realisti-
cally need to be allowed for the transition? 
Some social changes do not take root in less than a century; few do so in 
less than a generation. Will it yet be written of the Catholic Church after 
Vatican II, as it has been written of China after 1949, that "never has so 
great a change been brought about in so short a time among so numerous a 
people"?" If it is to prove true (and clearly a formidable case can already be 
made on that side of the argument), we can be sure that it will not be more 
than an overall truth, balancing many advances against many retreats and 
relapses, in the one case as in the other. 
In one sense, of course, all social structure, being ultimately of human 
invention, being by definition a humanmade part of the human environ-
ment, falls ultimately into the category of second nature as opposed to what 
is natural tout court. Yet an irreducible distinction remains between ele-
ments of the humanmade environment that people could have made 
otherwise and elements that they could not. 
We cannot alter the fact that social institutions, regardless of any original 
purpose for their creation, inevitably sink roots in the existing social order, 
establishing multiple ties of interdependence with it and thus acquiring a 
stake in its survival, merely because they need some kind of order and be-
cause this is the one (and ex hypothesi the only one) available to them. Re-
duced to its most elementary terms, the logic of this is the logic of the say-
ing, Nature abhors a vacuum. 
On the one hand, then, a minimum of compromising entanglement fol-
lows inevitably from the fact that churches have a social existence and can-
not be churches without having a social existence. On the other hand, and in 
virtue of the same fact, churches are not dispensed from a real share of 
responsibility, if not for the past of the existing social order (though some-
times there is question ofthat too), at least for its future. 
Once the consensus has been reached among globally representative 
Christians that the existing world order needs changing, that a change at 
least to the extent of reducing notorious inequalities is a moral imperative, 
and that a duty to work for such a change is integral to the task of the 
Church in the world, then the stage is set for a historic shift in the social role 
of the Church within the limits of properly historical possibilities. 
Whether this implies the possibility or the prospect of a post-
Constantinian Church is a matter of definition. In any case, such a church 
could not be conceived along the lines of pre-Constantinian Christianity. 
AN OVERALL TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 151 
There . . η never be again, even if there ever was before, a Christianity capa­
ble of facing the world with entirely clean hands, or with hands that are 
entirely untied. 
It is not merely that what is done cannot be undone. It is also that what is 
now pervasively and intricately interwoven with the fabric of world society 
cannot be made to behave as if it were not. In the measure that Christianity 
retains leverage in the world, in that measure it must accept the constraints 
of its leverage. Even if due regard for the powers that be were not written 
into the Christian mandate, it would be futile to wax indignant over the fact 
that it conditions, channels, and in some degree actually limits the possible 
Christian response to the cry of the people. 
Hence, in a situation where priority has shifted to the latter concern, the 
first condition for effective response is a lucid recognition of what can and 
what cannot be done—just as energy saved from beating one's head against 
a wall is energy available for getting around that wall. 
What can be done depends most fundamentally on the extent to which a 
new society is actually in the making. For those who are sure, for example, 
that some kind of socialism is the real wave of the future, it is ultimately 
only a matter of waiting for the churches to be carried along with it. The 
movement of revolution will in due course turn the powers that be into the 
powers that were; and the same gravitational force that once drew the 
churches back to the old status quo will just as effectively draw them 
forward to the new one. 
We can see the process at work in this way in regimes where socialism is 
already the ruling ideology. In the Soviet Union, China, and Eastern 
Europe apart from Poland, even the hostility of the ruling ideology to reli­
gion does not suffice to nullify the rule by which power gravitates toward 
power and by which Christian contestation of the existing political power 
tends to come less from the ecclesiastical centers of power than from the 
ecclesiastical peripheries." 
If this mechanism were the only one by which the social role of the 
Church could be changed, it would be ultimately self-defeating, since that 
role would remain essentially the same Constantinian role, continuing to 
give priority to its relations with the powerful over its relations with the 
powerless. 
But in fact there is no proximate prospect of such a purely Macchiavellian 
resolution of the problem. Even if we could foresee a global future in a 
recognizably socialist mold, we should have no hope of making that percep­
tion widely enough shared among church leaders in Asia today to seem 
firmer ground to them than the ground they now stand on. It could not be 
expected in Asia, and it seems no more feasible in the world as a whole: 
church leaders will never be the first to give up preferring a devil they know 
to a devil they don't know. But in any case we do not know the shape of the 
future; and all we have felt confident in predicting about it is that it will not 
fit, except remotely, any blueprint already known to us. 
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What we have, then, is a mechanism that is more effective for detaching 
the churches from their current moorings than for attaching them to any 
other available ones. Its effect is to strike at the present social roots of eccle-
siastical security without supplying any comparably secure alternative. Like 
Abraham four millennia ago, churches today are being put in a situation 
where they are less sure of what they must move toward than of what they 
must move away from. 
This could be called providential by those who believe in providence. In 
any case, it seems to be the more precise truth about the apparent shift in 
the global orientation of the churches toward social change. A double 
movement of history, operating interactively on the churches from within 
and from without, has sufficiently loosened their ties with the prevailing 
world order of the late twentieth century to enable them, for perhaps the 
first time in centuries, to consider fundamental options between structural 
stability and structural change without being subject to a humanly insupera-
ble bias in favor of the former. 
Thus is the world Church brought to a state of relative freedom of option 
within the limits of more or less normal sociological and historical causality. 
It would not be possible to assign a weight to each of the individuili in-
fluences that have combined to offer the churches a stake in some new 
world order sufficient to offset their stake in the existing one. Perhaps the 
crucial factor within Christianity is its demographic shift from the First 
World to the Third—a shift to which Asian Christianity makes its own 
modest contribution. 
A demographic shift in itself would not be decisive without a correspond-
ing redistribution of power. That has been certainly slower to follow—but 
not so slow within ecclesiastical institutions, bound as they are to ultimate 
egalitarianism, as within military, economic, and political ones. By the 
1970s the Christian demographic shift was already widely perceived as irre-
versible." Short of a successful effort of undisguised imperialism—already 
out of the question in Protestant and Orthodox churches, and already ceas-
ing to be thinkable even within Roman Catholicism—it is only a matter of 
time till the overall center of gravity in the Christian world will shift from 
North to South. 
It could be argued that it is only when the world Church is thus suspended 
between two world orders—becoming uprooted from one without yet being 
firmly rooted in the other—that the church institution is even relatively free 
to make a genuine preferential option for the poor. If it could all be brought 
about by mechanisms of self-interest, if it were merely a matter of switching 
sides from yesterday's masters to tomorrow's, there would be no more al-
truism embodied in church structures than in any others, and no more to be 
hoped for from them by the poor of the future than by those of the past. 
The saving grace comes from the fact that, while mechanisms of self-
interest cannot be wished out of existence, they can come to operate in ways 
that neutralize each other, and to some extent can even be manipulated in 
such a way as to serve a wider interest. 
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A first condition for effective response to the cry of the people is a lucid 
recognition of what can and what cannot be done. Here again, energy saved 
is energy available. 
Social structures, after all, are no more than stable patterns of human 
behavior, reciprocally related to the creation and operation of human 
values. There is nothing to prevent human actors inside and outside the 
church institution from deliberately changing the thrust of their own contri-
bution to its functioning. There is also nothing to prevent them, within 
limits already indicated, from deliberately setting in train the processes that 
could eventually change the structures themselves through the mediation of 
changed values, or change the values themselves through the mediation of 
changed structures. 
We say, human actors inside and outside the church institution. It cannot 
be too often recalled that, as a matter of empirical observation, history is 
not moved forward by religion exclusively, and furthermore that, as a mat-
ter of reminders needed and periodically received by religious believers, if 
religion is God's right hand in the world it is not his only one. Given the 
principle of the thing, one can find in history in the Christian era any num-
ber of reenactments of the biblical scenario of salvation, in which Yahweh 
had to show that he was nobody's property by finding his uses for Pharaohs 
and Cyruses as well as for the faithful from Moses through Ezra. 
The lesson has clearly been needed as much by Christians as by Jews. 
Church leaders can normally be relied on to uphold basic Christian ideals of 
love and justice at levels of abstraction where the individual and especially 
the institutional cost of implementing them has not yet been counted. By the 
same token, it is sociologically unrealistic to rely on them, unaided, to con-
tinue undeviatingly to uphold these ideals once they are caught in the inevi-
table conflict between the ideals and the narrower interests of the institution 
for which they are immediately responsible. That is precisely why they need 
the contribution, or contradiction, of the ecclesial avant-garde, which has 
no such stake in the narrower interests of the institution; and that also is 
why (since the ecclesial avant-garde either lacks institutional leverage in the 
measure of its radicalism or lacks radicalism in the measure of its leverage) 
both rearguard and vanguard in the world Church need the pressure of the 
forces of change in the world as a whole. 
We have seen some of the main ways in which this works out in practice 
nowadays. 
For their Pharaoh, provoking them to their Exodus from complicity with 
power, the churches have had the North-South imbalance in general and the 
national security regimes in particular. For their Cyrus, cutting short their 
Exile from evangelical single-mindedness, they have had Marxism in its 
revolutionary mode, and more generally all secular ideologies of change up 
to the point at which they become ideologies in power and agencies of con-
solidation. Within the fold of the faithful the same law of creative repres-
sion applies. The vanguard of change has been built up by the same mecha-
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nism inside the churches as in the world as a whole. It emerges as a reaction 
to top-heavy institutionalization, to the convergence and collision of eccle-
siastical with political power, and to the ecclesiastical forms of domination 
of the South by the North. 
For those committed to assisting and channeling this impetus for change 
from within the church institution, the key insight needed remains the in-
sight about power: the fact that power gravitates towards power, and that 
there is basically no exception to this rule even in the extreme case, even in 
the case of ecclesiastical power in a system dominated by antiecclesiastical 
power. The change-oriented ecclesiastical strategist who has firmly grasped 
this fact is left with only one strategy that can produce the desired results. 
That strategy will be one of systematically resisting, subverting, and as far 
as possible reversing the ecclesiastical concentration of power. 
What are the chances of any general adoption of such a strategy? Here 
again we must recall the prime necessity of a lucid recognition of what can 
and what cannot be done. 
What cannot be done short of a social miracle is to arrive at a prevailing 
pattern in which people invested with effective responsibility for the church 
institution give effective priority to interests beyond that institution—above 
all where there is question of subverting power in the institution in the name 
of those ulterior interests. 
"Subversive" individuals near the center, yes: the papacy of John XXIII 
would seem to have been a case of that kind. A regular pattern of "subver-
sion" from the center, no: for every subversive in a high church post, there 
will be any number of restorers and consolidators. 
A pious wish to look beyond the institution, often enough yes: the imme-
diate successor of John XXIII evinced that wish most poignantly. Effective 
priority for interests beyond the institution, not really ever as a regular pat-
tern: the system has its built-in ways of ensuring that subordination of its 
interests does not become a habit. 
It must be stressed that this hard reality has nothing essentially to do with 
bad will or bad faith on the part of persons. There will always be climbers 
and opportunists, and every institution will always have its share of them, a 
share determined by the extent to which the interests of the institution and 
of the opportunists coincide. But there will also always be quite enough 
people sincerely convinced that loyalty to the institution is the only true 
guarantee of all legitimate ulterior interests; and the system will similarly 
seek to filter their access to the levers of power precisely in the measure that 
they put the system first. It would simply not be a system if it did not. 
So much for what cannot be done. There should be no cause for dis-
couragement for those mindful of what can be done. 
Between, on the one hand, a social miracle of church change by which a 
social institution would act as if it were not one, and, on the other, a social 
mechanism of change that would be entirely and unproductively consequent 
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on a change in the world order itself, there are all the possibilities inherent 
in the following facts: the fact that the Church, like all social institutions, 
has a vanguard as well as a rearguard; the fact that it is open to being acted 
upon at points of leverage intermediate between its center and its fringes; 
the fact that it is now passing through a period in which it is not rooted as 
strongly as it would normally be in a particular global order; and the fact 
that the forces of resistance to change can make and are making their own 
contribution to change through counterproductive efforts to maintain the 
hitherto prevailing power relations in the world and in the Church. 
In the larger perspective of church history, examples of the operation of 
the last-mentioned mechanism may be found in the Orthodox schism, the 
Reformation, the French Revolution, and, as already instanced repeatedly, 
the rise of Marxism. A movement that may be in a narrower sense a break 
away from the Church, or an external assault on the Church, can have a 
larger historical meaning as a revolution within the Church, giving more or 
less abnormal new outlets to values and energies within the Church when 
more or less normal outlets for them have been blocked. 
This is a point that can sometimes be appreciated better from outside the 
Church than from within it. A generation before Vatican II, which reaf-
firmed the priority of the Church as a community of the faithful over the 
Church as a clerical organization, Gramsci took that very principle as a 
premise for his argument that the decline of church leadership from its posi-
tion as "organic intellectual" of the "historical bloc" of Christendom was 
in direct relation to its loss of roots among the masses of the people. 
Within this larger sense of the world Church (an entity existing partly in 
reality and partly in aspiration), it is not to be expected that any of these 
major historical actors will withdraw from the stage in any immediately 
foreseeable future. Some authentic gospel values will continue to find more 
fertile soil in the secular revolutions than in the clerical organization. Some 
others will continue to flourish more freely in the soil of the schisms and the 
heresies than in the soil of the parent church. 
It goes without saying that in all these cases—the secular revolutions, the 
ecclesiastical breakaways, the mother church itself—these authentic gospel 
values will remain intentionally or unintentionally mixed with values that 
are quite incompatible with the gospel. But that is only to say, as the gospel 
parable itself says, that the wheat must remain mixed with the weeds till the 
harvest of the kingdom. Disconcerting though it may be, this model of the 
ways in which the gospel gets preached turns out to be in some sense the 
historical norm. 
This model also provides a certain basis for gauging the extent to which 
the Church can be expected to shift its weight in the balance between the 
powers that be and the cry of the people. 
In every historical epoch, secular revolutionaries play a vanguard role in 
relation to the mass of believers. In the present epoch, their leverage in the 
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direction of developing a Church of the people is being exercised more 
strongly and felt more effectively than has been the case for centuries. In 
Asia, in the name of indigenization and contextualization, the ears of the 
churches are being opened as never before to the cry of the people as uttered 
through a unique multiplicity of voices—among which nationalism (and 
regional transnationalism), Marxism in its Asian modes, Islam, Buddhism, 
and Hinduism are only the loudest. 
Similarly, in every epoch since the Reformation, Protestantism as a whole 
has played a vanguard role in relation to Catholicism as a whole. In the 
present one, the rise of ecumenism has meant the decline of resistance to 
that influence. On the social front this pattern is reproduced in Asia, where 
the frontierspeople of the CCA have blazed many trails in the name of 
power for the powerless that were later to be entered upon with the more 
measured tread of the F ABC. 
In the epoch opened by Vatican II and by Medellin, the members of the 
Catholic avant-garde have become a force within Catholicism that has little 
real precedent since the rise of the clerical church. Their extra leverage 
comes from the acknowledgement by Vatican II that the Church is the peo-
ple; from the acknowledgement by Third World church leaders that the 
people are massively the poor; and, in the case of Asia, from the acknowl-
edgement by the bishops there that a Church of the people in Asia cannot be 
other than a Church of the poor and of the young. These acknowledge-
ments may remain only verbal at the level of the officebearers; but these 
latter can neither entirely disavow them nor entirely disavow those within 
the Church who insist on recalling them and on drawing consequences from 
them for action at the level of vanguard and rearguard alike. 
All of these vanguards have the weaknesses of their strengths. In the 
measure that they are intensely in touch with their times they risk a loss of 
perspective on other times. In the measure that they apply all their force to 
the immediate barrier to be breached they risk finding themselves off bal-
ance when and if they break through. 
Such are the problems inherent in being the vanguard of a vanguard. It is 
precisely the loyal followers of a radical (be it Marx or Luther) who are 
more liable to be frozen in conservatism when their leader is frozen in 
death. More generally, it is the special risk of an entity like the WCC (as 
compared with the Vatican), precisely in the measure of its greater openness 
to the currents of the world around it, that while on the one hand it is freed 
for costlier militancy against, for example, racism in Africa, on the other 
hand it is bound to relative silence about repression in the lands where 
Orthodoxy lives under communism. 
The problems of the Catholic social vanguard have much of this in com-
mon with the other Christian and the other social vanguards. In addition, 
the Catholic vanguard has a problem with the Catholic power structure that 
is entirely its own. To be a change-oriented ecclesiastical strategist; to be 
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convinced of our earlier conclusion that only one strategy can possibly pro-
duce the results being sought; to be accordingly committed to this strategy 
(that is, committed to reversing the ecclesiastical concentration of power)— 
to be all this within the Catholic Church is to live contradiction at a level 
that has no real parallel outside, except perhaps in the case of a humanist 
Marxist in a Stalinist party. 
That parallel is not without interest. To take one of the milder and sim-
pler illustrations, Communist parties have had their Garaudys, and Catho-
lic universities have had their Girardis; but as long as the model of manage-
ment was Stalinist in the one and papalist in the other, the end of the road 
for the persistent dissenter was inevitably expulsion.41 
And the parallel does not end there. Stalinism was never the only model 
for the Party: Eurocommunism has professed to find a place for difference 
and dialogue; but it has done so too recently to have had its profession pro-
perly put to the test; so the question remains whether there is a future for 
Eurocommunism. Similarly, papalism was never the only model for the 
Catholic Church: in its extreme form it is only the model of the latest-but-
one of more than twenty general councils. Is there a future for the older 
collégial or conciliar model, somewhat timidly reaffirmed by Vatican II? 
Because of the timidity and the ambivalence of the reaffirmation, and be-
cause of the powerful forces at work to minimize its significance, the future 
of difference, dialogue, decentralization, and multipolarity is as humanly 
uncertain for the critical tradition within Roman Catholicism as it is for the 
antitotalitarian heirs of Marx and Lenin. 
We have used the term Roman Catholicism in these pages whenever it has 
seemed needed to avoid ambiguity. On occasion we have put the "Roman" 
in quotation marks in acknowledgement of the paradox the juxtaposition 
implies. Roman Catholicism is in fact a term used mainly by Christians who 
claim to belong to the Catholic Church mentioned in the Apostles' Creed 
without belonging to the Catholic Church that has its headquarters in 
Rome. They typically see themselves as non-Roman Catholics; that is, 
Catholics without the Roman connection. 
In another sense, some Catholics who maintain the Roman connection 
also prefer to see themselves as non-Roman Catholics. Insofar as the "Ro-
man" is a contradiction of the "Catholic" (a contradiction not implied in 
the mere fact of communion with the church leader claiming succession 
from Saint Peter), they are clear that it is the "Catholic" that must be main-
tained and the "Roman" that must go. 
But can the Catholicity in Roman Catholicism ever really prevail over the 
Romanness? That is the crucial question for anyone who has ever posed the 
more general question of whether the weight of "the Church" in the scales 
of society can ever really lie more on the side of change than on that of con-
servatism or inertia. Because the majority of all Christians are in commu-
nion with Rome, and the majority of other Christians are fragmented to a 
point where their potential for radical social leverage is too far from the 
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ideal in the direction of dispersion, the social role of Christianity as a whole, 
in the world as a whole, depends most crucially on how far Catholicism can 
overcome its own historic handicap of paralyzing monolithism. 
There is room for a wide range of judgment on what is the optimum in-
termediate point between the extremes. There is less room for doubt that the 
point of departure before Vatican II was too far from the ideal, in theory 
and practice, in the direction of centralization. There is also less room for 
doubt that the point of departure two decades after the opening of Vatican 
II, if less far from the ideal in theory, was still too far in practice. Not very 
many would be willing to put it as bluntly as it was put in the "feedback" of 
the South Korean BISA delegates: The present Church structure cannot be 
poor. But they, like the small boy who spoke indiscreetly of the emperor's 
' ~.ck of clothes, were in fact only bringing the discussion back to the real 
world. 
This is not the place to judge any particular pontificate, especially if it is 
only a few years old and is destined to outlive the early 1980s. A single pope 
can be at best a key individual in a line of hundreds of popes, and one of 
several key factors in the evolution of church and papacy at a particular 
historical moment. As with all successors of Peter, and for that matter with 
Peter himself, there must inevitably be a wide gap between ideals and 
realizations—even in the case of John Paul II. It is the conclusion of these 
pages that the gap will have been less wide in his case in the measure that his 
social message contrives to be not merely proclaimed to the world outside 
the church institution, but also embodied within it. 
This may be brought about more effectively with his active cooperation, 
or more effectively against his active resistance. It is always possible that 
this is one of the historic cases where the rise of a Church of the people is at 
a stage where it is more liable to be killed by kindness than by repression. It 
seems even probable that this is a case where it must be counterproductive 
to try to contain a Church of South and North within a framework devised 
for a part of the North, and to contain a Church on the threshold of its third 
millennium within a framework more adapted to an earlier millennium. 
We have seen how it can happen in various local contexts that attempts to 
dam the undammable can become the most far-reaching forces of change. 
We may now be seeing how the same thing can happen on the scale of nearly 
a thousand million Catholics. For why should it not be so, if they and their 
leader are equally in the hands ofthat "shrewd Spirit" who, as none other 
than Karl Marx once remarked, "continually manifests himself in all these 
contradictions"?42 
If in fact far-reaching forces in Catholicism are now being built up by 
being dammed up, and if that is only another manifestation of the "shrewd 
Spirit," then Pope John Paul II will deserve the thanks of posterity not only 
for his many positive contributions, but even more for being the instrument 
of a providence beyond anything he has ever personally planned, and even 
contrary to some things he has personally wanted. In this matter it seems 
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that it comes to the same thing, whether we read history in the light of Marx 
or of Jesus. Either way we must conclude that all who have served that 
Spirit have done so ultimately on the Spirit's terms and not on their own. So 
it has been with confirmers of the faithful in the line of the shock-treated 
Peter. So it has been with servants of Yah weh in the pattern of the good 
pagan Cyrus. So it has been also with would-be-atheist servants of human-
ity in the manner of Marx. 
CONCLUSION: THE OUTLOOK 
It is now over three millennia since a minor movement of people across a 
neck of land between the world's two largest continents gave rise to a mem-
ory called the Exodus, and to a hope in a God who said: " I have heard the 
cry of my people." 
It is now almost two millennia since that tradition of memory and hope 
underwent its greatest single historical transformation, when some of its 
distant heirs at the same Eurasian crossroads, where it had till then been 
clinging to its first foothold, heard the same God commanding them: "Go 
out to the whole world." 
It is now a century and a third since a still more distant heir of that tradi-
tion reaffirmed a central strand of it with a force that jolted all of it and all 
of the world of which it had by then become part and parcel. 
What Karl Marx in effect set out to do was to bury the ancient memory 
and reformulate the ancient hope. What he achieved was to contribute to 
giving a new lease on life to both. At any rate, that was a part of his achieve-
ment, and one that may yet prove to have been the most far-reaching part: 
to contribute to the reawakening of the original resources of social con-
science among those who claim to belong to the tradition of Moses and 
Jesus. Certainly such a reawakening began to be noticeable in the second 
century of Marxism and the twentieth of Christianity, at a time when one 
out of every three people on earth was a Christian and when one out of 
every two Christians lived in a part of the world that had reason to feel a 
need for a Moses or a Marx. 
Contemplating a part of that part of the world, the same Marx posed the 
question that confronts not only this study but also every possible study of 
the human future in what remains of its present millennium: "Can mankind 
fulfill its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of 
Asia?"1 
The Asian part of the story of the rematching of Marx and Moses, which 
we have called Asian Christian social protest, emerged from its prehistory in 
the mid-1960s—a very recent date in the timescale we have been consider-
ing. The present lines are being written at a point in time just halfway be-
tween then and the end of the millennium. Having looked that far back, are 
we in any better position to look that far forward? What is the outlook for 
the phenomenon in its second couple of decades, given the record of its 
first? 
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This is not the place to attempt to steal from the future any secrets that 
properly belong to it. However, since tomorrow began yesterday, some-
thing of tomorrow must be available for inspection in what is already yes-
terday. 
Statistical data and trends are one example. What we have in this domain 
is nothing compared with what we would need to have to make reliable 
predictions. But for what they are worth the data have been assembled and 
organized on an unprecedented scale in the World Christian Encyclopedia 
of 1982. Rounding these data, we find we have to do with an Asian Chris-
tian population that will have grown from 20 million in 1900 through 100 
million in 1970 to a quarter of a billion in 2000; all this in a total Asian pop-
ulation that will have grown from one billion in 1900 through two billion in 
1970 to something on the order of 3.7 billion in 2000. 
We have some assurance that this picture will not change drastically in the 
space of a few decades: first, because of the relative inertia of major demo-
graphic trends over short time spans; second, because of the inertia of 
trends in the processing of demographic data. (A new Christian data-
collecting enterprise on the scale of the World Christian Encyclopedia is 
unlikely to be repeated within this century.) What the picture most signifi-
cantly shows is a Christian percentage of the Asian population that will 
have grown from 2 percent in 1900 through 5 percent in 1970 to something 
approaching 7 percent in 2000. In other words, it shows a trend in the direc-
tion of liberating Asian Christian social protest from the minority complex 
that has hitherto been the main inhibiting influence on its development. 
So far as it goes, this trend is verified not only regionally but also locally. 
In India and Indonesia, the locus of the two national Christian populations 
where an easing of the Christian minority complex would be most signifi-
cant for Christianity as a whole in nonsocialist Asia, the outlook is for an 
increase in the Christian percentage from 3.5 percent and 9.4 percent re-
spectively in 1970 to 4.7 percent and 13.3 percent in 2000. In South Korea, 
host of the fourth largest Asian national Christian population after the 
Philippines, India, and Indonesia, even much lower estimates of that popu-
lation than those of the World Christian Encyclopedia would agree in put-
ting it already past the point where a minority complex would be a major 
factor in inhibiting its self-expression. 
What else would be a major inhibiting influence on the future develop-
ment of Asian Christian social protest? Obviously, it would be checked at 
its root by any attenuation of its raison d'être—that is, by any easing of the 
conditions that gave rise to the need for it. What, then, is the outlook for 
any such easing in the middle or late 1980s, or in the 1990s? 
Most observers in the early 1980s have seen none. On the contrary, with 
the First and the Second World at this time in the depth of the worst reces-
sion in half a century, the outlook for the Third World can only be that 
things will have to get worse before they get better. 
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Or could it perhaps be said that, while this might be true on a global scale, 
it is not precisely applicable to Asia? Certainly the trend of World Bank 
reports of this period is to locate the most stubborn development failures in 
Africa and the greatest development breakthroughs in East and Southeast 
Asia. These breakthroughs are even leading some to envisage the twenty-
first century as the century of the Pacific. 
This may well be the real long-term outlook. Looking at the big picture, 
we have already ventured to say that in Asia we have to do with a continen-
tal area which, more than any other single one in the closing decades of the 
twentieth century, makes a plausible center of gravity for the world's af-
fairs. 
However, the local and short-term outlook is something else. The facts of 
the development record of revolutionary China are still clouded in confu-
sion and controversy. The South Asian development outlook has not been 
notably transformed since Myrdal compiled his dismal dossier on it in Asian 
Drama in the 1960s. The brighter picture in the rest of East Asia and in 
Southeast Asia is brighter mainly by the criteria of capitalist macro-
economics, characteristically insensitive to greater or lesser measures of 
built-in maldistribution. In the context of the Philippines, "galloping 
pauperization" was how seventeen bishops defined its "net effect" at the 
end of 1981.2 In the case of the "little Japans" of Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
South Korea, and Singapore, it has been argued that insofar as they have 
flourished as "export platforms," they have done so largely because they 
were a lucky size at a lucky time in the development of the world market. 
The conclusion of one such argument about them has been to this effect: 
"Miracles, maybe; models, surely not."3 In any case, not models of the 
kind of just, participatory, and sustainable society for which Christian 
social protest pleads. 
Inhibited, therefore, in the short term, not at all by any overall easing of 
the objective grounds for Christian commitment to fundamental social 
change in Asia, and less than hitherto by the Christian minority complex 
that is distinctive to the Asian situation, does it follow that social protest is 
assured of looming at least as large in the Asian churches in the next decades 
as in the last? 
There is a further possible inhibiting factor to be considered: the factor 
inherent in the internal autonomy of the churches as organizations and as 
communities. Could they recoil from their present social commitment, 
either because of exhaustion or debilitation in a too unequal trial of strength 
whether globally or locally, or because of internal reassessment of priorities 
along more traditional lines? 
Within certain limits (mainstream Christianity cannot unsay what it has 
said in the 1960s and 1970s), such a recoil is clearly an open possibility both 
globally and locally. In the short history of Christian social protest in con-
temporary Asia we have already seen that any linear model of progressive 
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social involvement of the churches does not fit the facts. In the somewhat 
longer experience of Latin America it is still more evident that the progress 
is at best of the two steps forward, one step backward kind. At the global 
level, we have had occasion to touch on the practical implications of at-
tempts at the top to turn back the clock, or at least step on the brake. At the 
Asian level, any undue euphoria about the revolutionary potential of the 
churches would be sobered in 1982 by the convulsions at the main point of 
convergence in Asia of Christian and Marxist social struggle—the 
Mindanao-Sulu Pastoral Conference. 
The ultimate lessons of these convulsions have yet to be discerned. As far 
as 1982 is concerned, they culminated in a formal act of dissociation by the 
Mindanao-Sulu bishops from the Board and the Secretariat of that Con-
ference, though without dissolving these bodies, which then proceeded on 
their own to schedule the 1983 meeting of the Conference, inviting the 
bishops as guests. 
These events assured two things, duly articulated in comment from both 
sides: that this most participatory and dynamic of Asian Catholic churches 
was now openly "a divided church"; and that the fifth triennial conference 
of 1983 would represent "an MSPC radically different from the last four." 
It is clear that the immediate cause of rupture was the alleged excessive inti-
macy of the Secretariat with the left, the Marxist third force, and specifi-
cally with the commitment to armed revolutionary struggle of the National 
Democratic Front and such component movements as the Communist Party 
of the Philippines and Christians for National Liberation. But there was no 
agreement even among the bishops that options regarding the third force 
were the ultimate issue. The ultimate issue was more persuasively identified 
by one of the bishops as "a symbolic shift in the understanding of church" 
(from "hierarchical church" to "people's church"). There were two ques-
tions about this "people's church": did it really represent the people, and 
did it leave any place for the bishops?4 
Thus, at a high price in pain and bitterness, the Catholics of Mindanao-
Sulu, with some participation from Protestants and Muslims, provided 
themselves and Christian Asia with an occasion for a first thorough ex-
ploration in words and deeds of the implications of Vatican II's Church of 
the people and the Asian bishops' Church of the poor. From the outset their 
own best contributions were rich in passion and intelligence on both sides. 
If in the process they seem even to themselves to be sunk in a mess and a 
scandal, that is only because they dared to bring into the open confusions 
and contradictions that could not remain forever buried under pious rheto-
ric. Whether they are destined to handle their particular crisis well or badly, 
the Christian world cannot but learn something from their experience. 
The Christian world (again more particularly the Catholic world) also 
stood to learn something from another Asian Christian confrontation of the 
early 1980s. In Mindanao, as in Central America and in varying degrees in 
every part of the world, it was seeing how sharp are the birth pangs of a 
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Church of all the people. In China, to a greater extent than in any other 
country, it was seeing what a long way it still remained from being a Church 
of all the peoples. 
The issue in China came into sharp focus in 1981 in connection with the 
Catholic see of Canton. Moves that had at first looked like a shared effort 
in bridge-building between the see of Rome and the government-recognized 
Catholic spokespersons in China broke off abruptly with the bridge in ruins 
and the two shores seemingly farther apart than ever. 
The issue was far from being pure and clear. From one point of view, 
already adverted to in these pages in references to positions taken by 
Chinese Christian spokespersons, it reflected a bona fide problem for the 
parent see and for Christians abroad generally, one that was not so different 
at bottom from that of Mindanao: how to be really in communion with the 
Christian, with the Catholic people in China; how to know who really 
speaks for them in a still relatively closed and manipulative political system. 
From another point of view it reflected a question that would remain even if 
there were no particular difficulty from the side of the political system: how 
much more give will there need to be in the worldwide system of Catholi-
cism before it is worthy to aspire to be a Church of all the people and of all 
the peoples? 
By its own previous standards the Vatican could fairly claim to have been 
exceptionally and thanklessly tactful and sensitive in its latest China moves. 
By the test of how far it would still have to go before it could make room for 
the great separate stream of Chinese experience, the Chinese Catholic critics 
of the Vatican (not all of them inside the People's Republic) could also 
plausibly argue that the Canton fiasco was not exclusively due to ecclesiasti-
cal shortsightedness on one side.' 
No one could rightfully wish on Mindanao, China, or Rome the fierce 
internecine quarrels here in question. These quarrels have added new 
wounds to old scars; there will be that much more healing to be done in the 
end. Yet the fact remains that the ends they all seek—a Church of all the 
people and of all the peoples—are not the sorts of ends that are likely to be 
gained at any lesser price. 
Agnostic common sense would forbid any such easy expectations. A 
Christian set of values would forbid them still more categorically. If the 
Mindanao turmoil marks even a step on the way to a Church that can find a 
fairer place for all its members and ministries, that will have been a priceless 
contribution, not only to the Church but also to its prospects of service to 
society everywhere. If the rude rebuff received by the Vatican in the Canton 
affair is better calculated than any easier medicine to bring home to all con-
cerned the full scale of the challenge of third-millennium Catholicity, it will 
have been medicine worth swallowing for the sake of the Catholic and 
Christian and human reconciliation the whole world of the third millennium 
will need. 
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With these "ifs" we must conclude. Of the three factors we have singled 
out as significant for the future of Asian Christian social protest— 
demographic progress toward outgrowing the Asian Christian minority 
complex; continuation of a critical imbalance in the sharing of the world's 
and Asia's goods; and continuation in practice as well as theory of the shift 
of some of the weight of the churches in the scales of society from the side 
of the haves to that of the have-nots—the first two are better assured in the 
short term. 
As for the third, in the long term, and as far as true believers are con-
cerned, it ought to be the best-assured of all. In the meantime, and given the 
limits of what can be honestly concluded from mere empirical evidence, it 
must be recognized as the factor most at the mercy of human freedom and 
fickleness, and therefore most subject to fits and starts and twists and turns. 
As to how exactly, especially in the very shortest term, the "shrewd Spirit" 
referred to by Marx can still be ' 'manifesting himself in all these contradic-
tions," that is a subject on which the pronouncements of real believers in 
such a Spirit should not be over prompt or over precise. 
APPENDIX 1 
KEY WORLD EVENTS: 1945-1969 
1945 
1946 
1945-55 
1947-49 
1945-75 
1948 
1948 
1949 
1949 
1950-53 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1956 
1958 
1960 
1961 
1962 
Aug 
May 
Aug 
Sep 
Oct 
Aug 
Apr 
Feb 
Oct 
Aug 
May 
Oct 
World War II ends; United Nations Charter signed 
War resumed in Asia as Mao in China and Ho in Viet-
nam bid for power 
East Europe passes under Communist governments, 
COMECON, Warsaw Pact 
West Europe underwritten by Marshall Plan and North 
Atlantic Treaty 
Colonial empires replaced by independent nations in 
Asia and Africa 
State of Israel proclaimed; at war with Arabs in 1948, 
1956, 1967, 1973,1982 
World Council of Churches inaugurated in Amsterdam; 
Orthodox join in 1961 
USSR: first Soviet atomic bomb test ends U.S.A.-
weapons monopoly 
China: Mao proclaims People's Republic of China; 
Chiang Kai-shek holds Taiwan 
Korea: Korean War hardens Cold War lines of division; 
partition of Korea resumed 
Vietnam: Geneva Conference ends French Vietnam 
presence; partition and 1956 election plan 
Afro-Asian identity affirmed in Bandung Conference of 
28 nations 
USSR: Khrushchev launches de-Stalinization in Soviet 
20th Party Conference 
USSR: limit of Soviet liberalization marked in crushing 
of Hungarian revolt 
Launching of Common Market in Europe, of Great 
Leap Forward in China 
China: Sino-Soviet split revealed in withdrawal of Sov-
iet technicians 
West: Castro makes Cuba first Marxist state in hemi-
sphere; isolated by U.S. 
Sino-Indian War; Cuban missiles crisis; Vatican II be-
gins RC renewal 
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1963 
1964 
1965 
1968 
1968 
1969 
Jul 
Aug 
Nov 
Aug 
Jul 
U.S.-U.K.-USSR test ban treaty begins series of super-
power détente accords 
Vietnam: Gulf of Tonkin Resolution mandates U.S. 
combat commitment 
China: Wu Han polemics begin Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution 
Czechoslovakia: Warsaw Pact troops oust Dubcek re-
gime 
New social concern affirmed by churches in Beirut, 
Uppsala, Medellin 
U.S. Vietnam troop withdrawals begin; Apollo 11 lands 
first people on moon 
APPENDIX 2 
KEY WORLD AND ASIAN EVENTS: 
1970-1982 
1970 Jan Nigeria: Biafra surrender ends costliest African seces­
sion effort 
Sep Chile: Allende election creates second Marxist state in 
Western hemisphere 
Dec Last of three Asian visits by Pope Paul (W. Asia 1964, 
Bombay 1964, E. Asia 1970) 
1971 Sep China: "heir apparent" Lin Piao disappears; later 
linked with anti-Мао plot 
Oct China: UN seat switched by vote from Taipei to Peking 
Dec Bangladesh: new nation emerges from Indo-Pakistan 
war 
1972 Feb China: Nixon visit launches move towards U.S.-P.R.C. 
relations 
Apr UNCTAD III in Santiago: forum for North-South con­
frontation 
May SALT I accords limiting strategic arms signed between 
U.S. and USSR 
Sep Philippines: Marcos proclaims martial law 
Oct S. Korea: Park proclaims martial law 
1973 Jan Vietnam ceasefire under Paris accords ends U.S. troop 
presence 
Jul Afghanistan: Daud overthrows monarchy and pro­
claims first Afghan republic 
Sep Chile: coup replaces Allende with Pinochet; freedoms 
suspended 
Oct Thailand: Thanom military regime overthrown; three 
years of democracy follow 
Oct Fourth Arab-Israeli war leaves Israel front briefly at 
widest limit 
1974 Jan Quadrupling of OPEC oil prices takes effect; disarray 
for rich and poor economies 
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Apr Portugal: coup begins democratization and dismantling 
of colonies 
Jul Greece: junta collapses in Greek-Turk confrontation 
over Cyprus 
Aug U.S. : Nixon resigns presidency in climax of Watergate 
disclosures 
1975 Apr Resistance to revolution collapses in Cambodia and 
South Vietnam (and, by December, in Laos). 
Apr Lebanon civil war ends Christian-Muslim entente; Syr-
ian intervention in 1976 
Jun India: Gandhi proclaims emergency; freedoms sus-
pended for 20 months 
Aug 35 nations sign Helsinki accords on European security 
and cooperation 
Nov Bangladesh: Ziaur takes power after coups topple Mu-
jib and Ahmed; slain in 1981 
Nov Spain: death of Franco begins democratization under 
King Juan Carlos 
1976 Jan China: death of Chou followed by eclipse of Deng; Hua 
made premier 
May UNCTAD IV in Nairobi staves off failure of North-
South dialogue 
Jul Vietnam reunification proclaimed; East Timor annex-
ation by Indonesia legalized 
Sep China: death of Mao foreshadows fall of "gang of 
four"; Hua made party chairman 
Oct Thailand: coup restores military rule under Thanin 
1977 Mar India: election ends Emergency, reversing 2/3 majority 
of Congress Party 
Jul Pakistan: coup replaces Bhutto with Zia after disputed 
election 
Jul Sri Lanka: election replaces Bandaranaike with Jay-
ewardene, setting new rightist trend 
Jul China: Deng reinstated as premier; takes charge increas-
ingly 
Nov Mid-East: visit to Jerusalem by Sadat of Egypt begins 
major new peace initiative 
Dec Cambodia breaks with Vietnam over border conflict 
1978 Apr Afghanistan: coup replaces Daud with Taraki in pro-
Soviet shift 
Jun Vietnam joins COMECON; last Chinese aid stopped 
Aug China and Japan sign peace treaty rejecting "hege-
mony" 
Oct John Paul II, first Polish pope, elected after deaths of 
Paul VI and John Paul I 
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1979 Jan U.S.-P.R.C. relations; U.S.-R.O.C. official break; 
Deng Xiaoping on U.S. tour 
Jan Cambodia invasion by Vietnam replaces Pol Pot by 
Heng Samrin 
Feb In CELAM III at Puebla, Latin American bishops reaf­
firm activist Medellin line 
Feb Khomeini replaces Shah in Iran and leads way to Islamic 
republic 
Feb China invades Vietnam in "defensive counterattack," 
then withdraws 
Mar Egyptian-Israeli Camp David treaty signed by Sadat, 
Begin, Carter 
Jun UNCTAD V in Manila fails to bring accord on struc­
tural change 
Jul Nicaragua: leftist revolution ends Somoza regime 
Oct South Korea: Park slain; limited liberalization cut short 
after new coup in Dec by Chun 
Dec NATO ministers approve 1983 deployment of new the­
ater nuclear force to reduce "imbalance" 
Dec Afghanistan: Soviet troops intervene, replacing Amin 
with Karmal and provoking internal war 
1980 Jan Zimbabwe: after 7 years of guerilla war, election trans­
fers power to black leader Mugabe 
Sep Poland: Kania replaces Gierek as First Secretary as 
Solidarity movement grows from Gdansk 
Sep Turkey: military rule resumed as Evren takes power 
from Demirel in coup 
Sep Iraq invades Iran in the name of nationalism and 
Islamic orthodoxy 
Nov U.S.: sweeping electoral shift brings right-wing control 
of Senate under Reagan 
1981 Jun France: electoral revolution brings left control of As­
sembly under Mitterrand 
Oct Europe: grounds well of protest against nuclear arms 
brings 1 million onto streets 
Dec Poland: under Jaruzelski, martial law imposed. Solidar­
ity leaders arrested 
1982 Apr Argentine-U.K. S.Atlantic war begins over Falklands/ 
Malvinas; U.K. control restored by June 
Jun In two mid-East wars, Israel invades Lebanon, Iran 
pushes back Iraq 
Jun Second of two UN disarmament conferences ends inde­
cisively despite new peak of public concern 
Sep China: 12th Party Congress brings qualified reinforce­
ment of post-Мао, pro-Deng trend 
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Oct Spain: electoral revolution brings Socialists to power 
under González 
Nov USSR: on death of Brezhnev, Andropov becomes Party 
General Secretary 
APPENDIX 3 
OTHER EVENTS RELEVANT TO 
ASIAN CHRISTIAN SOCIAL 
PROTEST: 1965-1982 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1970 
1971 
1972 
Aug 
Jul 
Feb 
Apr 
Jul 
Sep 
Aug 
Nov 
Jan 
Sep 
Oct 
Nov 
Apr 
Aug 
Hong Kong: Priests' Institute for Social Action (in 
Asia) formed 
Geneva: WCC Conference on Church and Society hears 
' 'theology of revolution" 
Vatican: Justice and Peace Commission formed; Popul-
orum Progressio encyclical issued 
S. Korea: first stand for poor by RC Church wins in 
Kang Hoa YCW case 
Beirut Ecumenical Conference on Development: first 
RC-WCC global joint effort 
Uppsala: WCC 4th Assembly: rich-poor gap called 
"crucial point of decision" 
Medellin: CEL AM II calls Latin American Church to 
solidarity with poor 
Christian protest acts by youth leaders in S. Vietnam, by 
Kim Chi Ha in S. Korea 
Manila: Asian bishops plan FABC, promise "Church of 
poor and young" 
Madras: Indian RC students (AICUF) aim for "radi-
cally new society' ' 
Bangalore: Asian student chaplains opt for more radical 
political role 
Rome: Synod of Bishops finds justice work "integral 
t o " evangelization 
S. Korea: joint pastoral after Wonju affair denounces 
social injustice 
Chile: first group of Christians for Socialism formed 
S. Vietnam: Catholics for Peace indict church privilege 
and silence 
Sep Philippines: church protest muted as Marcos proclaims 
martial law 
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Oct S. Korea: church protest muted as Park proclaims mar-
tial law 
1973 Jan Bangkok: end of WCC World Conference on Salvation 
Today 
Jan S. Vietnam: chaplains sentenced for use of 1971 Synod 
Justice statement 
May S. Korea: Theological Declaration of Korean Christians 
against Park regime 
Jun Singapore: Christian Conference of Asia 5th Assembly 
Aug Bangalore: Asian Seminar on Religion and Develop-
ment (successor meeting in Baguio in 1975) 
1974 Jan Jogjakarta: 41 priests protest public corruption and 
repression 
Apr Taipei: 1st F ABC Assembly finds search for justice 
"integral to" Gospel 
May Colombo: Towards World Community meeting of five 
world faiths 
Jun Philippines: WCC leaders and a CCA leader arrested 
Jun S. Vietnam: 301 priests denounce corruption; campaign 
against abuses grows 
Jul S. Korea: between arrests. Bishop Tji makes Declara-
tion of Conscience 
Oct Rome: Synod of Bishops on evangelization 
1975 Apr S. Korea: NCC leaders arrested for embezzlement; con-
victed in Sep; 
Vietnam: Hue and Saigon archbishops call Catholics to 
cooperate with new regime 
Jun India: church protest muted as Gandhi proclaims Emer-
gency 
Dec Nairobi: WCC 5th Assembly calls for "evangelism and 
social action" 
1976 Mar Singapore: 15 priests denounce government sterilization 
policy 
May Hong Kong: Asian joint meeting of Christian students 
(WSCF and IMCS) 
Aug Indonesia: Sawito affair; manifesto of Catholic stu-
dents 
Aug S. Korea: top Christian leaders again among dissidents 
sentenced 
Oct Philippines: referendum-plebiscite brings out church 
divisions 
Dec Philippines: 4 church media suppressed; 70 church per-
sonnel arrested 
1977 Jan Philippines : bishops unite in pastoral critical of govern-
ment 
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Feb FABC-OHD Asian seminar reviews bishops' social 
program (BISAs 1-3) 
Apr Vietnam: Hue archbishop protests repression of Bud-
dhists and Catholics 
Jun CCA 6th Assembly calls for "continued priority on 
human rights" 
Aug Taiwan: Presbyterian Declaration on Human Rights 
1978 Jan Indonesia: student leaders arrested in new protest and 
reaction 
Apr S. Korea: bishops unite in support of Dong-Il workers, 
YCW, URM 
Jun Hong Kong: confrontation in RC Church over Golden 
Jubilee School case 
Nov Calcutta: FABC 2nd Assembly reaffirms 1974 As-
sembly, but focuses on prayer 
1979 Jan Sri Lanka: Third World Theologians, in 1st Asian meet-
ing, for a "liberating" Asian theology 
Feb Puebla: John Paul II and CELAM III give mixed 
signals on social action 
May Baguio: BISA V marks East-West rift among Asian 
bishops on social action 
Nov S. Korea: post-Park regime renews crackdown on Chris-
tian activists 
Dec Taiwan: Human Rights Day events lead to 1980 jailing 
of Presbyterian general secretary Kao 
1980 Mar San Salvador: Archbishop Romero slain at Mass, cata-
lyzing Christian protest in w. hemisphere 
May S. Korea: Christian and other protest muffled after 
bloody crushing of Kwangju uprising 
Jun Spectrum of Christian social attitudes reflected in Asia 
in three world mission congresses 1979-80 
1981 Feb Philippines: mixed signals again from John Paul II on 
social action during Asian visit 
May Bangalore: CCA 7th Assembly: Living in Christ with 
People; bishop proposes local socialism 
Jun China: furor over pope's naming of Canton archbishop 
dramatizes issue of local church autonomy 
Sep John Paul II, in encyclical Laborem Exercens, reaffirms 
priority of labor over capital 
Oct John Paul II intervenes in Jesuit Order to assert author-
ity and brake radicalism 
1982 Mar Philippines: Mindanao-Sulu bishops "dissociate" from 
their Pastoral Conference Secretariat 
Mar S. Korea: Pusan arson sequel reopens Church-State 
confrontation; priest jailed 
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Jul Philippines: Cardinal Sin seen as calling for Marcos 
resignation 
Aug S. Korea: Justice and Peace Commission joins call for 
Chun resignation 
Sep Philippines: new wave of pressures on Church, leading 
to united episcopal protest Feb. 1983 
Nov Sri Lanka: arrests of Jaffna clergy in Tamil-Sinhala 
conflict 
Nov West: national defence policies challenged in draft state-
ments prepared for U.S. Catholics and Church of 
England. 
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APPENDIX 5 
DISTRIBUTION OF ROMAN 
CATHOLICS AND OTHER 
CHRISTIANS CIRCA 1980 
R.C. 
Asia Total 69.5 
Philippines 41.6 
India 11.8 
Indonesia 4.3 
Soviet Asia 0.0 
South Korea 1.1 
Vietnam 3.4 
Japan 0.4 
Lebanon 1.5 
Burma 0.4 
China 1.1 
Pakistan 0.5 
Sri Lanka 1.1 
Taiwan 0.4 
Malaysia 0.5 
Syria 0.2 
Hong Kong & Macao 0.3 
Iraq 0.3 
Thailand 0.2 
Bangladesh 0.2 
Iran 0.0 
( • = 1 million R . C ; 0 = 1 million O.C.) 
O.C. Millions 10 20 30 40 
72.9 
7.6 
15.3 
13.1 
14.4 
10.3 
0.2 
3.1 
0.5 
1.6 
0.7 
1.0 
0.2 
0.9 
0.4 
0.6 
0.5 
0.2 
0.3 
0.2 
0.3 
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Note 1: Figures rounded to nearest 100,000 
Note 2: R.C. figures represent •'affiliated" in WCE 
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Singapore 
North Korea 
Turkey 
Jordan 
Saudi Arabia 
Gulf States 
Israel 
Laos 
0.1 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.2 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
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APPENDIX 6 
RELATIVE 
INSTITUTIONALIZATION 
OF CATHOLICISM IN 
ASIAN NATIONS 
13 Asian Territories in Order of Catholic Population (• = .5 million) 
1. Philippines •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
***************************** 
2. India • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
3. Indonesia • • • • • • • • 
4. China (1949) • • • • • • 
5. Vietnam • • • • • • 
6. Korea • • 
7. Sri Lanka • • 
8. Pakistan • 
9. Japan * 
10. Burma • 
11. Malaysia * 
12. Taiwan * 
13. Hong Kong * 
13 Asian Territories In Order of Catholic Pastoral Personnel ( • = 1,000) 
1. India • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
• • • • • • 
2. Philippines • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
3. Japan • • • • • • • • • 
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4. Indonesia ••••••• 
5. South Korea ••••• 
6. Sri Lanka ••• 
7. Taiwan •• 
8. Thalland •• 
9. Hong Kong Φ 
10. Malaysia • 
11. Burma • 
12. Pakistan • 
13. Bangladesh • 
14 Asian Territories in Order of No. of Pastoral Personnel per 1,000 Catholics (•• -1) 
1. Japan ••••«•«••«••«••••«••«••••••••«••••••••••«•«••• 
2. Thailand •••••••••••••••••• 
3. India •••••••••••• 
4. Taiwan •••••••••••• 
5. South Korea •••••••• 
6. Hong Kong •••••••• 
7. Singapore •••••••• 
8. Bangladesh •••••• 
9. Sri Lanka •••••• 
10. Burma ••••• 
11. Malaysia ••••• 
12. Pakistan •••• 
13. Indonesia ••• 
14. Philippines • 
SOURCES FOR APPENDIXES 4, 5, 6. For comparability of data all 
figures except those for Appendix 7 have been cited from the World Chris­
tian Encyclopedia, though its data will undoubtedly need revision even-
182 APPENDIX 6 
tually in one particular or another. It will take at least another couple of 
decades to make a balanced overall assessment of this prodigious compila-
tion, but as a whole it is already set to be a benchmark of global Christian 
statistics for the rest of this century. Some of the more important glosses 
that need to be made right away are the following: 
1. Preliminary reports on the July 1982 census of China announced a 
figure of 1,008 million for the total PRC population. This would mean that 
the WCE figure for mid-1980 is too low by about 120 million. This would 
make a significant difference in percentages and other comparisons at the 
Asian level. 
2. The WCE figure for Christians in China in 1980 (1.8 million) might 
have seemed optimistic in that year, but would be considered too low by 
1982. By then, even usually sober sources spoke in terms of up to 10 million 
Christians in the People's Republic, and one formidably equipped evangeli-
cal monitoring center claimed up to 50 million. Any revision on that scale 
would of course transform the related Asian figures for Christian statistics 
even more than the general Asian population picture would be transformed 
by the (still provisional) Chinese census figures. 
3. Final results of the February 1981 census of India reported a popula-
tion of 685 million. This implies a WCE overcount for mid-1980 of at least 
25 million. 
4. The WCE figure for Christians in India (27 million) is higher by a good 
10 million, and for Christians in S. Korea (11 million) is higher by a good 5 
million, than the figures conventionally received. The WCE figure for the 
total Christian population of Asia in the old geographical sense (in UN 
terms, East Asia plus South Asia plus Soviet Asia) is higher by 25 million 
than the figure previously arrived at as the best supported for the purposes 
of this study. Some of the reasons for this upward revision are elucidated in 
the WCE section on methodology. 
5. In the case of Soviet Asia, (a) general population figures have been 
taken from early 1980s editions of Asia Yearbook oí PEER, (b) figures for 
Christians are compiled from WCE breakdowns for Asian jurisdiction of 
the Orthodox Church, with some extrapolations for other denominations. 
6. In text and appendixes, percentage calculations are made on the basis 
of WCE figures for 1980: 4,374 million for the world population, 2,750 
million (a compiled figure) for the Asian population, 1,433 million for 
Christians in the world, and 142 million for Christians in Asia. 
7. For Appendix 6 the WCE figures would not claim to be as up-to-date 
or as precisely related to a single year as those available from the early 1980s 
editions of Annuario Pontificio (Vatican), l'Asie en chiffres (Paris), or the 
Catholic Almanac (Huntington, Indiana). 
8. See also, in list of sources below, Bilan du Monde, Hoke, Secretaria 
Status, World Christianity. 
APPENDIX 7 
THE NOTION OF 
TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS 
The "transnational dimension" has been a recurring theme in these 
pages. In academic writing on international relations this phenomenon is 
generally considered to have been neglected in the past, and to have been 
coming into its own only during the 1970s, the same decade that saw the rise 
of Asian Christian social protest. 
The mental block that excluded transnational thinking was the literal 
understanding of international relations as meaning essentially relations 
between nation states. Since their rise around the fifteenth century, and 
especially since their consolidation around the eighteenth, nation states 
have dominated the field of relations within the human community to the 
point of making the latter look, in the analogy of Wolfers, like a billiard 
table on which states are the billiard balls. It has taken a vast twentieth-
century proliferation of nongovernmental movements and organizations 
crossing state boundaries to make the billiard table image fade in favor of a 
cobweb image more applicable to the world of today, and for that matter to 
world history as a whole. 
Theory is still slow to catch up with this reality. Superpower strategic 
thinking, NATO-style analyses of power relations, help to keep the state-
centric stereotypes alive. Even in the study of international relations as an 
academic discipline the stereotypes die hard. As recently as 1964, a survey 
of the role of theory in international relations distinguished phases and 
emphases—the diplomatic history phase, the current events emphasis, the 
phase of emphasis on law and organization, and the then most recent trend 
of realism in regard to power politics—without at all adverting to any need 
for a shift of emphasis from international to transnational thinking. Even 
as recently as 1970, Keohane and Nye could still note that "a state-centric 
view of world affairs prevails.'" Though their assault on this way of think-
ing was described in 1973 as "path-breaking," a further assault was found 
needed by Mansbach and others in 1976.2 
The debate is not over, but it has not left the field unchanged. In 1968 it 
was already observed in The International Encyclopedia of the Social 
Sciences that "the tendency to reify nations is diminishing."3 In 1973 Hun-
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tingdon claimed that "today man's capacities are outrunning the nation-
state system."4 In 1976 Mansbach et al. spoke of "the growing irrelevance 
of the state-centric model."5 In 1977 Berman and Johnson described "in-
ternational society" as becoming "increasingly a transnational society."6 
We have been examining the rise of Asian Christian social protest in the 
context of this rise of "transnational society." We have seen something of 
how it contributes to diminishing the tendency to "reify nations." We have 
had a chance to observe the extent to which it shows, in one geographic area 
of one transnational enterprise, that "man's capacity for organization is 
outrunning the nation-state system." 
Huntingdon, the author of the latter contention, explicitly adverts to the 
Marxian analogy—"as capitalist forces outran feudal relations." In doing 
so he is touching on another limitation needing to be transcended in think-
ing about international relations. For all the cross-fertilization that has 
taken place in that thinking, it might as well be described as two mono-
logues, one in the East and one in the West. Hence the importance of "in-
cluding Marx as a 'silent p a r t n e r ' . . . in the unspoken East-West dia-
logue," all the while bearing in mind that "it is with the non-silent partners 
that the last word rests."7 
At bottom, anything answering the description of a "transnational para-
digm" is no more than the recognition that governments and government 
agencies, while remaining the most formidable figures on the international 
stage, by no means have that stage to themselves. The mere advertence to 
that fact is a "paradigm shift" of some importance by itself. Consciously or 
unconsciously, we are all dependent on paradigms, and it is precisely those 
"practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intel-
lectual influences," that are usually "unconscious captives of paradigms 
created by 'some academic scribbler of a few years back.' ' " 
In the case of the "path-breaking'' paradigm of Keohane and Nye, it is 
claimed that "the state-centric paradigm covers only four of the thirty-six 
possible types of politically important interactions across state boundaries 
that are identified by the world politics paradigm."9 What this is in effect 
saying is that the number of "possible types of politically important inter-
actions across state boundaries" equals the square of the number of signifi-
cant actors that can be distinguished by the test of relative freedom from 
state control. Since every actor can potentially impinge on every other, this 
makes for a much more "complex conglomerate model" than the state-
centric one. 
In this unlimited multiplicity of interstate and transnational relations, 
those relations for which the churches are responsible are actually among 
the oldest. Churches have always been transnational actors, precisely in the 
measure that they have remained true to their universalist aspirations, refus-
ing to be reduced to subunits of states. As far as that goes, what has been 
happening in Asian churches has ample precedent in Christian history, and 
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there is a novelty only in the degree to which it has been happening. The 
more important novelty lies in the extent to which Christian transnational-
ism is now resisting its cooption by the prevailing power structure in 
transnational society. 
1. Harrison, pp. 3ff. 
2. Keohane and Nye, p. 9. 
3. lESS.vol. 8 (1968), p. 66. 
4. Huntingdon, p. 368. 
5. Mansbach, chapter 2. 
6. Berman and Johnson, p. 263. 
7. Kubalkova and Cruikshank, pp. xii, xv, xvi. 
8. Keohane and Nye, pp. 379ff. 
9. Ibid., pp. 38Iff. 

NOTES 
Introduction: The Problem 
1. From the "Message" of the First Asian Bishops' Conference, held in Manila 
in November 1970. Text in Teaching All Nations, 1971, no. 1:21. 
2. From the report from the section "Justice and Service" in the Sixth Assembly 
of the CCA (Penang, 1977). Text in CCA News (1977): 108. 
3. From the "Final Statement of the First Asian Theologians' Conference" 
sponsored by the EATWOT (Wennappuwa, 1979). Text in Virginia Fabella, ed. 
Asia's Struggle for Full Humanity, p. 158, and Document Reprint Service, 1979, no. 
4:8. 
4. See Appendix 7 on the notion transnational. 
Chapter 1: The Global Background 
1. The first recorded slave war took place in Sicily in 138-32 B.C. Even here the 
information is what one would expect from victors recalling the vanquished. 
2. The variety of "historical routes from the pre-industrial to the modern 
world" is put in unusually broad perspective by Barrington Moore, Social Origins of 
Dictatorship and Democracy. 
3. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité 
parmi les hommes, p. 66. 
4. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, pp. 79, 
120f. 
5. On the power of the people, notice the Chinese Constitution of 1982 ("All 
power belongs to the people"); the Indian Constitution of 1950 ("The people of 
India solemnly resolve . . . " ) ; the Soviet Constitution of 1977 ("All power is vested 
in the people"); and the American Constitution of 1787 ("We the people of the 
United States . . . " ) . These purport to speak for the four largest national popula-
tions, including about half the world's people. Such is the theory. For one view of 
the reality see Peter Berger, Pyramids of Sacrifice. 
6. Almost half the world's population, including China, India-Pakistan, and 
Indonesia, achieved or recovered full political self-determination in the decade 
1946-55 alone. 
7. See text, p. 124, for the best-accepted estimate of the inequality in the 1970s. 
8. The denunciation was explicit and repeated in Robert McNamara's presidency 
of the World Bank during the 1970s. During the Clausen presidency (from 1980) a 
change of tone was widely noticed, but see the International Herald Tribune, April 
17-18,1982, for renewed emphasis on the Bank's critical role vis-à-vis its dominant 
member, the United States. 
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9. The Economist, 19 August 1978, pp. 64-66. 
10. The financial elite of the North found their most-noticed forum of the 1970s 
in the Trilateral Commission, with members from the United States, Western 
Europe, and Japan. The Commission showed itself on the one hand to be no friend 
of unrestricted democracy, and on the other hand to be not entirely comfortable as 
the bedfellow of the cruder military regimes. 
11. See, for example, two books originally published in German in the same year 
(1968): Joachim Kahl, The Misery of Christianity, and Viteslav Gardavsky, God Is 
Not Yet Dead. 
12. In fact, despite Gal. 3:28 and Col. 3:11, "Christian" justifications of slavery 
still appeared as late as the nineteenth century. 
13. For the nuances implied in that "more or less," see Robert M. Grant, Early 
Christianity and Society. 
14. For the "original fervor," see Acts 2:44-46,4:32-37. For the texts of Gratian, 
and for the Church as a landlord, see R. H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capi-
talism, pp. 45, 69ff. 
15. Where Gratian sees no place for profits from trading, and where Saint 
Thomas sees a place only for the wages of the trader's labor, Saint Antonino finds 
room for other sources of value besides labor and materials (Tawney, pp. 47,48, 
53). 
16. It was not altogether facetious on Tawney's part to write (p. 48): "The true 
descendant of the doctrines of Aquinas is the labor theory of value. The last of the 
Schoolmen was Karl Marx." 
17. To see how far this "rereading" can go, consult José Porfirio Miranda, Marx 
and the Bible and Marx against the Marxists. 
18. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, p. 183. 
19. For documentation on Medellin and after, see IDOC International, The 
Church at the Crossroads. 
20. Walter M. Abbott, ed., The Documents of Vatican II, pp. 199f. 
21. Joseph Gremillion, ed., The Gospel of Peace and Justice, p. 514. 
22. "Although it is not yet widely recognized, the military establishments and the 
Catholic Church are also among today's forces for social and political change in the 
other American republics. This is a new role for them. For since the arrival of the 
conquistadores more than 400 years ago, the history of the military and the Catholic 
Church, working hand in hand with the landowners to provide 'stability,' has been a 
legend in the Americas" (Keesing's Contemporary Archives [1969]: 23714). 
Rockefeller's bracketing of the military with the Church as a force for social 
change was presumably influenced by the case of the left-wing military regime and 
program that took over Peru in 1968. A decade later it could safely be said that these 
words of 1969 had proved more broadly prophetic about the Church than about the 
military. The full text of The Rockefeller Report on the Americas with an introduc-
tion by Tad Szulc of the New York Times was published by Quadrangle Books 
(Chicago, 1969). 
23. Tawney, p. 280. 
Chapter 2: The Asian Background 
1. Transcending Eurocentricity is still unfinished business for historians, with 
isolated exceptions like Arnold Toynbee, and for historical atlases, with no real 
exception before The Times Atlas of World History. 
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2. It has been noted in connection with the original limits-to-growth thesis (see 
Donella Meadows, et al., The Limits to Growth) that "geographic limitations have 
not played an important role in any of the collapse models described" (H.S.D. Cole, 
et al., Thinking about the Future, p. 25). It is also argued (pp. 119-22) that a "dual-
world model" (i.e., one that takes account of the developed/underdeveloped divi-
sion) would give very different results at least in the medium term. In short, even if 
some basic validity is attributed to the limits thesis, Asia can be seen as the last conti-
nent for which it is relevant. For a chart of energy consumption in 35 countries, see 
H.S.D. Cole, et al., Thinking about the Future, p. 93. 
3. Among the continents, only Europe has a larger proportion of arable land 
than Asia, but only Asia-outside-the-Soviet Union has less than half its land under 
cultivation, pasture, and forest combined (Oxford Economic Atlas of the World, p. 
6). 
4. Gunnar Myrdal adverts to the parallel at the outset of Asian Drama (vol. 1, p. 
x), as well as in its subtitle, An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations. Note that the 
4
 'Asian drama' ' of which he speaks is more precisely a drama of South and South-
east Asia. 
5. For whatever can be said in favor of the thesis that the rich are still the best 
hope of the poor, The Economist may be as good a continuing source as can be 
found. 
6. On the current economic reality of Asia, the range of difference in interpreta-
tion and emphasis even among specialists was reflected in editions of the 1970s in the 
leading yearbooks for Asia, The Far Eastern Economic Review Yearbook and 
Europa's The Far East and A ustralasia. 
7. Note the titles of two basic books, each concerned with one of the main pe-
riods in question: Laurence E. Browne, The Eclipse of Christianity in Asia and 
K. M. Panikkar, Asia and Western Dominance. 
8. See note on sources for Appendixes 4, 5, 6. 
Chapter 3: The Colonial Antecedents 
1. For detailed estimates of the Christian percentage of Asian ethnic groups, see 
Donald Hoke, ed., The Church in Asia, pp. 693-97, and David B. Barrett, ed., 
World Christian Encyclopedia, p. 10. Vietnam is an exception in that Catholics 
there belong to the majority ethnic group rather than to the minorities. 
2. The rural percentage of Christians emerges as less than 30 percent of the pop-
ulation in the scattered areas where large-scale statistics exist on this point. See 
William Biernatzki, et al., Korean Catholicism in the 1970s, p. 174, for Catholics in 
Korea; Francis Xavier Bell, The Catholic Church in Thailand, vol. 7, p. 4, for 
Catholics in Thailand; François Houtart, Religion and Ideology in Sri Lanka, p. 
369, for Christians in Sri Lanka. For the larger picture see Barrett. 
3. Such at least is the thesis of Palmer. See especially Spencer Palmer, Korea and 
Christianity, p. 110, note 11, for religious affiliation of Korean political leaders 
during 1952-62: Protestant 32.5 percent, Confucian 17.5 percent, Buddhist 13.3 
percent, Catholic 8.5 percent. 
4. CELAM (Consejo Episcopal Latinoamericano) was founded in Rio de Ja-
neiro in 1955. 
5. Karl Marx, Kritik des Hegeischen Staatsrechts, cited in Т. В. Bottomore and 
M. Rubel, eds., Karl Marx, pp. 41f. 
6. See François Houtart, Religion et modes de production précapitalistes. 
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7. Ibid., p. 135 and chapter 7. 
8. See Jerrold Schecter, The New Face of Buddha. 
9. See Holmes Welch, The Buddhist Revival in China and Buddhism under Mao. 
10. Maxime Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism, p. 218. 
11. Ibid., p. 157. 
12. Cited in Kosuke Koyama, Waterbuffalo Theology, p. 47. 
13. Parig Digan, "Friars on Trial," pp. 47,48, 32, citing Emma Helen Blair and 
James A. Robertson, eds., The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898, vol. 52, pp. 259-61, 
236-39. 
14. See Ivan Illich, Deschooling Society and Limits to Medicine. 
15. David Moberg, The Great Reversal, esp. p. 30. 
16. Spencer Palmer, Korea and Christianity, esp. p. 95. 
17. Robert J. Miller, ed., Religious Ferment in Asia, pp. 22-36. 
18. Donald W. Treadgold, The West in Russia and China, vol. 2, chapter 2. 
19. Ibid., chapters. 
20. I. Scheiner, Christian Converts and Social Protest in Meiji Japan, p. 8; Parig 
Digan, "Christian Socialism in Japan," p. 445. 
21. G. O. Totten, The Social Democratic Movement in Prewar Japan, p. 120. 
Chapter 4: The Post-Colonial Setting 
1. Informations catholiques internationales, 1 Oct. 1962; Bilan du Monde 1:31. 
2. Floyd Anderson, ed., Council Daybook, vol. 1, p. 24. 
3. For most countries (France would be an exception) the theme "church and 
society" found an important place in religious information only after the opening of 
Vatican II. 
4. Harry Haas, Informations catholiques internationales, 15 July 1961;reflec-
tions of a chaplain to Asian youth. 
5. D. S. Amalorpavadass, Informations catholiques internationales, 1 Dec. 
1964, citing an Indian Protestant bishop. 
6. Joseph Vadakkan, A Priest's Encounter with Revolution, p. 89; Informations 
catholiques internationales, 15 Nov. 1961, Aug. 1965. 
7. This formulation appears in a SELA information leaflet. 
8. Banished from the Philippines for his social involvement in the 1940s, Hogan 
became in 1961 the first executive secretary of SELA. Silenced by his bishop in 1965, 
Vadakkan was unilaterally restored to good standing in 1977. 
9. PISA is given 2 column inches in Informations catholiques internationales, 15 
Sept. 1965. 
10. The author was one of this first set. 
11. Events in outline in Informations catholiques internationales: 15 Sep. 1965; 15 
Feb., 1 Mar., 1 Apr., 15 Apr., 1 May, 15 May 1968; Aug., 1 Nov. 1969; 1 Apr., 1 
Sep., 1 Nov., 1 Dec , 15 Dec. 1970. Text of message and resolutions of Asian 
bishops in Teaching All Nations, 1971, no. 1:15-31. 
12. FABCPapers 13:24, note 10. 
13. Joseph Gremillion, The Gospel of Peace and Justice, p. 597. 
14. Federation of Asian Bishops' Conferences, His Gospel to Our Peoples, vol. 3, 
pp. 160-66. The speech is given in Latin and English, the latter being notably 
weaker. We have followed the original Latin. 
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15. Informations catholiques internationales (Nov. 1977):49. 
16. Document Reprint Service (Aug. 1980): 11. 
17. Kim to author, Dec. 1979, personal testimony. 
18. Federation of Asian Bishops' Conferences, Evangelization in Modern Day 
Asia, p. 35; His Gospel, vol. 2, p. 341; FABCPapers 13:25. 
19. Federation of Asian Bishops' Conferences, Evangelization, p. 24; His Gospel, 
vol. 2, p. 334. 
20. FABC Papers 13:18. 
21. Against the background of such criticism, the final statement of 1978 is at 
pains to stress the continuity of the topics of 1970,1974, and 1978. Ibid., p. 13. 
22. W. Roetenberg, "The Asian Bishops' Office for Human Development," 
Sunday Examiner, 3 March 1972; "The Challenge of the Office for Human Devel-
opment," Impact, Oct. and Nov. 1972. The quote is from p. 352 in the October 
issue. 
23. Parig Digan, "Asia Journey," 1980, p. 11. 
24. Info on Human Development, Aug. 1976. 
25. Ibid., Jan. 1977, March 1977. 
26. Ibid., June 1979. 
27. Catholic Bishops' Conference of India, Report of the General Meeting, pp. 
30,31. 
28. Digan, "Asia Journey," 1980, p. 11. 
29. Christian Conference of Asia: Sixth Assembly, p. 39. 
30. Ibid., pp. 70, 68. A resolution to raise 25 percent of the administrative budget 
"from the region" (p. 11) would require "at least double" its "present contribu-
tion" (p. 68). In fact, according to the minutes of the 1981 Assembly, "churches in 
Asia were only contributing 8.24 percent of the administrative budget of the CCA" 
(CCA· Seventh Assembly, p. 7). 
31. T. K. Thomas, ed.. Testimony amid Asian Suffering, pp. 41f. 
32. CC4 News, 15 Aug. 1974. 
33. Ibid. (Jan. 1980): 10; (July 1980): 3, 8. 
34. Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1968): 23012. 
35. Informations catholiques internationales (\ Jan. 1976): 6; CCA News, Dec. 
1975. 
36. CCA News, 15 Jan. 1973. 
37. Ibid., 15 June 1973. 
38. Ibid., 15 Oct. 1974. 
39. Ibid. (Dec. 1975): 2. 
40. Ibid., p. 9. 
41. Ibid., p. 3. 
42. Federation of Asian Bishops' Conferences, His Gospel, vol. 2, p. 269. 
43. CCA News, Feb. 1976, editorial. 
44. Ibid., Jan. 1976, editorial. 
45. See Yap Kim Hao, ed., Asian Theological Reflections on Suffering and Hope. 
46. Christian Conference of Asia: Sixth Assembly, p. 37. 
47. Ibid., pp. 29, 31,39,29. 
48. Ibid., pp. 17,9, 11,116,108. 
49. Ibid., p. 116. More on this later. 
50. CC4 News (Nov. 1977): 1. 
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Chapter 5: The Transnational Avant-Garde 
1. Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama, vol. 2, p. 796. 
2. Ibid., p. 798. 
3. Cited by Ho Kwon Ping, "Bad News for Asia's Poor," Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 15 Sep. 1978. Reprinted in Info on Human Development, Oct. 1978. 
4. Christian Conference of Asia: Sixth Assembly, pp. 83, 79. 
5. See Y. Kim, "Christian Koinonia in the Struggle and Aspirations of the Peo­
ple of Korea," in Yap Kim Hao, ed., Asian Theological Reflections, pp. 37-48, esp. 
pp. 39 and 46. See also John С England, ed., Living Theology in Asia, pp. 25-31. 
6. Parig Digan, "Asia Journey," 1979, p. 9. 
7. See, for example, M. M. Thomas, Revolution in India and Christian Hu­
manism, esp. p. 12. 
8. Digan, "Asia Journey," 1980, p. 25; Mil Roekaerts, Christians and the Emer­
gency in India, p. 30. 
9. Yap, p. 77; Sarai К. Chatterji, ed., The Meaning of the Indian Experience, 
pp. 79f. 
10. Letter from the General Secretary of the NCCI to the CCA and the WCC, in 
M. M. Thomas, ed.. Christians and the Emergency, pp. 39-40. 
11. See Chapter 7, note 30. 
12. WSCF-IMCS, The Struggle for Self-Reliance in Asia Today, p. 20. 
13. Ibid., p. 65. 
14. Ibid., p. 4. 
15. Ibid., pp. 21,24, 100, 122, 123,6. 
16. On communism see positions taken by BISA IV (Info on Human Develop­
ment [Mar. 1978]: 5), and by the CCA (CCA: Sixth Assembly, p. 96). 
17. WSCF-IMCS, pp. 20ff.; Digan, "Asia Journey," 1979, p. 13. 
18. Parig Digan, Indonesia, pp. 18-19. 
19. WSCF-IMCS, p. 86. 
20. Digan, "Asia Journey," 1979, p. 14; "Asia Journey," 1980, p. 4. 
21. Digan, "Asia Journey," 1980, pp. 5,14, 24. 
22. Info on Human Development (Nov. 1980): 10. 
23. Ibid., 1 Jan. 1975, 1 Aug. 1975; ACFOD Co/isMuf/on, p. 1. 
24. Document Reprint Service 79/04: 3, 6, 7, 8; Virginia Fabella, ed., Asia's 
Struggle for a Full Humanity. 
25. Info on Human Development (IHD) (Jan. 1980): 7-8. 
26. Informations catholiques internationales (Apr. 1980): 36-38. For New Delhi 
sequel see ICI (Oct. 1981): 21-23. 
27. Digan, "Asia Journey," 1980, pp. 5-6. The ideas were expressed to the 
author by de la Torre in an interview in prison in 1980. The formulation is the 
author's own. 
28. Parig Digan and Jonas Johnson, eds., Christianity and the New China, vol. 2, 
pp. 94-101; Edicio de la Torre, ed., Pintíg; IHD (June 1980): 20-22, and supple-
ment (OHD Papers 5). 
29. IHD (Jan. 1981): 13. 
30. John С England, "Kim Chi Ha and the Poetry of Christian Dissent," p. 137. 
31. Digan, "Asia Journey," 1980, pp. lOf. 
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Chapter 6: The Underlying Local Contexts 
1. LWF-IL, Mar. 1981, no. 32:4. 
2. Parig Digan, The Christian China-watchers, pp. 47-49. 
3. Digan, "Christian Socialism in Japan," p. 452. 
4. Digan, "Asia Journey,·* 1980, p. 14. 
5. Ibid., p. 14f. 
6. That is, if one accepts official figures and those current among Christian 
Filipinos. Moro spokespersons, however, claim a Muslim population of 5.5 million 
in the southern Philippine islands, which would make them over 10 percent of the 
population of the archipelago and a majority in what they regard as their national 
Bangsa Moro territory. See Permanent Peoples' Tribunal, Philippines: Repression 
and Resistance, p. 271. 
7. In Sri Lanka an insurrection of radical youth was suppressed in 1971, but 
parliamentary radicalism was not silenced. Among Christians in Sri Lanka, an 
Anglican bishop and a Catholic bishop have been among Asia's few self-proclaimed 
socialist church leaders. The country has provided more than its Asian share of 
radical Christian intellectuals. Thailand, for its part, provided the OHD with its 
second head, Bishop Bunleuen, and with a notable national social action office, the 
Catholic Council of Thailand for Development. Both have had to bear the lash of 
anticommunism; and this unseated a secretary of the Church of Christ in Thailand, 
who had also headed a Coordinating Group for Religion in Society. In Singapore 
there has been only isolated grassroots criticism of the Lee Kuan Yew government, 
notably in connection with the sterilization controversy of 1976, while the official 
Catholic Church compromised its position to save its schools. For the main confron­
tation experience in Hong Kong (in 1978) see Chapter 7, note 30. 
8. For a summary see Far Eastern Economic Review Asia Yearbook, 1977, p. 
184. 
9. For one gauge of the state of Catholic-Communist dialogue in Vietnam at the 
end of the 1970s, see Echange France Asie, Dossier 72, Feb. 1982, both for a secret 
Party document it publishes on how to deal with the Catholic Church, and for the 
interpretation by its Paris clerical editors. On both sides it is clear how little five 
years of a "new" relationship could do to overcome a century of mortal enmity 
between Communist and Catholic worldviews. 
10. The Presbyterian position, the root cause of its General Secretary's incarcera­
tion, was spelled out in a Statement (1971), an Appeal (1975), and a Declaration on 
Human Rights (1977) urging measures to make Taiwan " a new and independent 
country." 
11. The South African comparison was made to the author in an interview of Dec. 
1979. Digan, Asia Journey, 1979, pp. 12-13. 
12. T. K. Thomas, ed., Christianity in Asia, pp. 91-93. 
13. Digan, "Asia Journey," 1980, p. 10. 
14. See p. 39. 
15. Quoted in National Catholic Reporter (20 March 1981): 14. 
16. Sarai К. Chatterji, ed., The Meaning of the Indian Experience, p. 84. 
17. For analysis along "mode of production" lines, see any of the works of 
François Houtart. 
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18. See esp. Association of Major Religious Superiors, Ichthys. 
19. Robert Youngblood, "Structural Imperialism and the Catholic Bishops' 
Conference of the Philippines," pp. 21-22. 
20. Far Eastern Economic Review (21 Aug. 1981): 17-24. 
21. Jaime Cardinal Sin, Exhortation against Violence, p. 5. 
22. See Felix Casalmo, The Vision of a New Society. 
23. Permanent Peoples' Tribunal, p. 274. 
24. Digan, "Asia Journey", 1980, pp. 5,9. 
25. Ibid., pp. 2-9. 
26. The question of communist infiltration and manipulation has periodically 
convulsed church bodies in sensitive positions, such as the NASSA and the MSPC. 
The 1982 convulsions of the MSPC are touched on in the Conclusion of this study. 
27. Youngblood, esp. pp. 2,14, 18. 
28. Revealing in this connection are the minutes (available from AMRS) of a 
meeting on 10 May 1975 between members of AMRS and the nuncio. 
Chapter 7: An Overall Transnational Perspective 
1. Joseph Gremillion, ed.. The Gospel of Peace and Justice, p. 388; Keesing's 
Contemporary Archives (KCA) (1976): 27563. 
2. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, 1848, 
pp. 82,83,85. 
3. Ibid. p. 92. 
4. Ibid., p. 42. 
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6. KCA (1974): 26548. 
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THEBES 
There is no such thing as a challenge to belief that is 
answerable in words alone. given the centrality of the 
test of practice in a guide -for living — be that guide 
Buddhism or Marxism or Christianity. 
Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche can be considered as modern 
contributors to the ci« négatif« in theology. 
Given the particularity of actual Christian cultural expe-
rience, Christianity is best considered not as a universal 
to be particularized but as a particular to be 
universalized by successive particular!zations, 
Given that non-Christians are mostly alienated more by 
Christians than by Christ, Christian apologetics should 
make the sharpest possible distinction between what can be 
claimed in favour of Christians and what can be claimed in 
favour of Christ. 
The psychology of Karl Jung and the sociology 'of Karl 
Mannheim can be used as clues to the understanding of the 
Bool; of Revelation. 
There is a definite interdependence between better Chris-
tian understanding of China and better self-understanding 
of the Church. 
In the process of investigating the historical roles of 
the Christian churches, it is necessary to suspend 
judgment on their theological claims. 
In effect if not in intention, Marxism has contributed to 
the reawakening of the original resources of social 
conscience in the Judaeo—Christian tradition. 
To be committed to change in church and society is to be 
committed to resisting the ecclesiastical tendency towards 
concentration of power. 
In social history, attempts to dam the undammable can 
become the most far-reaching forces of change. 
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